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Executive remuneration around the world has risen exponentially and grabbed the 
attention of the public, academia, policy makers and regulators. This thesis focuses on 
family companies in view of their pervasiveness and significant economic contribution 
to a country. The objectives of this study are to investigate the extent of executive 
remuneration and its determinants in Malaysian listed family companies. By 
employing agency theory as the theoretical framework, this research examines the 
influence of family participation on board, corporate governance mechanisms and 
institutional ownership on executive remuneration.  
 
The sample of this study comprises a total of 279 companies listed on the Main Board 
of Bursa Malaysia that fulfilled the selection criteria. The five-year study period from 
2010 to 2014 provides a total of 1,395 firm-year observations and allows the 
assessment of the influence of the revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(MCCG) 2012 on executive remuneration. Multiple regression model is employed to 
examine the association between explanatory variables and executive remuneration. 
Random effects estimation is used for the panel analysis of the five-year longitudinal 
data. 
 
This study reports that the executive remuneration of Malaysian listed family 
companies increases significantly from 2010 to 2014 although the corporate 
governance landscape has been further enhanced in 2012. The multiple regression 
results show that there is a statistically significant and positive association between the 
CEO-chairman role duality and executive remuneration. Independent non-executive 
directors exert a significant negative influence on executive remuneration. Tenure of 
independent non-executive directors, remuneration committee, and institutional 
ownership do not have any influence on executive remuneration. Although both family 
CEOs and family directors are not statistically significant, family ownership shows a 
statistically significant and positive association with executive remuneration. 
Executive remuneration is statistically significant and positively associated with the 
board size, firm size, lagged firm performance and growth opportunities; and 




The findings reveal that the board of directors and institutional investors suggested by 
the agency theory advocates could not effectively govern the executive remuneration 
and ameliorate the Type II agency conflict in Malaysian family companies. This study 
documents that family CEO exacerbates the Type II agency conflict while non-family 
CEO mitigates it. The results from this study have wide-ranging implications for 
Malaysian policy makers and regulators in assessing and implementing a sound 
corporate governance framework to mitigate the possible expropriation of minority 
shareholders by the controlling shareholders in family companies. The longitudinal 
analysis of executive remuneration in this thesis should allow a better assessment of 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Background and Motivation of the Study 
Executive remuneration is a controversial issue and has attracted widespread attention 
from the general public, academia, practitioners, regulators, institutional investors, and 
media (Barontini and Bozzi 2011; Croci, Gonenc and Ozkan 2012; McCahery, Sautner 
and Starks 2016). Most of the studies focus on CEO pay1 and are conducted in the 
context of developed countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom 
(Finkelstein and Boyd 1998; Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri 2003; 
Fahlenbrach 2009; Zorn et al. 2017). The onset of the 2008 global financial crisis 
brings executive remuneration further into the social limelight. Apart from the CEO 
pay, directors’ remuneration has started to receive attention from academia and media 
in the 2000s (Brick, Palmon and Wald 2006; Basu et al. 2007; Abdul-Wahab and 
Abdul-Rahman 2009; Dah and Frye 2017).  
 
In a seminal study, Jensen and Murphy (1990) put forward that an optimal 
remuneration contract could align the interests of executive directors and shareholders 
and mitigate the classical principal-agent problem of a company. The remuneration 
packages should be aligned with the long-term business objectives and commensurate 
with directors’ responsibilities and expertise. However, it is ironic to find out that the 
main culprits behind several corporate scandals and collapses are the board chairman, 
CEO and executive directors, and these companies include big names such as Enron, 
WorldCom, and Lehman Brothers. Take Enron’s scandal as an example, prior to its 
bankruptcy in 2002, the total directors’ remuneration in 2001 is USD380,619 and ranks 
the seventh highest remuneration payout in the United States (Abelson 2001). The 
2008 global financial crisis precipitated by the excessive risk-taking and pay motives 
of the top executives of major financial institutions (Erkens, Hung and Matos 2012; 
DeYoung, Peng and Yan 2013) further pinpoints the ineffectiveness of remuneration 
packages in aligning the interests of executive directors and shareholders.  
 
                                                 
1 CEO is just one of the executive directors. The examination of the overall remuneration of executive 
directors is largely ignored in the literature. 
2 
 
The criticism on executive remuneration is fuelled by the escalating pay scales of top 
executives over the years. In the United Kingdom, Li and Young (2016) report that the 
wage packages of FTSE 350’s chief executives rise by 82% over 13 years, but there is 
a negligible link between the pay and fundamental value generation for the investors. 
Besides, about two-thirds of FTSE 100’s CEOs are paid more than 100 times the 
average salary in the country (The Equality Trust 2017). In the United States, the 
remuneration of CEOs grow faster than that of the highly paid employees over the last 
three decades; the CEO-to-employee remuneration ratio is 20-to-1 in 1965, peaks at 
376-to-1 in 2000 and is 303-to-1 in 2014 (Mishel and Davis 2015). Dah and Frye 
(2017), by using the data from ExecuComp database, report that the directors are over-
remunerated; and the overpaid directors are associated with the reduced pay-for-
performance sensitivity. They argue that excessive remuneration is a sign of board 
entrenchment in the US companies. 
 
Similar scenarios are observed in the developing countries. For instance, in India, there 
is a massive pay gap between the top executives and employees. The remuneration 
packages of top executives are approximately 1,200 times of their employees’ salaries 
in the companies (The Economic Times 2017). In South Africa, Deloitte (2017) finds 
out that the CEOs of the top 100 JSE companies are paid about 500 times more than 
what the ordinary employees earned, and the remuneration of these CEOs 
underperform shareholders’ value. 
 
In the Malaysian context, the average remuneration per executive director has been on 
the rise in recent years: RM1,1164,727 in 2013; RM1,347,649 in 2014; and 
RM1,539,000 in 2015 (Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 2015, 2014b, 2013b). 
There is a significant disconnection between the director remuneration and firm 
performance (Immanuel 2015; Focus Malaysia 2014; Abdullah 2006). In addition, the 
pay disparity between the executive directors and ordinary employees is huge. For 
instance, in 2015, the average remuneration per executive director is RM1,539,000 
(Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 2015), while the average salary of ordinary 
employee is RM27,744 (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2015). Furthermore, the 
remuneration packages of the CEOs from some family companies are substantially 
higher than the average director remuneration. For instance, in 2013, the board 
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chairman cum CEO of Genting Berhad receives around RM136 million and the 
chairman of IOI Corporation Berhad is paid approximately RM52 million (News 
Straight Times 2014). The remuneration package of the former is more than 4000 times 
of the national income per capita of RM33,010 (Economic Planning Unit 2013), while 
the latter is about 1575 times.  
 
Overall, several corporate scandals and collapses, the outbreak of 2008 global financial 
crisis, and the insignificant association between executive remuneration and firm 
performance highlight the failure of remuneration contract as a governance mechanism 
to align the interests of executive directors and shareholders. Besides, the escalating 
executive remuneration over the years and the huge pay disparity between the top 
executives and ordinary employees have stoked the public outrage (Thompson 2009). 
Consequently, executive remuneration is under the close scrutiny of the media, 
academia, investors, policy makers, and regulators around the world.  
 
Bruce, Buck, and Main (2005) document that institutions 2  affect executive 
remuneration. It has been increasingly recognised that institutional differences are 
important in explaining the corporate decisions and actions (Jackson and Deeg 2008). 
Most scholars in the cross-national comparative corporate governance posit that 
institutions affect the corporate governance practices (Aguilera and Jackson 2010). 
According to Yoshikawa, Rasheed, and Brio (2010), the determinants of executive 
remuneration are affected by institutional norms, corporate governance practices and 
legal restrictions. Kowalewski, Talavera, and Stetsyuk (2010) maintain that the 
findings of the studies conducted in the context of Western countries may not be 
applicable to the countries with different legal systems and economic environments. 
Further, Essen, Oosterhout, and Carney (2012) claim that Asian companies operate in 
an institutional context where many of the key assumptions of the agency theoretical 
view of corporate boards may not hold.  
 
Malaysia is a multiracial country, and the spheres of politics and races are inextricably 
intertwined. The Malaysian companies operate in a unique and distinctive environment: 
                                                 
2 Institutions are defined as the rules and norms that guide individuals, organisations and markets in 
interacting with each other.  
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multiracial, multicultural, cronyism-inclined, rent-seeking, and high power distance 
(Gomez and Jomo 1999; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Satkunasingam and Shanmugam 
2006; The Iclif Leadership and Governance Centre 2014). Unlike the strong 
shareholders’ right protection in the developed countries, the World Bank (2012) 
comments that Malaysia’s Companies Act 1965 still contains gaps with regard to the 
shareholders’ rights even after several amendments. Substantial transactions including 
large related party transactions do not require majority approval from the shareholders. 
Besides, the minority shareholders have little influence on board selection, decisions 
on share issuance, and directors’ pay (The World Bank 2012). Corporate governance 
in Malaysia is still evolving, particularly concerning the protection of the minority’s 
right. Most of the public listed companies in Malaysia are characterised by 
concentrated ownership structure and significant participation of controlling 
shareholders in the management (Carney and Child 2013; Satkunasingam and 
Shanmugam 2006), which give rise to agency conflicts between the controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. This unique institutional setting provides an 
appealing context for this study. There are empirical and literature gaps regarding the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms suggested by the agency theory 
advocators in governing executive remuneration in the context of Malaysia.  
 
This thesis focuses on family companies in view of their pervasiveness around the 
world. Specifically, family companies account for approximately one-third of the S&P 
500 in the United States (Anderson and Reeb 2003) and about 44.29% of listed 
companies in the Western European countries3 (Faccio and Lang 2002). Based on the 
studies by Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Carney and Child (2013) on nine 
East Asian countries4, the most common form of corporation is family business. Fan 
et al. (2011) document that family businesses are a crucial source of private wealth 
creation in Asia and contribute approximately one-third of the Asian GDP. In Malaysia, 
family companies account for about 44.70% of listed companies (Carney and Child 
2013; Ibrahim, Abdul-Samad and Amir 2008) and contribute around 67.00% of 
                                                 
3 The percentages of family companies of each Western European country examined by Faccio and 
Lang (2002) are shown in Appendix 1.1. 
4 The nine countries are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan 
and Thailand. The percentages of family companies of each East Asian country examined by Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Carney and Child (2013) are shown in Appendix 1.2. 
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nominal GDP (Fan et al. 2011). According to Credit Suisse (2017), Malaysia ranks the 
seventh globally in terms of the number of family-owned companies. Despite the 
prevalence and significant economic contribution of family companies, there are 
limited studies on the executive remuneration of family companies in the Malaysian 
context. The executive remuneration in family companies has to be studied extensively 
as there is a probability that the controlling family shareholders would misappropriate 
funds via executive remuneration at the expense of minority shareholders. This often 
gives rise to the conflict of interest between the controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders.  
 
Family companies are generally considered less vulnerable to the classical agency 
problem between the shareholders and management, or known as Type I agency 
conflict (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Bhaumik and Gregoriou 2010). The concentrated 
ownership of a family entails a different agency conflict. Family companies face the 
agency problem between the controlling family shareholders and minority 
shareholders, or known as Type II agency conflict (Bhaumik and Gregoriou 2010; 
Villalonga and Amit 2006). Specifically, a more severe problem in family companies 
is the extraction of private benefits by the controlling family shareholders for 
themselves. The controlling family shareholders may use their dominant positions in 
the companies to expropriate5 wealth at the expense of minority shareholders via 
several ways, such as related party transactions, special dividends, excessive 
perquisites and other tunneling6 activities (Johnson et al. 2000; Cesari 2012; Liew, 
Alfan and Devi 2014; Zhang et al. 2017).  
 
Most of the prior studies in the Malaysian context measure the expropriation of 
minority shareholders by way of related party transactions (Hamid, Ting and Kweh 
2016; Liew, Alfan and Devi 2014; Mustafa, Latif and Taliyang 2011). Liew, Alfan, 
and Devi (2014) report that the probability of expropriation via related party 
transactions in the Malaysian listed family companies is higher than that in non-family 
                                                 
5 Expropriation is a process of which one uses the controlling power to maximise one’s own welfare or 
benefits and redistribute wealth from others (Claessens et al. 1999). 
6  Tunneling refers to the extraction or transfer of resources out of a company by the controlling 
shareholders who are typically also the top managers. Please refer to Johnson et al. (2000) for a detailed 
discussion about tunnelling. 
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companies (32.85% versus 14.83%). Different from past studies, this study posits that 
the controlling family shareholders of Malaysian listed companies can expropriate the 
minority shareholders via executive remuneration.  
 
The mainstream literature most often explains the accounting policy choices by using 
the agency theory tenet (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Elston and Goldberg 2003; Sapp 
2008; Theeravanich 2013). In this study, agency theory provides an ideal conceptual 
framework for examining executive remuneration of the Malaysian listed family 
companies. The cornerstone of the classical agency theory is that the interests of 
principals (shareholders) and agents (management) tend to diverge. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) postulate that the separation of ownership and control of a company 
provides the management with the incentive to serve their personal interests at the 
expense of shareholders’ interests. According to Jensen and Murphy (1990), 
remuneration design is viewed as a contractual remedy to mitigate the agency problem 
between the shareholders and management. Nonetheless, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
criticise and refute the former view; they posit that the management in publicly traded 
companies without a controlling shareholder could use their substantial power to 
extract remuneration more favourably than they could obtain under an arm’s length 
bargaining with the shareholders. The remuneration payout may not be aligned with 
the firm performance. The empirical findings of the pay-performance link are 
inconclusive. The positive association supports the view of Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
that remuneration is a tool to align the managerial interests with that of the 
shareholders (Rampling, Eddie and Liu 2013; Gregg, Jewell and Tonks 2012; Kato 
and Long 2006; Conyon and Peck 1998). On the other hand, the negative association 
supports the view of Bebchuk and Fried (2004) that the management could use their 
substantial power to extract higher remuneration for themselves (Brick, Palmon and 
Wald 2006; Abdullah 2006; Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999).  
 
Due to the inconsistency in findings, extant studies have moved beyond the pay-
performance concept and suggested other potential factors influencing executive 
remuneration. Corporate governance has been identified as a complementary factor in 
influencing the executive remuneration; for instance, the board independence, 
remuneration committee, board size, to name a few (Kuo and Yu 2014; Yatim 2013; 
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Ozkan 2007). The role of corporate governance in addressing agency problem has been 
a long-standing interest (Kumar and Zattoni 2017). By using American companies and 
Japanese companies, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Basu et al. (2007) 
respectively report that the top executive remuneration is higher in the companies with 
weaker corporate governance. They postulate that the companies with weaker 
corporate governance are saddled with greater agency problems, as reflected in the 
high remuneration regardless of firm performance. Yoshikawa, Rasheed, and Brio 
(2010) as well as Kuo and Yu (2014) contend that the studies of executive 
remuneration are mainly confined to the US context. 
 
The extant studies and agency theory advocators suggest the board of directors and 
institutional investors as the mechanisms to govern executive remuneration (Hartzell 
and Starks 2003; Méndez, García and Pathan 2017; Kumar and Zattoni 2017). The 
board of directors of a company is appointed by the shareholders to act on their behalf 
and its responsibilities include, among others, supervising executives and establishing 
executive remuneration (Zattoni and Cuomo 2010; Brick, Palmon and Wald 2006). 
The role of governing executive remuneration lies within the purview of independent 
or non-executive directors. Past studies show a negative association between 
independent or non-executive directors and executive remuneration, indicating that 
they play a governance role in restraining executive remuneration (Ghosh 2006; Lim 
and Yen 2011). In addition, prior studies document that institutional ownership is 
negatively associated with executive remuneration, suggesting that the institutional 
investors play an activist role in monitoring the remuneration packages of the investee 
companies (Hartzell and Starks 2003; Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman 2009). 
 
Generally, the empirical studies of the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms (board of directors and institutional investors) and executive 
remuneration are based on the conflict between the shareholders and management or 
commonly known as Type I agency conflict. This study attempts to make a theoretical 
contribution by premising on Type II agency conflict between the controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders to examine the executive remuneration in 
family companies. Despite a wealth of research on CEO and directors’ remuneration, 
little is known about its determinants in family companies (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-
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Kintana and Makri 2003). When a family controls a company, the governance 
decisions are in the hand of family (Castro, Aguilera and Crespí-Cladera 2017). 
 
The foregoing discussions outline the context and purpose of this study. The next 
sections detail the research gaps and problem statement leading to the formulation of 
research questions for this thesis. 
 
1.1 Research Gaps 
Most of the family business studies centre on the firm profitability and valuations 
(Mishra, Randøy and Jenssen 2001; Anderson and Reeb 2003; Maury 2006; Andres 
2008; Chiung-Wen et al. 2009; Liu, Yang and Zhang 2012), succession (Burkart, 
Panunzi and Shleifer 2003; Royer et al. 2008; Daspit et al. 2016), socio-emotional 
wealth (Berrone et al. 2010; Zellweger and Dehlen 2012), to state a few. There are 
only a few empirical studies examining the executive remuneration of family 
companies (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri 2003; Croci, Gonenc and 
Ozkan 2012). Massis et al. (2012), based on a comprehensive review of 251 pieces of 
the most cited literature on family business published in 33 journals between 1996 and 
2010, report that 73% of the articles are in the American and European contexts. This 
implies a western skew in the current knowledge about family companies and presents 
a research gap in the emerging markets or developing countries7. Massis et al. (2012) 
and Sharma and Chua (2013) call for more in-depth research of family businesses in 
the emerging markets and under-represented regions such as Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. The heterogeneity of institutions and environments in different capital 
markets and countries offer research opportunities to seek a deeper understanding of 
family companies. It is important to ascertain whether the findings based on the 
developed markets can be generalised to the emerging markets so as to contribute to 
the global knowledge in this field of study. 
 
                                                 
7 There are few studies pertinent to family companies in the contexts of developing countries, but they 
are not examining executive remuneration. Instead, they examine the corporate management of Thai 
family companies (Suehiro and Wailerdsak 2004), firm performance of Philippine family companies 




Malaysia is chosen for this study for several reasons. Firstly, it is economically 
different from the developed countries such as the United Kingdom and the United 
States where most of the studies on executive remuneration, corporate governance, and 
family companies are carried out. Malaysia is a developing country. In 2016, the GDP 
of Malaysia is USD296.36 billion; in comparison, the GDPs of the United States and 
the United Kingdom are USD18.57 trillion and USD2.62 trillion respectively (The 
World Bank 2016). It is ambiguous whether the factors influencing executive 
remuneration in the developed countries and Malaysia are the same. 
 
Secondly, Malaysia is a land of many races; culturally distinct from the developed and 
some other developing countries. Cultural difference is important because the 
traditions of a nation are instilled in its people. The communities of Malaysia consist 
of three main ethnic groups, namely Bumiputera8, Chinese and Indian. Different ethnic 
groups have different cultural practices and uphold different norms and values 
(Haniffa and Cooke 2002). The Malaysians are characterised as high power distance 
(Haniffa and Cooke 2002). According to The Iclif Leadership and Governance Centre 
(2014), Malaysia scores the highest in power distance with a rating of 100 among 18 
Asian countries 9 . Satkunasingam and Shanmugam (2006) document that the 
shareholders hardly take legal actions against a company’s directors due to the cultural 
factor in Malaysia.  
 
Thirdly, Malaysian companies operate in a racially discriminated economy as a result 
of the government’s initiatives favouring Bumiputera (Jomo 2004). Bumiputera have 
been given, among other privileges, priorities for large government contracts, 
increased access to capital, opportunities to buy assets that have been privatised, and 
other subsidies (Johnson and Mitton 2003). Consequently, Malaysian companies that 
are not government-linked or politically-connected have to build closer ties with the 
government officials or bribe them in order to obtain businesses and projects for 
business survival (Gomez and Jomo 1999). In the context of family companies, Carney 
                                                 
8 The Malays and indigenous peoples are collectively known as Bumiputera (Son of Soil). 
9 The 18 Asian countries surveyed include Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, 
Thailand and Vietnam. 
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and Child (2013) report that 22% of the Malaysian listed family companies have 
political ties. Their findings reveal the incidence of crony capitalism among the 
Malaysian listed family companies. 
 
Succinctly, Malaysian companies operate in a unique and distinctive environment. The 
differences in terms of the underlying economy, institutional environment, cultural, 
and societal values offer the research opportunity to empirically examine the executive 
remuneration of the Malaysian listed family companies. The culture of high power 
distance in Malaysia casts doubt pertaining to the governance function of independent 
directors. They may be less willing to question the remuneration packages of executive 
directors, particularly those related to the controlling shareholders who have a higher 
ranking position in the company. On this premise, it is probable that such culture would 
obstruct the board governance on executive remuneration in family companies.  
 
The theoretical justification for choosing Malaysia is that prior studies have identified 
expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders as a severe 
corporate governance issue in Malaysia and other East Asia countries; this is due to 
the high level of ownership concentration and significant involvement of the 
controlling shareholders in the management of the public listed companies (Young et 
al. 2008; Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013; Liew, Alfan and Devi 2014). The most 
common controlling shareholder of Malaysian listed companies is the family (44.7%), 
followed by the government (33.5%) (Carney and Child 2013). Claessens and 
Yurtoglu (2013) note that family controlling shareholders are largely involved in the 
management of family companies. As such, this institutional environment provides an 
avenue to study the potential conflict of interests between the controlling family 
shareholders and minority shareholders in Malaysian listed family companies via 
executive remuneration, which gives rise to the Type II agency conflict. 
 
A good corporate governance framework can be an instrument to mitigate the 
expropriation issue and principal-principal conflict. Sarbah, Quaye, and Affum-Osei 
(2016) maintain that there is a general lack of understanding of the effective corporate 
governance principles in family companies. According to Crespí–Cladera and Gispert 
(2003), the emotional ties of the family shareholders in running the business may affect 
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the procedures of the best corporate governance practices, lead to showing favouritism 
towards family members, and provide the controlling family shareholders with 
excessive control over the business; the controlling family shareholders will then reap 
the benefits to the detriment of minority shareholders.  
 
In Malaysia, family companies account for approximate 44.70% of public listed 
companies (Carney and Child 2013) and 67.00% of national nominal GDP (Fan et al. 
2011). As such, the corporate governance of Malaysian listed family companies has to 
be studied extensively in view of their important contribution to the nation’s economic 
growth. Sound corporate governance practices are essential to protect the minority 
shareholders and strengthen investors’ confidence (Rezaee 2012). Besides, a strong 
corporate governance landscape is crucial to attract the inflow of foreign capital funds 
into Malaysia. The corporate governance failures of family companies could produce 
a far-reaching repercussion in foreign investment and potentially impede Malaysia’s 
economic growth.  
 
Prior empirical studies examining the influence of corporate governance on executive 
remuneration in the Malaysian context include both family and non-family companies 
in their sample sets (Yatim 2013; Abdullah 2006). The statistical results are 
generalised across overall companies. Besides, these prior studies employ single-year 
analysis, which limits the scope of evaluation. Different from the past studies, this 
study employs longitudinal data from 2010 to 2014 (inclusive of starting and ending 
years), which allows the panel data analysis, and provides a better understanding of 
the extent of executive remuneration and its determinants in family companies.  
 
Over the five-year period, this study selects two years pre- and post- 2012 in order to 
provide insight into the efficacy of the revised Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) 2012 in governing executive remuneration in Malaysian listed 
family companies. The MCCG is revised in 2012 after taking into account the 
changing market dynamics, international developments, and the need to continuously 
recalibrate and enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance framework 
(Securities Commission Malaysia 2013). Among others, the key areas that are 
strengthened in the revised MCCG 2012 include the following: (i) the independence 
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of independent directors whose tenure should be capped at a cumulative period of nine 
years; (ii) the separation of the chairman and CEO roles; (iii) the board should establish 
formal and transparent remuneration policies and procedures to attract and retain 
directors; the remuneration committee should perform this function; and (iv) the 
relationship between the company and shareholders (Securities Commission Malaysia 
2013). To date, there is a lack of empirical studies that examine the executive 
remuneration covering the period of the introduction of the revised MCCG 2012. This 
study makes a timely contribution and fills the gap by investigating the effectiveness 
of key corporate governance attributes strengthened by the revised MCCG 2012 in 
governing executive remuneration.  
 
In addition, the Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011 (CG Blueprint 2011) issued by 
the Securities Commission requires the institutional investors to explain how corporate 
governance has been adopted as an investment criteria, and the measures they have 
taken to influence, guide and monitor the investee companies (Securities Commission 
Malaysia 2011). The Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors 2014 (MCII) is one of 
the deliverables of the CG Blueprint 2011. The MCII postulates that institutional 
investors are the major players in the global economy who can exert significant 
influence over their investee companies. They should be committed to effective 
corporate governance and consider acting collectively with other investors, where 
appropriate, to promote good corporate governance (Securities Commission Malaysia 
and Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 2014).  
 
The recommendations for institutional investors in MCCG and CG Blueprint as well 
as the issuance of MCII clearly show that the Malaysian government relies on the 
institutional investors as an external governance mechanism to enhance the corporate 
governance practices of listed companies. Notwithstanding this, there are limited 
studies related to the influence of institutional investors in the context of family 
companies. This study contributes to the body of knowledge and fills the gap by 
investigating the influence of institutional investors on the executive remuneration in 




Furthermore, in April 2009, the Prime Minister of Malaysia announces the 
disbandment of the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC), repeal of FIC Guidelines, 
and liberalisation of certain restrictions in order to stimulate economic growth and 
encourage foreign investments (Hill, Tham and Zin 2012). Covering the period from 
2010 to 2014, this study provides insights into the participation of foreign institutional 
investors in Malaysian listed family companies, immediate after the disbandment of 
FIC and the repeal of FIC Guidelines, as well as provides timely empirical evidence 
pertaining to the governance role of the foreign institutional investors. 
 
Past studies on the effects of various corporate governance mechanisms typically 
assume that these mechanisms operate independently. For instance, Conyon and Peck 
(1998) examine the influence of non-executive directors and remuneration committee 
on the top management remuneration without taking the ownership structure of 
companies into consideration; Dong and Ozkan (2008) examine the association 
between institutional ownership and director remuneration without taking the board 
composition into account; Croci, Gonenc, and Ozkan (2012) examine the association 
between the institutional investors and CEO remuneration without including the board 
characteristics in their model. Rediker and Seth (1995) point out the fact that the 
studies on a single corporate governance mechanism often neglect the broader linkages 
of various governance mechanisms and their joint impact on various governance issues. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) suggest that the focus on a single corporate governance 
mechanism does not detect the interdependence of different mechanisms. Even among 
different corporate governance mechanisms, Berglöf and Claessens (2006) argue that 
concentrated ownership may exert an overpowering influence, especially in the 
countries where the regulatory environment and legal enforcement are weak. On this 
premise, this study contributes by examining the effects of various corporate 
governance mechanisms on executive remuneration in the companies with 
concentrated ownership structure, particularly family companies. Specifically, 
different corporate governance mechanisms, which are the board of directors and 
ownership structure, are jointly investigated to examine their influence on the 




1.2 Problem Statement 
A high level of ownership concentration and significant participation of controlling 
shareholders in the management are the main features of Malaysian listed companies 
(Liew, Alfan and Devi 2014; Abdul-Rahman 2006), which give rise to conflicts of 
interest between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997; Young et al. 2008). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) highlight that the 
controlling shareholders tend to represent their own interests at the expense of minority 
shareholders. They can use their controlling rights to maximise their own welfare and 
redistribute wealth from the minority shareholders. Young et al. (2008) identify the 
expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders as a severe 
corporate governance issue in Malaysia. Accordingly, there is a bona fide concern that 
the controlling family shareholders design their own pay packages at the expense of 
minority shareholders (Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong 2005).  
 
In recent years, the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) receives 
complaints from the investors regarding excessive directors’ remuneration, sales of 
shares at a premium by the controlling shareholders but not accorded to the minority 
shareholders, insider trading, and other issues concerning minority rights are being 
sidestepped (Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 2014a, 2013a). The Minority 
Shareholder Watchdog Group (2013a) reports that the remuneration level of a listed 
company’s director skyrockets from RM8.40 million in 2011 to RM33.40 million in 
2012, representing a humongous increase of 297.62% in one year. This extravagant 
executive remuneration constitutes about 14% of the firm’s net profit of RM232.7 
million for the year. Moreover, in 2013, the annual average income per capita is 
RM33,010 (Economic Planning Unit 2013), whilst the average remuneration per 
executive director is RM1,164,727 (Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 2013b). 
The huge income disparity demonstrates the excess remuneration paid to the executive 
directors. Furthermore, two listed family companies pay their CEO and board 
chairman more than 4000 times and 1575 times respectively the national income per 
capita in 2013 (News Straight Times 2014). 
 
In addition, the mass media report that the Malaysian listed companies continue to pay 
high remuneration to their directors despite incurring huge losses (Focus Malaysia 
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2014; Immanuel 2015). They raise doubts about whether this is justifiable and fair to 
the minority shareholders. Furthermore, based on the survey done by Malaysian 
Business on the highest paid directors, 62.14% of companies increase their 
remuneration payout from 2012 to 2013 despite a drop in the Malaysian economic 
growth from 5.6% in 2012 to 4.7% in 2013 (The Malaysia Insider 2014). Apparently, 
the remuneration of Malaysian companies has been on the rise over the years, but it 
has no substantial linkage with the firm-level and country-level performances. 
 
The executive remuneration of a company draws the attention of its various 
stakeholders. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the general investors are 
particularly concerned with the excessive directors’ remuneration, and they request the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (2013a) to take actions in governing the 
remuneration payout. Besides, McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016) report that poor 
corporate governance and excessive remuneration, among others, are the main 
concerns of the institutional investors around the world; their intervention in the 
investee companies is more likely to be driven by corporate governance issues such as 
excessive executive remuneration rather than firm profitability. Moreover, the 
remuneration arrangement of the top executives in a company is also of interest to its 
employees. The sky-high executive remuneration and enormous pay disparity between 
executives and employees can send vibes throughout the company and weaken the 
loyalty of subordinate employees (O'Reilly 2007). Whelton (2006) highlights that 
exaggerated CEO remuneration may contribute towards a feeling that the CEO is a 
superhuman and not in communion with fellow employees. Mackey (2009) documents 
that employees really care about the executive remuneration, and a smaller pay gap 
can bring about greater solidarity and better performance throughout the workplace. 
Excessive executive remuneration can lead to poor employee morale and resentment 
(Whelton 2006). By and large, the executive remuneration is one of the major concerns 
of different stakeholders of a company, including policy makers and regulators, 
employees, general and institutional investors; hence, it warrants a closer scrutiny.  
 
This thesis focuses on the family companies in view of their ubiquity and significant 
economic contribution, yet potential to expropriate minority shareholders via 
excessive remuneration. Specifically, this study examines the extent of executive 
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remuneration of listed family companies from 2010 to 2014, during which there is a 
second revision made to the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in 2012. 
Besides, this study investigates the influence of (i) family participation on board, (ii) 
corporate governance mechanisms, and (iii) institutional ownership on the executive 
remuneration of family companies. This research is distinctive in the sense that it 
contributes from the perspective of a developing country and premises on the Type II 
agency conflict between the controlling and minority shareholders. 
 
1.3 Objectives and Research Questions 
The evolutionary process of strengthening Malaysian corporate governance landscape 
begins after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) is released in March 2000. Subsequently, it goes through two 
rounds of revisions in 2007 and 2012 in order to continuously recalibrate and enhance 
the effectiveness of corporate governance framework. Further, the Corporate 
Governance Blueprint 2011 (CG Blueprint) is introduced by the Securities 
Commission Malaysia to engender a shift in corporate governance culture, from mere 
compliance with rules to one that more fittingly captures the essence of good corporate 
governance. With the formulation of an industry-driven code for institutional investors, 
the CG Blueprint 2011 is aimed at enhancing the relationship and trust between the 
company and its stakeholders.  
 
This study examines the executive remuneration of family companies listed on the 
Main Board of Bursa Malaysia from 2010 to 2014 in order to provide insights into the 
influence of the revised MCCG 2012 on executive remuneration.  
 
The main objectives of this longitudinal study are: (i) to evaluate the extent of 
executive remuneration of listed family companies in Malaysia from 2010 to 2014; (ii) 
to examine the factors influencing the executive remuneration of listed family 
companies in Malaysia, and (iii) to investigate the impact of the revised Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance 2012 on executive remuneration of listed family 




Accordingly, the following are the research questions pertinent to executive 
remuneration: 
1. What is the extent of executive remuneration of listed family companies in 
Malaysia from 2010 to 2014? 
2. What are the factors influencing the executive remuneration of listed family 
companies in Malaysia? 
3. What is the impact of the revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
2012 on executive remuneration of listed family companies in Malaysia? 
 
This study cross-sectionally examines the influence of (i) family participation on board, 
(ii) corporate governance mechanisms, and (iii) institutional ownership on the 
executive remuneration over five separate periods from 2010 to 2014 in order to gain 
insights for each period. In addition, panel data analysis is undertaken to examine the 
influence of the abovementioned variables on executive remuneration over the five-
year period. The longitudinal study also enables the examination of the trend of 
executive remuneration over time. 
 
1.4 Importance of the Study 
Given the importance of the emerging economies in the global economy, it is necessary 
to shed light on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms suggested by 
the agency theory in reining in executive remuneration, in order to contribute to the 
global knowledge in this field of study. Theoretically, this study is of importance as it 
examines whether the corporate governance mechanisms suggested by the agency 
theory advocators to restrain the executive remuneration and mitigate the Type I 
agency conflict between shareholders and management in widely held companies are 
able to govern executive remuneration and ameliorate the Type II agency conflict 
between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in family companies 
that are characterised by the concentrated ownership structure. 
 
Practically, the findings of this study should enable the Securities Commission 
Malaysia to assess the effectiveness of the MCCG, which mimics the Cadbury 
Committee Report 1992 and Greenbury Committee Report 1995 of the United 
Kingdom. It is ambiguous whether the corporate governance mechanisms such as 
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independent non-executive directors and institutional investors in Malaysian listed 
family companies are as effective as those in the widely held companies in the 
developed countries that can restrain the level of executive remuneration. 
 
Expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders, principal-
principal problems or Type II agency conflicts, have been identified as severe 
corporate governance issues in East Asian countries including Malaysia (Young et al. 
2008; Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013; Liew, Alfan and Devi 2014). The findings of this 
study should enable the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group to evaluate the 
possible expropriation of minority shareholders via executive remuneration. 
 
Besides, the findings of this study would be of interest to the general and institutional 
investors, particularly foreign investors. This study should facilitate their appraisal and 
evaluation of the corporate governance practices and investor protection in Malaysian 
listed family companies. The corporate governance inefficacy of family companies 
may affect their investment preferences and decisions. 
 
1.5 Study Outline  
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter Two provides an overview 
of the development of corporate governance in Malaysia. Chapter Three reviews the 
literature on agency theory and relevant prior empirical studies leading to the 
development of hypotheses. Chapter Four presents the research methodology, which 
encompasses the research design, sample selection, operationalisation of variables, 
modelling specification and data analysis methods. Chapter Five discusses the 
descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in this study. Chapter Six reports 
the statistical analyses of the independent variables hypothesised to be associated with 
executive remuneration. Chapter Seven discusses the additional analyses conducted. 
Lastly, Chapter Eight concludes the study with a summary of key findings, 
implications, assumptions, limitations, suggestions for future studies, and contribution 




CHAPTER TWO: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN MALAYSIA 
 
2.0 Introduction 
Corporate governance is now universally invoked wherever business and finance are 
discussed. It has attracted a great deal of public interest due to its importance for the 
enhancement of corporate accountability and transparency. The development of 
corporate governance is a global occurrence, so it is a multifaceted area covering legal, 
cultural, ownership and other structure differences.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 presents the various definitions of 
corporate governance that have been predominantly cited by scholars. Section 2.2 
discusses the corporate governance mechanisms – internal and external. Section 2.3 
presents a number of theories associated with the development of corporate 
governance. Section 2.4 provides a brief background about Malaysia, while section 
2.5 illustrates how corporate governance has evolved in Malaysia. Section 2.6 provides 
an overview of the effectiveness of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance. 
Section 2.7 provides a brief summary of the chapter. 
 
2.1 Defining Corporate Governance  
There is no generally accepted definition of corporate governance. The Cadbury 
Committee Report’s definition of corporate governance has been recognised as the 
starting point for most reviews of governance. The Cadbury Committee (1992, 14), in 
paragraph 2.5, defines corporate governance as 
 
‘…the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Boards of 
directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The 
shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the 
auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance 
structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the 
company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, 
supervising the management of the business and reporting to shareholders 
on their stewardship. The board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations 
and the shareholders in general meetings’ 
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In 1999, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
publishes its Principles of Corporate Governance upon the request of the OECD 
Council to develop corporate governance standards and guidelines. The OECD 
recognises that there is no single model of corporate governance that is applicable to 
all countries. The OECD Principles represent certain common characteristics that are 
fundamental to good corporate governance, which include (i) the rights of 
shareholders, (ii) the equitable treatment of shareholders, (iii) the role of stakeholders 
in corporate governance, (iv) disclosure and transparency, and (v) the responsibilities 
of the board. The OECD Principles have become an international benchmark for policy 
makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have also 
been adopted as one of the Financial Stability Board’s Key Standards for Sound 
Financial Systems and form the basis for the World Bank’s Reports on the Observance 
of Standards and Codes in the area of corporate governance (OECD 2015). According 
to OECD (2015, 9), corporate governance 
 
‘…involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, 
its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides 
the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined’ 
 
In the context of Malaysia, the High Level Finance Committee on Corporate 
Governance (1999, 52) defines corporate governance as: 
 
‘…the process and structure used to direct and manage the business and 
affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity and 
corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing long-term 
shareholder value, whilst taking into account the interests of other 
stakeholders…’  
     
Some common features that characterise corporate governance can be drawn from the 
above definitions. Essentially, corporate governance is about the system, process and 
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structure governing the actors of the company for its stakeholders 10 . The above 
definitions of corporate governance acknowledge the existence and importance of 
shareholders and various stakeholders. These definitions illustrate corporate 
governance is concerned with both internal control such as the board structure, and 
external aspects such as the relationship with shareholders and stakeholders. It 
provides the mechanisms through which corporate objectives could be set, monitored 
and achieved.  
 
2.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Corporate governance mechanisms can be broadly segregated into internal and 
external mechanisms. The internal mechanisms include board of directors (Weisbach 
1988; Jensen 1993; Zattoni and Cuomo 2010; Essen, Oosterhout and Carney 2012; 
Kumar and Zattoni 2017) and ownership structure (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Nguyen, Locke and Reddy 2014); whilst the external 
mechanisms include legal system (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999; 
Coombes and Watson 2001; Mallin 2004; Abdul-Rahman 2006; Peng and Jiang 2010; 
Sapp 2008) and institutional investors (Hartzell and Starks 2003; Aggarwal et al. 2011; 
McCahery, Sautner and Starks 2016).  
 
Figure 2.1 displays the relationships of a company with its various stakeholders. The 
need for corporate governance mechanisms arises from the potential conflicts of 
interest among different stakeholders in the corporate structure (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Hart 1995; Gillan and Starks 2003). These conflicts of interest, also known as 
agency problems, arise due to differing goals and preferences of various stakeholders 
and imperfect information (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In fact, it has long been 
identified by Berle and Means (1932) that the root cause of agency conflicts is the 
separation of ownership and control.  In today’s corporate context, companies raise 
funds by issuing shares to investors in the securities market. These shareholders entrust 
a board of directors and management to manage the companies. This situation gives 
rise to the separation of ownership and control. Berle and Means (1932) note that in 
                                                 
10 Stakeholders are those that can affect or are affected by the achievement of the organization’s 
objectives such as shareholders, creditors, customers, employees, government, regulators and 
community (Freeman 1984). 
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the absence of corporate governance mechanisms, the separation of ownership and 
control provides executives with the ability to act in their own self-interest rather than 
in the interests of shareholders. Thus, adequate corporate governance mechanisms are 
essential to ensure that the company’s best interest is put forward (Anandarajah 2004). 
Good corporate governance can be achieved via a synergistic nexus between the 
shareholders, board of directors and management. In general, the focus on corporate 
governance stems from the separation of ownership and control, which gives rise to 
agency problems.  
 
Figure 2.1: Corporate structure and stakeholders 
 
Source: Anandarajah (2004) 
 
As an internal mechanism, the board of directors is expected to play an important role 
in corporate governance, particularly in monitoring management. The board is the 
shareholders’ first line of defence against incompetent management, and serves as a 
link between the shareholders and managers (Weisbach 1988). The shareholders 
cannot possibly oversee the managers so they elect the representatives (board of 
directors) to oversee and possibly intervene in the management on their behalf (Abdul-
Rahman 2006). The responsibilities of the board include endorsing the company’s 
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strategy, developing directional policy, appointing, supervising and remunerating 
senior executives and ensuring the accountability of the company to its shareholders 
(Méndez, García and Pathan 2017; Zattoni and Cuomo 2010). The corporate board 
structure around the world is broadly divided into (i) unitary or one-tier board11 and 
(ii) dual or two-tier board12. The countries having a unitary or one-tier board include 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Malaysia, and India; whilst the 
countries practising a dual or two-tier board are Germany, China, Japan, Taiwan, and 
Indonesia (Ding 2009; Tan 2011; Block and Gerstner 2016).  
 
The 2008 global financial crisis as well as several corporate scandals such as Enron 
and WorldCom have given new impetus toward rethinking the fundamental principles 
of corporate governance. All of these incidents have led to the increased expectations 
pertaining to the monitoring effectiveness of the board of directors. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) postulate that board composition is a crucial factor in establishing the 
effectiveness of a board as an objective monitor of management. Board composition 
is generally proxied by the percentage of outside directors or independent directors on 
the board of directors (Adrian, Wright and Kilgore 2016). The outside directors or 
independent directors are deemed as the corporate guardians and act as a buffer 
between the executive directors and the shareholders. They monitor the executive 
directors’ actions and decisions and, are required to ensure the company is acting in 
the best interests of shareholders and other stakeholders.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) put forward that ownership structure is a crucial factor in 
determining an effective corporate governance system. Agency theory regards large 
shareholders (shareholders owning a large amount of shares in a company) as a 
favourable ownership structure because they have the incentive to engage in 
monitoring management (Goh, Rasli and Khan 2014; Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
                                                 
11 A one-tier board has both managerial and supervisory responsibilities in one unified board of directors. 
It consists of executive and non-executive directors which are elected by shareholders and responsible 
for all aspects of company activities. 
12  A two-tier board system is composed of a management board and a supervisory board. The 




According to Edmans (2014), large shareholders or block-holders13 can play a crucial 
role in corporate governance because their large stakes give them the incentive to bear 
the cost of monitoring managers. In widely held companies, the shareholders have 
inadequate incentive to monitor the management intimately as the benefits for any 
individual shareholder is too minimal to cover the monitoring costs (Grossman and 
Hart 1982). Large shareholders can exert governance through two mechanisms: (i) 
voice - such as suggesting a strategic change via public shareholder proposal, private 
letter to management, or voting against the directors; and (ii) exit - if the manager 
destroys corporate value, block-holders can sell their shares, suppressing the share 
price and hence punishing the managers (Edmans 2014). 
 
Notwithstanding this, the concentrated ownership structure gives rise to the possible 
expropriation of minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders may act in their own 
interests at the expense of minority shareholders, such as engaging in related-party 
transactions, buying products at an excessive price from another company they own, 
selling assets at below market price to controlling shareholders, paying special 
dividends to controlling shareholders, and other managerial entrenchment14 activities 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel and Gutierrez 2001; Edmans 
2014). The concentrated ownership structure may alleviate the conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and management, but there may be the conflicts of interest 
between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. In short, instead of 
mitigating the agency problem, concentrated ownership structure may exacerbate it. 
 
The legal system serves as one of the external governance mechanisms in influencing 
the type of ownership and control structure in a country (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer 1999; Coombes and Watson 2001; Abdul-Rahman 2006; Peng and Jiang 
2010). Shareholder protection is rooted in the legal structure of a country (Peng and 
Jiang 2010). The ineffectiveness of a legal system to protect shareholders’ rights 
discourages a diverse shareholder base. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) 
                                                 
13 Block-holders are generally defined as the shareholders who hold at least 5% of a company’s common 
shares (Edmans 2014; Nguyen, Locke and Reddy 2014). 
14 Entrenchment refers to the executives hold their jobs past the point where their stewardship is 
beneficial to the owners (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Walsh and Seward 1990). 
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highlight that the concentrated ownership structure is a consequence of poor legal 
protection for minority shareholders. They note that widely held companies are more 
common in the countries with good shareholder protection, whilst family-controlled 
companies and state-controlled companies are more pervasive in the countries with 
poor shareholder protection. In the United States and the United Kingdom, where the 
rights of minority shareholders are well protected by the legal system, companies with 
diversified shareholder bases are more prevalent than family-controlled companies 
(Mallin 2004). On the other hand, in Asia, South America and some European 
countries, where the legal protection of minority shareholders is either ineffective or 
absent, family shareholders often retain control in the companies and non-family 
investors would have little investment interest in such companies as their rights are 
less protected (Mallin 2004). The legal system of a country affects the ownership 
structure of its companies, which in turn affects the corporate governance practices.  
 
Franks and Mayer (1997) contend there are two types of ownership and control 
structures: (i) the outsider system and (ii) the insider system. The outsider system is 
commonly found in the United States and the United Kingdom where the shareholders 
have voting rights that provide them with some level of influence. If the company is 
poorly managed or shareholder rights are neglected, the shareholders can counter by 
selling shares (exit), causing share prices to decline, and consequently, exposing the 
company to a hostile takeover (Graves and Waddock 1990; Hawley and Williams 1997; 
Parrino, Sias and Starks 2003; Aggarwal et al. 2011). The outsider system is known as 
Anglo-American or Anglo-Saxon system due to the influence of the US and the UK 
markets on other countries. Coombes and Watson (2001) document that most of the 
previous studies discuss corporate governance model based on the tenet of outsider 
system or the market model of corporate governance.  
 
Contrary to the market model of corporate governance, the control model of corporate 
governance typifies an insider system, where the ownership and control are 
concentrated in the hands of an identifiable and cohesive group of insiders. The insider 
system is prevalent in Asia, Latin America and much Continental Europe. The large 
shareholders have significant direct control in the company. They may be the family 
of founders, financial institutions, or governments (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
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Shleifer 1999; Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000). For instance, the state/government 
plays a dominant role in French and Chinese companies (Liu and Sun 2005; Mallin 
2004), family groups or known as chaebol are the dominant shareholders of the 
companies in South Korea (Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000); banks and other 
financial institutions are the common controlling shareholders in German and Japanese 
companies (Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005; Kaplan 1994); founders and their family 
members are typically the major shareholders of companies in Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Thailand (Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000). In contrast to the outsider system 
or market based system, which insists upon the public disclosure of information, the 
insider system is more prone to a selective exchange of information among insiders. 
The low level of separation of ownership and control could lead to an abuse of power 
by controlling shareholders. They can access insider information to gain advantages 
and influence management decisions (La Porta et al. 2000). Figure 2.2 shows the 
distinguishing features of the two models of corporate governance that prevail in 
different countries.  
 
Figure 2.2: Two models, a World Apart 
Source: Coombes and Watson (2001) 
 
Many countries recognise that local businesses need external funds in order to grow 
and pursue expansion. External investors will only be attracted to the business if their 
shareholder rights are protected, both in the context of country’s legal framework and 
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the corporate governance of individual companies. This leads to increasing pressure 
for legal reform to protect shareholders’ rights and corporate governance reforms 
within the individual companies. Nonetheless, controlling family shareholders have 
the tendency to resist legal pressure for reform as a better protection of minority 
shareholders would dilute their control (Mallin 2004). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
document that the companies in developed market economies such as the United States, 
Germany and Japan are well governed by the legislation. The corporate governance 
systems in most other countries, ranging from poor developing countries, to transition 
economies, to some European countries such as Italy, lack some crucial elements of a 
good system, particularly the legal protection of shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997). LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) urge for the improvement of 
legal environment in order to alleviate the expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Succinctly, the legal system is another critical factor in shaping sound corporate 
governance. The economic growth of a country will be stagnant if the legal system 
does not have or cannot allow for an effective corporate governance system and 
provide good shareholder protection.  
 
Moreover, agency theory advocates suggest that institutional investors15 could serve 
as an external governance mechanism in ameliorating the agency conflict between 
shareholders and management (Hartzell and Starks 2003; Dong and Ozkan 2008).  
Institutional investors manage large pool of investment funds and have a fiduciary duty 
to serve their contributors (Hawley and Williams 1997; Ozkan 2007). As such, 
institutional investors have the incentive to exercise intimate oversight of the 
management in order to reduce agency costs and protect the wealth of their 
contributors. Institutional investors can influence the management by using their proxy 
vote or by selling shares if they are dissatisfied with the management or firm 
performance (Graves and Waddock 1990; Hawley and Williams 1997; Parrino, Sias 
and Starks 2003; Gillan and Starks 2003; Aggarwal et al. 2011). In addition, 
institutional investors can use formal and informal ways, such as shareholder activism 
or the election of board members to influence management (Cubbin and Leech 1983; 
Khan, Dharwadkar and Brandes 2005; Dong and Ozkan 2008). Past studies show that 
                                                 
15 Institutional investors include insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds, and bank trusts  
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institutional investors are effective corporate monitors via corporate performance 
(Cornett et al. 2007; Nguyen, Locke and Reddy 2014); earnings management (Chung, 
Firth and Kim 2002; Koh 2007); director remuneration (Hartzell and Starks 2003; 
Ozkan 2007); and adoption corporate governance practices (Aguilera and Cuervo-
cazurra 2004; Aggarwal et al. 2011). 
 
To summarise, the internal corporate governance mechanisms encompass the board of 
directors and concentrated ownership; while the external corporate governance 
mechanisms include the legal system and institutional investors.  
 
2.3 Theories Influencing the Development of Corporate Governance 
The development of corporate governance has been influenced by many disciplines 
such as finance, economics, accounting, law, management and organisational 
behaviour. Just as many disciplines have influenced the development of corporate 
governance, the theories that have fed into it are quite varied as well. The main theories 
that explicate the development of corporate governance are agency theory, transaction 
cost economics, and stakeholder theory (Mallin 2004; Abdul-Rahman 2006). Agency 
theory comes from the fields of finance and economics; transaction cost economics 
derives from the economic and organisational theory; while a social-oriented 
perspective focuses on stakeholder theory.  
 
2.3.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is discussed in detail under section 3.1, thus this section discusses the 
agency theory relatively briefly. Agency theory identifies the agency relationship 
where one party, the principal, delegates work to another party, the agent. The agency 
relationship can have a number of disadvantages relating to the opportunism or self-
interest of the agent. The agent may not act in the best interests of the principal. The 
agent may misuse his power for pecuniary or other advantages and may not take 
appropriate risks in pursuance of the principal’s interest due to the different attitudes 
toward risk. Moreover, there is the problem of information asymmetry whereby the 
principal and agent have access to asymmetrical levels of information. Practically, the 




In the context of a firm, the managers are the agents while the shareholders are the 
principals (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Agency theory views 
corporate governance mechanisms, particularly the board of directors, as an essential 
monitoring device to minimise principal-agent problems (Fama and Jensen 1983). The 
managers must be monitored and institutional arrangements must provide some checks 
and balances to make sure they do not abuse their power.  
 
In the last few years, there has been increasing pressure on the institutional investors 
to play governance role. This is due to the numerous corporate abuses such as 
overpaying directors for poor performance, corporate collapses and scandals which 
have caused corporate pension funds becoming insolvent and shareholders losing their 
investment.  
 
In short, agency theory views the company as a nexus of contracts where there is a 
connected group of or series of contracts amongst various players. The focus of the 
agency theory is the selection of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms to 
minimise the agency costs. Board of directors, shareholder activism by institutional 
investors, and takeover markets are some of the monitoring mechanisms employed to 
reduce agency problems.  
 
2.3.2 Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is initially developed by Coase (1937), and then 
expounded on by Williamson (1971). TCE is an interdisciplinary alliance of law, 
economics and organisations. TCE is often viewed as being closely related to agency 
theory. While agency theory views the company as a nexus of contracts, TCE views 
the company as a governance structure. As the companies grow in size, whether by the 
desire to achieve economies of scale or by technological advances, they increasingly 
require more capital, which needs to be raised from capital markets; a wider 
shareholder base is then established. Consequently, the problems associated with 
separation of ownership and control arise. Williamson (1985) proclaims that the costs 
of any misaligned actions may be as a result of a judicious choice of governance 




Stiles and Taylor (2001) point out that both TCE theory and agency theory assume 
managers operate under ‘bounded rationality’ and always seek to conduct 
opportunistic behaviour (self-interest seeking) such as misleading, distorting and 
confusing the other party in a contract. ‘Bounded rationality’ means managers will 
tend to satisfy rather than maximise profit, which is not in the best interests of 
shareholders. The opportunism can be mitigated by internal corporate governance 
mechanism such as monitoring mechanism that prevents inappropriate behaviour by 
the agents and report on how well their performance meets the principals’ expectations. 
Thus, the existence of opportunism results in transaction costs in the form of 
monitoring behaviour, safeguarding assets and ensuring the other party does not 
engage in opportunistic behaviour (Grover and Malhotra 2003). Both TCE and agency 
theories regard the board of directors as an instrument of corporate control (Stiles and 
Taylor 2001). 
 
TCE and agency theory basically deal with the same issues and problems. While 
agency theory focuses on the individual agent, transaction cost theory focuses on the 
individual transaction. Agency theory concerns the tendency of managers or directors 
to act in their own best interests such as pursuing perquisites and status. On the other 
hand, TCE concerns managers or directors may arrange transactions in an 
opportunistic way. Distinct from the agency theory, the corporate governance issue 
heightened by TCE is the effective and efficient accomplishment of transactions by 
the company, rather than the protection of the ownership rights of shareholders (the 
focus of agency theory). In short, TCE views the company as a governance structure. 
If the companies use an appropriate governance structure, it can help to align the 
interests of management and shareholders, and indirectly minimise the transaction 
costs incurred.  
 
2.3.3 Stakeholder Theory 
Embedded in the management discipline in the 1970s, stakeholder theory is gradually 
developed by Freeman (1984), incorporating corporate accountability to a broad range 
of stakeholders. Stakeholder theory is in juxtaposition to agency theory. Stakeholder 
theory takes account of a wider group of constituents rather than focusing on 
shareholders. Stakeholder theory posits that every organisation is created to serve a 
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diverse range of people with a broad societal purpose. The theory laments the focus on 
just corporate profit maximisation could result in severe negative consequences for 
human rights, working conditions and the environment (Abdul-Rahman 2006).  
 
Unlike the agency theory which emphasises that managers are working for and serving 
shareholders, stakeholder theory suggests that managers have a network of 
relationships to serve, for instance, suppliers, employees and business partners 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995; Metcalfe 1998). Freeman (1984) contends that the 
network of relationships with many groups can affect the decision-making process. 
Shareholders and stakeholders may favour different corporate governance practices 
and monitoring mechanisms (Mallin 2004). Donaldson and Preston (1995) claim that 
all stakeholders have intrinsic values, and no set of interests is assumed to dominate 
the others. Stakeholder theory dictates that managers have a fiduciary duty to act in 
the interest of all stakeholder groups by giving equal consideration when making 
corporate decisions and choosing an action that will achieve an optimal balance among 
the conflicting claims of these groups (Smith and Hasnas 1999). 
 
2.3.4 Summary  
The development of corporate governance has been influenced by a number of theories. 
Hence, the theoretical frameworks that have evolved are quite varied. There have been 
efforts to converge the corporate governance systems in view of the globalisation of 
financial and product markets, and the increasing proximity of legal and institutional 
norms. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that one should expect a uniform corporate 
governance arrangement in the world (Abdul-Rahman 2006). 
 
The current theories related to corporate governance cannot fully explain the 
complexity and heterogeneity of corporate business. Corporate governance in different 
countries may vary due to its cultural values, and political, social and historical 
circumstances. In this sense, the governance for developed and developing countries 
can vary due to the culture and economic contexts of an individual country. 
 
This thesis adopts agency theory in explaining corporate governance mechanisms in 
the context of a developing country, Malaysia.  
32 
 
2.4 Contextual Background of Malaysia 
Although developing countries in Asia share a range of common governance attributes 
such as concentrated ownership, some characteristics are unique and distinctive to 
particular countries. Malaysia is a multiracial country and the spheres of politics and 
races are inextricably intertwined. Malaysian companies operate in a multi-ethic and 
multicultural environment as well as a unique government and institutional setting.  
 
Malaysia is a federal constitutional monarchy located in Southeast Asia, consisting of 
thirteen states and three federal territories. It is separated by the South China Sea into 
Peninsular Malaysia consisting of eleven states and East Malaysia (Borneo) consisting 
of two states. There are four main ethic communities in Malaysia: i) Malays, ii) 
Chinese, iii) Indians, and iv) other indigenous peoples from the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak, such as Iban, Melanau, Bidayuh and Kadazan Dusun. The Malays and 
indigenous groups are collectively known as Bumiputera (Son of the Soil). As of  2016, 
the largest ethnic community in Malaysia is Bumiputera (68.6%), followed by Chinese 
(23.4%), Indians (7.0%) and others (1.0%) (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2016). 
 
In early years, despite Chinese making up less than one-third of the population, they 
have controlled most of the country’s economy (Gomez 1999; Heng 1997; Jesudason 
1989). The Chinese business ubiquity have elicited the attempt of the Malaysian 
government to redistribute wealth to achieve economic parity among the other ethnic 
communities (Gomez and Jomo 1999). The New Economic Policy (NEP) has been 
introduced and implemented between 1971 and 1990, with the objective to achieve 
national unity by ‘eradicating poverty’ irrespective of race, and by ‘restructuring 
society’ to achieve inter-ethnic economic parity (Jomo 2004; Gomez 1999). The NEP 
aims to correct the economic imbalance by increasing the participation of Bumiputera 
in the economy. One of its targets is to achieve 30% of Bumiputera ownership in the 
corporate sector by 1990 (Gomez and Jomo 1999).  
 
In reality, the NEP is criticised as a positive discriminatory policy favouring 
Bumiputera. The poverty reduction efforts are primarily designed for Bumiputera 
(Jomo 2004). The NEP have successfully increased the Bumiputera’s corporate 
ownership from 2.4% in 1970 to 20.3% in 1990, despite the figure still falling short of 
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the targeted 30% (Rasiah and Shari 2001). When the NEP ends in 1990, the Malaysian 
government has subsequently introduced the National Development Policy (NDP) for 
the period from 1991 to 2000 and the National Vision Policy (NVP) for the period 
from 2001 to 2010, with the aim of achieving a balanced development within a 
framework of rapid growth. In particular, one of the main objectives of the NVP, which 
incorporates the critical thrusts of the previous NEP, is to achieve at least 30% 
Bumiputera participation in all industries by 2010. All publicly listed companies 
(PLCs) must have at least 30% of equity ownership by Bumiputera (Securities 
Commission Malaysia 2001). In this premise, it is elicited that Malaysian PLCs operate 
in a racist discriminatory economy because of the government’s initiatives favouring 
Bumiputera.  
 
Furthermore, Malaysian companies operate in an economy of cronyism and rent-
seeking (Gomez and Jomo 1999). Through the NEP, rents have been created, captured 
and disbursed, ostensibly as part of the government’s policy of ‘restructuring’ to 
achieve greater inter-ethnic wealth parity and develop Bumiputera entrepreneurs. 
Gomez and Jomo (1999) further reiterate the rentier opportunities are distributed to the 
companies controlled by politicians, retired bureaucrats, parties in the ruling coalition 
and politically well-connected businessmen. Bumiputera have been given, among 
other privileges, priority for large government contracts, increased access to capital, 
opportunities to buy assets that have been privatised, and other subsidies (Johnson and 
Mitton 2003). Consequently, Malaysian companies that are not government-linked or 
politically-connected have to build closer ties with the government in order to obtain 
business contracts and projects for business survival (Gomez and Jomo 1999). LaPorta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) document that the companies operating in a 
complicated political environment need to deal with various laws and regulations that 
restrict or subsidise their activities. As a result, in order to avoid the restrictions or to 
get subsidies, the companies need to bribe politicians and regulators, or have political 
ties. In the context of family companies, Carney and Child (2013) document that 22% 
of family companies are politically connected. Their findings evident that the 




Since independence in 1957, Malaysia’s economy has gone through a major 
transformation from heavy reliance on tin mining and rubber plantations to industrial 
based economy. The government has established several policies and agencies to 
promote the industrial sector and encourage foreign investment such as liberal equity 
policy where the foreign investors are allowed to hold 100% equity of the investments 
in new projects as well as any investments in expansion or diversification projects by 
existing companies in the manufacturing sector. The industrialisation and capital 
inflow from foreign investment have successfully boosted Malaysia’s economic 
growth (Ling and Sing 2007). As well, the privatisation of key state enterprises in the 
transport sector, gaming and utilities have further prospered the growth of market 
capitalisation in the 1980s (Thillainathan 1999). 
 
The rapid growth of the Malaysian economy has not diluted the concentrated 
ownership structure of Malaysian companies (Tam and Tan 2007). The concentration 
of ownership and control in most Malaysian PLCs tends to be vested in the block-
holders. The dominant shareholder with concentrated ownership in Malaysian PLCs is 
the family, followed by the government (Carney and Child 2013; Claessens, Djankov 
and Lang 2000). Specifically, 44.7% of PLCs are family-owned companies and 33.5% 
of PLCs are government-owned companies (Carney and Child 2013). The highly 
concentrated ownership and control in Malaysia is a distinctive feature that requires a 
different corporate governance system than the environment with strong investor 
protection and a dispersed ownership structure. Thillainathan (1999) maintains that in 
an environment of concentrated ownership, it is unlikely to limit the manager’s 
discretion through hostile takeovers because no such market may exist given the 
existence of large controlling shareholders.  
 
Due to the frequent acquisitions, take-overs, and mergers and acquisitions by the 
foreigners, the government has established the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) 
to regulate foreign interests in order to minimise the imbalances of local participation 
in Malaysian companies whilst encouraging foreign investment with balanced 
ownership and control. The FIC has implemented FIC Guidelines to regulate the 




In April 2009, the Prime Minister of Malaysia announces the removal of the 30% 
Bumiputera equity requirement for 27 services sub-sectors, disbandment of the FIC 
and the repeal of the FIC Guidelines. This is due to the urgent need for Malaysia to 
undergo a transformation in its pursuit to achieve the status of a developed nation (Hill, 
Tham and Zin 2012). The motives of the disbandment of FIC and the liberalisation of 
certain restrictions are to stimulate economic growth and encourage more foreign 
investments. In 2016, the foreign investments account for 46.8% or equivalent to 
RM27.4 billion of all investments approved for the year. Of this foreign investments 
amounted RM27.4 billion, RM10.3 billion or 37.6% is for new projects while the 
remaining RM17.1 billion or 62.4% is for expansion or diversification projects 
(Malaysian Investment Development Authority 2016). Foreign investors, in 
complying with their investment criteria, demand higher standards of corporate 
governance in investee companies (Emerging Markets Committee 2012).  
 
2.5 Corporate Governance Landscape in Malaysia 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the eruption of several local corporate scandals in 
Malaysia urges the government to consider implementing corporate governance 
system. These local corporate scandals include the irregularities in Renong Berhad, 
the Bumiputera Malaysia Finance (BMF) scandal, the Perwaja Steel Mill fiasco, the 
downfall of Sime Bank Berhad, the corporate misconduct of Technology Resources 
Industries (TRI) Berhad and the massive troubles of Malaysian Airline Systems 
(MAS). The corporate governance efforts are done in a piecemeal manner (Murphy 
2013). The importance of corporate governance has become increasingly appreciated 
when the 1997 Asian financial crisis hit the Malaysian economy. The following sub-
sections provide an overview of the development of corporate governance in Malaysia.  
 
2.5.1 Pre- 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
Malaysia has been under British rule for over eighty years. Despite gaining 
independence on 31st August 1957, the colonial influence is pervasive and evident in 
the enactment of the Companies Act 1965 (CA), which modelled on the English 
Companies Act 1948 and the Australian Uniform Companies Act 1961 (Yap and Guan 
1997). The Companies Act 1965 stipulates the fundamental rules governing the 
procedures for incorporation, the basic constitutional structure, and the cessation of 
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companies. Over the years, the CA has been amended several times to reflect changes 
in the local corporate environment, giving it some Malaysian character. The CA 
stipulates the fundamental corporate governance requirements, among others, 
financial disclosure, directors’ duties and shareholders rights (Teoh and Chuah 1997).  
 
In 1973, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange – KLSE (now known as the Bursa 
Malaysia) has been incorporated. The listing requirements (LRs) of the KLSE is an 
important aspect of corporate governance in Malaysia. Any company seeking to be 
listed in the KLSE is required to include a minimum threshold of stipulated criteria. 
The criteria include the number of shareholders, the value and volume of public shares, 
qualitative criteria pertinent to corporate governance, as well as the credible 
documentation of compliance with those criteria. Over time, the LRs has experienced 
continuous amendments as to enhance the corporate governance and disclosure of 
public listed companies. For instance, in 1987, the LRs introduces the requirement for 
the presence of independent directors on board. In 1993, the LR mandates all PLCs to 
set up an audit committee comprising a majority of independent directors. All of these 
corporate governance initiatives have been implemented well before the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. Nonetheless, prior to the disastrous financial crisis, the LRs does not 
stipulate any obligation to disclose the directors’ remuneration. 
 
The Securities Industry Act 1973 (SIA) has been enacted to supplement the CA. It has 
been repealed and replaced by a similar act in 1983, as to make provisions with respect 
to stock exchanges and persons dealing in securities, and for certain offences relating 
to trading in securities. The establishment of the SIA provides more protection for the 
investors’ interests as well as more specific regulations for the securities industry.  
 
In 1987, the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers has introduced the Malaysian Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers 1987, and issued various practice notes to regulate the 
corporate activities on takeovers and mergers. Nonetheless, takeovers are rare in 
Malaysia. This is due to the large ownership stake of the controlling shareholders, 
which prevents the accumulation of enough shares to threaten the corporate control 




On 1st March 1993, the Securities Commission (SC) has been established under the 
Securities Commission Act 1993 (SCA). It is the central regulatory authority for the 
capital market, which administers the SIA 1983. Upon its establishment in 1993, the 
SC inherits the merit-based regulation (MBR) regime16. In 1996, the SC has decided 
to gradually replace the MBR by adopting disclosure-based regulation (DBR) regime17 
as a necessary progression for the Malaysian capital market to become more efficient 
and to develop into a sound and credible market of international standing. The move 
involves the amendments to several related legislative acts, including the SCA 1993, 
the SIA 1983, the Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991, and also the 
introduction of several new regulatory codes and guidelines, such as Policies and 
Guidelines on Issue/Offer of Securities, and Guidelines on Due Diligence Practices 
1996. 
 
In April 1996, the Registrar of Companies has introduced guidelines to regulate the 
behaviour of company’s directors and secretaries (Guidelines on Voluntary Codes of 
Company Directors and Company Secretaries 1996). The Code of Ethics for Directors 
1996 adopts the principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and corporate 
social responsibility, and covers three main areas: (i) corporate governance; (ii) 
relationship with shareholders, employees, creditors and customers; and (iii) social 
responsibility and the environment.  
 
Succinctly, the PLCs in Malaysia are subject to several major legislative acts namely 
(i) Companies Act 1965; (ii) Listing Requirements of KLSE; (iii) Securities Industry 
Act 1983; (iv) Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 1987; (v) Securities 
Commission Act 1993. Each of these enactments has been amended on several 
                                                 
16 Under the MBR, the SC regulates the offering of securities by assessing the investment merits and 
the pricing of the offering. The regulator assume a paternalistic role in assessing the merit of securities 
to be issued and interposes itself between those seeking to raise funds and those seeking to invest.  
17 Under the DBR, the onus of assessing the merit of any securities rests with the investors whose money 
is being put at risk. The investors assess and determine the investment merits of the offering while the 
SC regulates the disclosure of material information. The rationale for the shift to the DBR include 
enhancing regulatory focus on investor protection, increasing the efficiency of the market by removing 
the deficiencies which exist in an MBR environment, encouraging higher standards of disclosure, 
improving due diligence and corporate governance as well as accountability among promoters and 
directors of public companies, their advisers to investors, and facilitate market discipline on pricing and 
valuation of securities. The shift to DBR takes effect over a period of five years under three phases, 
beginning in 1996, and with full DBR achieved by 2001. 
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occasions, and a majority of the changes are related to improving corporate governance 
practices.  
 
Due to international development on corporate governance and major domestic 
corporate scandals such as the government-owned Perwaja Steel Mill in the mid-1990s, 
a number of new governance initiatives have been undertaken before the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis as to further reform the corporate governance system in Malaysia 
(Lilling 2006). For example, in 1997, the Code on Takeovers and Mergers has been 
revamped as a move towards creating more ‘corporate governance conscious’ boards 
of directors (Lilling 2006). Just few months prior to the onset of the 1997 Asian crisis, 
the Financial Reporting Act has been legislated in the parliament; it introduces a new 
financial reporting framework, with the establishment of the Financial Reporting 
Foundation, and the Malaysia Accounting Standards Board (Cheah 2005).  
 
2.5.2 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
The devaluation of the Thai baht or more commonly referred to as the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis has drastically depreciated the economy of Malaysia and other East 
Asian countries. The economic situation in Malaysia have substantially changed with 
the plummeting of the Malaysian currency and stock market (Sari 2001). The 
Malaysian currency, Ringgit Malaysia (RM) has deflated from a peak exchange rate 
of RM 2.49 to USD 1 in April 1997 to its lowest rate of RM 4.88 on 7th January 1998 
(Jomo 1997). Between 1997 and 1998, the Malaysian Ringgit has depreciated by 45.2% 
against the greenback, while the Composite Index of the KLSE has dropped by 54.7% 
and its market capitalisation has plunged by 57.9% (Ong 1999). 
 
The aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis has alerted the government the 
importance of implementing effective corporate governance mechanisms (The 
Equality Trust 2017; The World Bank 2012). There has not been a consensus about 
the causes of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, but the poor corporate governance 
practices have been widely regarded as the primary culprit. These practices include 
over leveraging by the companies; allegations of cronyism; conglomerate structures 
that are perceived to be given preferential treatment; the existence of a complex system 
of family-controlled companies; poor legal protection for investors against 
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expropriation due to corporate insiders; little or no effective laws to ensure controlling 
shareholders and management treat minority investors equitably and fairly; lack of 
transparency, disclosure and accountability, especially inadequate disclosure of risk 
exposures (Suto 2003; Abdul-Rahman 2006; Claessens et al. 1999). 
 
The 1997 financial crisis has caused the public particularly investors to lose confidence 
in the local stock market, corporate governance, and the financial reporting system in 
Malaysia. This is reflected on the subsequent cash flow movements where there is a 
significant decrease in capital inflows and an increase in capital outflows. The ratio of 
total market turnover to market capitalisation has increased from 0.59 in 1996 to 1.13 
in 1997 (Thillainathan 1999). The problem occurred not merely because of the 
weaknesses in the laws, but also due to the weak enforcement of minority shareholder 
rights, as well as the failure of regulators to take strong actions or impose required 
penalties against violators (Abdul-Rahman 2006). 
 
Consequently, the 1997 Asian financial crisis has resulted in the government taking 
proactive measures to review and strengthen corporate governance in order to regain 
the confidence of investors. The major reforms include the establishment of the: (i) 
High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) in March 1998; (ii) 
Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) in March 1998; and (iii) 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) in August 2000. The details of each 
of these institutional developments are presented in the following sections.  
 
 2.5.3 Post- 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
The post 1997 era witnesses the significant development of corporate governance in 
Malaysia in an attempt to enhance corporate transparency and accountability. This sub-
section outlines the initiatives implemented since 1998. 
 
2.5.3.1 Statutory Reforms 
In March 1998, the High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) 
is established by the Ministry of Finance. It is represented by the senior representatives 
of the government, regulatory bodies, industry bodies and professional associations. 
The primary task of the FCCG is to identify and address weaknesses highlighted by 
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the 1997 financial crisis and to establish a framework for corporate governance best 
practices. The FCCG’s findings are reported through the publication of the Finance 
Committee Report on Corporate Governance (FCCG Report) in 26th March 1999. The 
FCCG Report represents the end-product of an extensive collaborative effort between 
the government and industry, and covers three broad areas: i) the development of the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance which sets out a set of principles and best 
practices for good governance; ii) reform of laws, regulations and rules to strengthen 
the regulatory framework for corporate governance; and iii) training and education to 
ensure the framework for corporate governance is supported by the necessary human 
and institutional capital. 
 
The FCCG is also responsible to review the existing corporate legislation and suggest 
whether legislative or regulatory reform is required to improve them. The SIA has been 
amended in April 1998 in order to enhance and reinforce the power of the Securities 
Commission, and also to institute civil remedies against offenders for insider trading. 
The SIA has been once again amended in 2003 as to incorporate better controls and 
improvements of the securities industry, in terms of its disclosure, enforcement and 
reports. The amended SIA requires annual Regulatory Report on compliance with 
ongoing requirements, as stated in its provision 11E. Through subsequent amendments 
to the SIA, the powers of the SC and the KLSE have been significantly reinforced.  
 
Moreover, an amendment has been made to the SCA 1993 in April 2000, which further 
provides power for the SC to pursue civil action on behalf of investors. With such an 
authority, the SC has taken enforcement actions against the directors and controlling 
shareholders of PLCs. According to a corporate governance assessment by the World 
Bank (2012), the SC has taken over 130 administrative actions, 51 civil actions and 
initiated 45 prosecutions over the last five years. They have also issued dozens of 
warning letters each year for minor infractions. These enforcement actions cover a 
range of offenses, including provision of false and misleading information, and failure 
to comply with rules on takeovers and other SC requirements. Compared to many other 
jurisdictions, the SC has been relatively aggressive in using its power and a range of 
enforcement tools. Notwithstanding this, there have also been notable scandals and 
investigations which remain ongoing. The delay in sanctions imposed on these cases 
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has raised questions among market participants on the willingness to pursue them, 
especially if a prominent person is involved. (The World Bank 2012). 
 
Between 1999 and 2000, several amendments have been made to the CA 1965 to 
incorporate the proposals from the FCCG Report. In 2006 and 2007, the CA has 
experienced another round of significant amendments. Some of the key changes 
include clearer duties of the loyalty and care for directors, recusal requirements for 
conflicted directors, a requirement for shareholders to approve substantial related party 
transactions in line with LRs, a shareholders’ right to file derivative actions on behalf 
of the company in cases where directors may have violated their duties, a requirement 
for companies to establish internal controls, and whistle-blower protection for auditors 
and company officers. However, according to The World Bank (2012), despite CA 
1965 being amended several times, it still contains gaps with respect to shareholder 
rights and is not always clear or explicit in key areas. For instance, the shareholders 
have the right to ‘speak’ but not the right to ask questions; as well as no explicit right 
for shareholders to receive dividends in proportion to their shareholdings or to receive 
them in a timely manner. In addition, the CA offers a weak basis for the issues of 
creditor rights, insolvency and liquidation. More particularly, the World Bank (2012) 
comments that the CA lacks clarity and specifics in key areas, and the market 
participants may not always fully understand relevant parts of it.  
 
In relation to the LRs, it has been revamped in 2001 to implement the 
recommendations of the FCCG Report. About twenty two out of twenty five 
recommendations proposed in the FCCG Report have been incorporated in the 
revamped LRs. The revamped LRs is in line with the MCCG 2000 to enhance 
corporate governance and transparency, enhance efficiency in capital market activities, 
strengthen investor protection, and promote investors’ confidence. The LRs has been 
periodically revised by the Bursa Malaysia, with the approval from the SC, to include 
a number of key corporate governance provisions, covering non-financial and material 
disclosure, rules for related party and major transactions, and the audit committee in 
PLCs. Nevertheless, the World Bank (2012) notes a few omissions in the LRs, 
including clear requirements to disclose key risk factors and the details of board 
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member pay and independence, and the confirmation of the independence of external 
auditor. 
 
Furthermore, the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) has been established 
through the enactment of the Companies Commission of Malaysian Act 2001 to further 
improve the surveillance and enforcement of corporate legislation. The CCM is a 
statutory body formed following the merger of the Registry of Companies (ROC)18 
and the Registry of Business (ROB)19. The CCM is responsible for the administration 
and enforcement of the legislative acts, which include Companies Act 1965, 
Registration of Business Act 1956, Trust Companies Act 1949, Kootu Funds 
(Prohibition) Act 1971 and any subsidiary legislation made under those acts. 
 
The level of statutory requirements has been considerably improved after the 1997 
financial crisis to enhance the corporate governance system in Malaysia. The 
amendments to the existing legislation and the introduction of new legislation have 
further strengthened the enforcement of laws. 
 
2.5.3.2 Institutional Development 
The development of corporate governance in Malaysia has been complemented by 
institutional development. The Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance and the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group have been established in the aftermath of the 
1997 financial crisis to enhance the corporate governance practices in Malaysia.  
 
(i) Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance  
The Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) is established by the 
Finance Committee in March 1998. It is a non-profit public company limited by 
guarantee, with founding members consisting of the Federation of Public Listed 
Companies, Malaysian institute of Accountants, Malaysian Institute of Certified 
                                                 
18 The formation of the ROC during the British colonial period in year 1898 marked the beginning of 
business registration in Malaysia. All companies incorporated in Malaysia, then under the Companies 
Act 1965, are mandatory to register with the ROC, a body that has the regulatory role over those 
companies. 
19 The ROB is established in year 1939 and is responsible for the registration of other businesses, which 
include sole proprietorships and partnerships. 
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Public Accountants, Malaysian institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators, 
and Malaysian Institute of Directors. The missions of the MICG include: i) promoting 
corporate governance; ii) defining corporate governance best practices, and iii) 
facilitating the adoption of corporate governance best practices.  
 
The Finance Committee Report 1999 acknowledges MICG as ‘The Recognised 
Corporate Governance Training Centre’ for raising the awareness and practice of good 
corporate governance in Malaysia  (Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governane 2014). 
Moreover, MICG provides an independent platform for various stakeholders to 
interact and debate corporate governance issues to promote continuous improvement 
in corporate governance best practices. 
 
(ii) Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group  
In addition, the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) is established in 
August 2000 following the recommendations of the Finance Committee Report 1999. 
It is a government initiative to protect the interests of minority shareholders through 
shareholder activism. It is funded by the four founding organisations, which are 
National Equity Corporation, Social Security Organisation, Armed Forces Fund Board, 
and Pilgrims Fund Board. Appendix 2.1 shows the details of each organisation. The 
mission of the MSWG is to promote sustainable shareholder value in companies 
through engagement with relevant stakeholders, with a focus on minority shareholder 
interests.  Malaysia is the only emerging country in East Asia where the government 
has institutionalised the shareholder activism, through the creation of such a 
mechanism.  
 
Over the years, the MSWG has evolved into an independent research organisation 
focusing on corporate governance matters. It provides a platform and collective voice 
to both retail and institutional minority shareholders. This has been the first step 
towards encouraging shareholder activism without resorting to the courts (Minority 
Shareholder Watchdog Group 2013a). Despite its set up, according to Satkunasingam 
and Shanmugam (2006), the shareholders rarely take legal action against a company’s 
directors due to cultural factors in Malaysia. Malaysian society is conditioned to accept 
inequality in power as the norm and Malaysians rarely question or challenge those in 
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power. As individuals in a collective society, they are not comfortable confronting 
others, especially in public and when the conflict is with their social superiors. 
Moreover, the legislature is very much subject to the power of executives and 
politicians, thus the Malaysian society tends to allow powerful individuals to have 
rights to certain privileges because of their status (Satkunasingam and Shanmugam 
2006). In view of the high power distance and collectivist culture of Malaysia (Haniffa 
and Cooke 2002), the establishment of the MSWG is relevant in terms of in raising 
any controversial issues on behalf of minority shareholders.  
 
The explicit connection between the MSWG and minority shareholders originates 
from the fact that the MSWG provides proxy-voting services to dispersed shareholders 
and raises issues on behalf of individual shareholders at the annual general meetings 
(AGMs) (Ameer and Abdul-Rahman 2009). Ameer and Abdul-Rahman (2009) report 
that the MSWG have attended Annual General Meetings (AGM) and Extraordinary 
General Meetings (EGM) of the same company more than once from 2006 to 2008 to 
raise issues that are of potential disadvantage to minority shareholders. Of particular 
importance among the corporate governance issues raised are the remuneration of 
directors, ratification of the personal transactions of directors, and due diligence. In 
2014, the MSWG’s monitoring portfolio numbered 295 companies comprising about 
30% of the total number of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia, and representing 
about 90% of Bursa’s total market capitalisation. During the year, the MSWG analysts 
have attended a total of 400 companies’ meetings, comprising 295 AGMs and 105 
EGMs. Many issues have been raised for the benefit of minority shareholders in terms 
of strategic, financial, operational and corporate governance issues. (Minority 
Shareholder Watchdog Group 2014a).  
 
Ameer and Abdul-Rahman (2009) document that the Malaysian companies targeted 
by the MSWG earn statistically significantly higher stock returns than non-targeted 
firms over the long run. Moreover, they report significant increases in the earnings and 
cash flow from operations in the MSWG-targeted companies as compared to non-
targeted companies one year after initial MSWG activism. They document that there 
is a lack of MSWG involvement in the family companies. Later, Azizan and Ameer 
(2012) extend the studies of Ameer and Abdul Rahman (2009) by segregating 
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companies into family-controlled and non-family-controlled. They report that the 
targeted family-controlled companies have higher cash flows from operations than 
non-targeted companies as well as an improved financial performance after the 
shareholders’ intervention led by the MSWG. This suggests that the shareholder 
activism led by the MSWG have disciplined the management of the family companies 
to improve firms’ performance. However, they assert that the management of the 
family-controlled companies are entrenched and reluctant to change their value-
decreasing operations even the concerns are raised by the MSWG.  
 
To recap, Ameer and Abdul-Rahman (2009) and Azizan and Ameer (2012) show that 
the MSWG plays a critical role in addressing agency problems in Malaysian 
companies. Its intervention has resulted in improvements in the profitability of 
companies as well as an increase in shareholder wealth. However, there is a lack of 
MSWG involvement in family companies, and the family shareholders are entrenched 
and unwilling to change despite the MSWG has raised concerns on particular issues.  
 
2.5.3.3 Developments of Codes and Best Practices 
In addition to statutory legislation and institutional developments, several codes 
related to corporate governance have been introduced in a continuous effort to enhance 
the corporate governance practices in Malaysia, such as Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (MCCG), Corporate Governance Blueprint (CG Blueprint) and Malaysian 
Code for Institutional Investors (MCII). 
 
(i) Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
The recognition of corporate governance in Malaysia is significantly evidenced by the 
release of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) in March 2000. The 
MCCG is derived from the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee Report 1992, 
Greenbury Committee Report 1995, Hampel Committee Report 1998, and Higgs 
Committee 2003 in the United Kingdom. Malaysia is the first Asian nation to 
implement the code on corporate governance. The compliance with the MCCG is 
voluntary. Notwithstanding this, the revamped LRs 2001, Paragraph 15.26, requires 
the PLCs to state in their annual reports on the extent of their compliance with the 
MCCG, and the reasons for any non-compliance.  
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The MCCG consists of four parts: Part 1 outlines the principles of corporate 
governance (focuses on the boards of directors, director remuneration, shareholders, 
accountability and auditing); Part 2 establishes the best practices in corporate 
governance (focuses on the role of boards of directors, accountability and auditing and 
shareholding); Part 3 recommends the principle and best practices for other corporate 
participants (investors and auditors); and Part 4 provides explanatory notes to earlier 
parts of the MCCG (High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance 2000). 
 
The Economist (2015) documents that the introduction of MCCG in the 2000 and its 
integration with the LRs in the 2001 has an substantial effect on the shareholders’ 
wealth, increasing share price performance by an average of about 4.8%. This suggests 
that the corporate governance reform is well received by the market. The MCCG has 
been revised in 2007 to emphasise the role and responsibilities of the board of directors, 
the audit committee and the internal audit function. Salleh and Haat (2014) report that 
the audit committee characteristics such as audit committee expertise, audit committee 
independence, audit committee disclosure, and the frequency of meetings, possess a 
negative association with earnings management after the revision of MCCG in 2007. 
This implies that the revised MCCG 2007 has improved the quality and strengthened 
the effectiveness of the audit committee.  
 
The MCCG has gone through second round of revision in 2012 after taking into 
account the changing market dynamics, international developments, and the need to 
continuously recalibrate and enhance the effectiveness of the corporate governance 
framework (Securities Commission Malaysia 2013). The MCCG 2012 takes effect on 
31st December 2012. It sets out 8 broad principles followed by 26 corresponding 
recommendations. Some of the key amendments and areas that have been strengthened 
in the revised MCCG 2012 include:  
 
(i) Independence of independent directors: The tenure of independent directors 
is capped to a cumulative period of nine years. The board should provide strong 
justification to the shareholders for retaining independent directors who have 
reached the nine-year term limit. Listed companies should seek shareholders’ 
approval at the nearest AGM before the director reaches the nine-year term limit. 
47 
 
Shareholders’ approval should be sought annually after the nine-year term limit. 
The rotation of independent directors within a group of companies is not 
advisable. Failure to seek shareholders’ approval for the extension of the tenure 
of any independent director prior to the nine-year term limit must be explained 
in the annual report. 
 
(ii) Separation of Chairman and CEO: The positions of Chairman and CEO 
should be held by different individuals and the chairman must be a non-executive 
member of the board. Where the Chairman is not an independent director, the 
board should comprise a majority of independent directors. The responsibilities 
of the Chairman should include leading the board in the oversight of 
management, while the CEO focuses on the day-to-day management of the 
company and this division should be clearly defined in the board charter. Listed 
companies that do not comply with any of the recommendations of the MCCG 
2012, including the separation of the positions of chairman and CEO, must 
explain their circumstances and reasons or justifications for doing so in their 
annual report. 
  
(iii) Remuneration of directors: The board should establish formal and transparent 
remuneration policies and procedures to attract and retain directors. A 
Remuneration Committee can perform this function. 
 
(iv) Relationship between company and shareholders: The board should 
encourage shareholder participation at general meetings and voting on 
resolutions by way of poll. The board is encouraged to put substantive 
resolutions to vote by poll and make an announcement of the detailed results 
showing the number of votes cast for and against each resolution. Substantive 
resolutions are those which are not procedural and administrative in nature; for 
example, the appointment of directors and auditors, approval for issuance of 
shares, share buy-backs, related party transactions and resolutions that are tabled 
by way of supplementary circular to shareholders. 
 
(Securities Commission Malaysia 2013) 
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On the back of the development in corporate governance, this study is expected to a 
make timely contribution by investigating the effectiveness of key corporate 
governance attributes strengthened by the revised MCCG 2012; the independent 
variables of this study include the tenure of independent directors, CEO-chairman role 
duality, remuneration committee, and institutional investors (shareholders); whilst the 
remuneration of executive directors is the dependent variable.  
 
(ii) Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011 (CG Blueprint) 
In July 2011, the SC has introduced the Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011 (CG 
Blueprint), to engender a shift in corporate governance culture from mere compliance 
with rules to one that more fittingly captures the essence of good corporate governance. 
The CG Blueprint outlines the strategic initiatives aimed at reinforcing individual and 
market discipline, and promoting greater internalisation of the culture of good 
governance. There are 35 broad recommendations in total. One of the 
recommendations in CG Blueprint is the formulation of a new-industry-driven code 
for institutional investors. The new code requires institutional investors to explain how 
corporate governance has been adopted as an investment criteria and the measures they 
have taken to influence, guide and monitor investee companies. In addition, it 
stipulates that the institutional investors should intervene when there are concerns 
about the issues such as the investee company’s strategy, operational performance, 
acquisition or disposal strategies, any failures in internal controls, inadequate 
succession planning, inappropriate remuneration packages, and the failure of 
independent directors to properly hold executive management to account  . The CG 
Blueprint is aimed at deepening the relationship of trust between companies and 
stakeholders (Securities Commission Malaysia 2011). 
 
(iii) Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors 2014 (MCII)  
Institutional investors can sometimes exert a significant influence on corporate 
governance, especially when they hold significant stakes in their investee companies. 
Recognising their important role, the SC and MSWG have jointly launched the 
Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors on 24th June 2014, which is the first of such 
initiative in the ASEAN region. The MCII is one of the deliverables of the CG 
Blueprint and is collectively developed by Malaysia’s largest institutional investors, 
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namely Employees Provident Fund (EPF), Retirement Fund (KWAP), Armed Forces 
Fund Board (LTAT), National Equity Corporation (PNB), Social Security 
Organisation (SOCSO), and Pilgrims Fund Board (LTH).  
 
The MCII is a voluntary code which sets out the broad principles of effective 
stewardship by institutional investors, followed by the guidance to help institutional 
investors understand and implement the principles. The MCII states that institutional 
investors are the major players in the global economy that can exert a significant 
influence over their investee companies. They should be committed to effective 
corporate governance and consider acting collectively with other investors where 
appropriate to promote good corporate governance (Securities Commission Malaysia 
and Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 2014). The MCII provides guidance on 
effective exercise of stewardship responsibilities towards the delivery of sustainable 
long-term value to the institutional investors’ ultimate beneficiaries or clients. There 
are six key principles for institutional investors: 1) disclose the policies on their 
stewardship responsibilities; 2) monitor their investee companies; 3) engage with 
investee companies as appropriate; 4) adopt a robust policy on managing conflicts of 
interest which should be publicly disclosed; 5) incorporate corporate governance and 
sustainability considerations into the investment decision-making process; and 6) 
publish a voting policy. 
 
The recommendations for institutional investors in the MCCG, the CG Blueprint as 
well as the issuance of the MCII clearly demonstrate that the Malaysian government 
relies on the institutional investors to enhance the corporate governance practices of 
listed companies. However, the monitoring role of institutional investors in governing 
the investee companies has yet to be tested empirically. This study makes a timely 
contribution by investigating the influence of institutional investors on executive 
remuneration in an enhanced corporate governance landscape. 
 
The evolution of corporate governance discussed, including statutory and non-
statutory legislations is summarised in Table 2.1. For the purpose of this study, the 
milestone of corporate governance development is described up till 2014. The MCCG 
has been further revised in 2017. While the key principles and recommended practices 
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in the revised MCCG 2012 remains largely intact, the revised MCCG 2017 emphasises 
the strengthening of the independence of board directors, board diversity, transparency 
of directors remuneration, audit committee, and risk management committee, among 
others (Securities Commission Malaysia 2017) .    
 
Table 2.1: Milestones of the corporate governance development in Malaysia 
Year  
1965 Enactment of Companies Act 1965 
1973 Establishment of Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (now known as Bursa 
Malaysia) and Listing Requirements (LRs) 
1973 Enactment of Securities Industry Act (SIA) 
1987 Introduction of Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
1993 Establishment of Securities Commission (SC) under the enactment of 
Securities Commission Act 
1996 Introduction of Guidelines on Voluntary Codes of Company Directors 
and Company Securities by Registrar of Companies (ROC) 
1997 Legislation of Financial Reporting Act 
1998 - Establishment of High Level Finance Committee on Corporate 
Governance (FCCG) by the Ministry of Finance 
- Establishment of Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) 
1999 Publication of FCCG Report 
2000 - Establishment of Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) 
- Introduction of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
2001 Establishment of Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) under the 
enactment of Companies Commission of Malaysian Act  
2007 Revision of MCCG 
2011 Introduction of Corporate Governance Blueprint 
2012 Second revision of MCCG 
2014 Introduction of Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors (MCII) 
 
2.6 Effectiveness of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
This section discusses the current standing of Malaysian corporate governance based 
on the findings of the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes by the World 
Bank (2012), the Balancing Rules and Flexibility Study by KPMG and ACCA (2014), 
and the Malaysia-ASEAN Corporate Governance Report by the Minority Shareholder 








2.6.1 Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
According to the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes 201220, Malaysia’s 
individual score has surpassed the average of six Asian countries, namely Indonesia, 
India, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam. Figure 2.3 shows the 
assessment of Malaysia’s corporate governance score versus regional averages. The 
gaps ranges between 5% and 22%. The assessment reveals that Malaysia is a regional 
leader in corporate governance and has achieved high levels of compliance in a number 
of key areas, both fundamental as well as sophisticated subjects such as the prohibition 
of insider trading and implementation of high-quality accounting standards (The 
World Bank 2012). 
 
Figure 2.3: Malaysia’s corporate governance versus regional averages 
assessment
 
Source: The World Bank (2012) 
                                                 
20 The Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) is a joint initiative of the World 
Bank and IMF to help member countries to strengthen their financial systems by improving compliance 
with internationally recognised standards and codes. It is introduced as part of a series of measures to 
strengthen the international financial architecture after the 1997-1998 financial crisis.  
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2.6.2 Balancing Rules and Flexibility Study by ACCA and KPMG  
The Balancing Rules and Flexibility Study is a study of corporate governance 
requirements by ACCA and KPMG across 25 markets, including 10 developed 
countries and 15 developing countries. The study focuses on the clarity, degree of 
enforceability, and the number and type of instruments used by the markets analysed. 
It also calls for the governments to work towards meeting global requirements based 
on the OEDC Principles of Corporate Governance.  
 
Table 2.2: High scoring markets in the development of corporate governance  
Highest scoring markets 
1. United Kingdom** 
2. United States** 
3. Singapore** 
4. Australia** (equal 4th) 
5. India* (equal 4th) 
6. Malaysia* (equal 4th) 
7. Hong Kong** (equal 7th) 
8. Russia* (equal 7th) 
9. Brazil* 
10. Taiwan** 
Mid-range scoring markets 
11. South Africa* (equal 11th) 
12. Thailand* (equal 11th) 
13. Korea** 
14. UAE* 
15. New Zealand** 









24. Brunei* (equal 24th) 
25. Laos* (equal 24th) 
** denotes developed country 
*   denotes developing country 




The 201421 study reports that Malaysia (along with India) is leading other developing 
countries in corporate governance requirements, as shown in Table 2.2. Overall, 
Malaysia has emerged fourth (jointly with India and Australia) out of 25 countries, 
scoring just below the developed countries, namely United Kingdom, United States 
and Singapore, in the development of corporate governance requirements. Malaysia 
has adopted a balanced approach, consisting of a blend of legislation, the CG Codes 
and guidelines.  
 
Nevertheless, there are some areas that have been flagged as being less well-defined 
in Malaysia’s corporate governance framework, such as disclosure on the director’s 
time and resources, stakeholder engagement, risk governance, shareholder rights and 
remuneration structure, which warrant closer study (KPMG and ACCA 2014).  
 
2.6.3 ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard 
The ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard, funded by the Asian Development 
Bank, is one of the initiatives under the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum to raise 
corporate governance standards in companies from the region. It provides a rigorous 
methodology benchmarked against international best practices including the OECD 
principles of corporate governance to assess the corporate governance performance of 
publicly listed companies in the six participating ASEAN member countries, namely 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. This 
methodology provides comparable information for foreign investors and external fund 
managers to facilitate their investment decision-making.  
 
The Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group22 uses the ASEAN Corporate Governance 
scorecard to assess Malaysian PLCs and their compliance with the recommended 
principles and best practices of corporate governance. Table 2.3 shows the trend on 
corporate governance average base score from 2009 to 2015. Based on the score points, 
Malaysian PLCs show an improvement in corporate governance practices over time. 
The average base score of 60.23 points in 2014 is slightly lower than the 61.59 points 
                                                 
21 The last Balancing Rules and Flexibility Study is conducted in 2014. 
22 The Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group is appointed by the Securities Commission Malaysia as 
the Domestic Ranking Body to use ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard. 
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the previous year. The decline could be attributed to more parameters in the ESG & 
Sustainability areas that smaller companies are not able to cope with, hence 
contributing to the lower average score (Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 
2014b).  
 
Table 2.3: Trend on corporate governance average base score from 2009 to 2015  
Year No. of companies 
assessed 
Average Base Score 
2009 899 52.00 
2010 898 55.60 
2011 820 57.50 
2012 500 56.70 
2013 862 61.59 
2014 873 60.23 
2015 870 62.98 
Source: Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (2015) 
 
In relation to the directors’ remuneration, based on the Malaysia-ASEAN Corporate 
Governance Report 2015, there remains insufficient disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration by Malaysian PLCs. Only a small fraction, about 9% of the companies 
assessed in 2015 compared to 8% in 2014, disclose the details of remuneration of each 
director, including the CEO. In 2015, only 27% or 234 of the 870 companies provides 
the shareholders the opportunity, as evidenced by the agenda item, to approve total 
remuneration. Malaysian PLCs are predominately represented by family companies, 
whereby most of the shareholders and directors are related by family relationships. 
The family shareholders have a tendency to approve remuneration packages of their 
family members based on emotion and incumbent ties. 
 
2.6.4 Complaints and Concerns of Investors 
Although Malaysia fares relatively high in corporate governance scoring among Asian 
countries, investors have expressed concern over the implementation of corporate 
governance. Specifically, in 2011, the MSWG receives several investor complaints 
concerning minority rights being sidestepped, certain rights not offered to minority 
shareholders, sales of shares at a premium by major shareholders but not accorded to 
the minority shareholders, insider trading, etc. (Minority Shareholder Watchdog 
Group 2011). The MSWG finds out that a director is paid approximately RM33.4 
million in 2012 compared to about RM8.4 million in 2011, a huge increase of around 
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300%. The remuneration is a sharp increase in one year and constitutes roughly 14% 
of the company’s net profit of RM232.70 million for the year (Minority Shareholder 
Watchdog Group 2013a). 
 
In 2013, the MSWG receives several complaints from the investors, requesting the 
MSWG to take up their issues collectively. Among others, the issues concern about 
the questionable related party transactions, excessive remuneration, and minority 
shareholders’ rights being side-lined (Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 2013a). 
Again, in 2014, investors have requested the MSWG to raise their issues, which 
include excessive directors’ remuneration, and selective disclosure of materials 
(Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 2014a). Since 2011, the concern of investors 
has centred on the issues of expropriation of minority rights, excessive directors’ 
remuneration and other corporate governance issues. 
 
2.7 Summary 
Corporate governance has attracted global attention when large companies such as 
Enron in the United Kingdom and WorldCom in the United States collapsed in 2001 
and 2002 respectively. Whereas in Asia, prior to the turmoil of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, corporate governance does not appear to be emphasised. The 1997 
Asian financial crisis is the watershed for the corporate governance evolution in 
Malaysia. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a number of no less significant 
governance measures have been introduced prior to 1997. Some earlier local corporate 
scandals in Malaysia have contributed to the impetus for greater corporate governance 
regulations. However, this effort has been done in a piecemeal manner. After the 1997 
financial crisis, the Malaysian government and market regulators have taken proactive 
approaches to transform the corporate governance landscape in an attempt to enhance 
corporate transparency and accountability, as well as to rebuild the confidence of 
investors. The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, introduced in 2000, is the 








This chapter reviews the relevant literature as a prelude to the development of the 
hypotheses. The literature review provides a basis for understanding the area of 
research on executive remuneration. The hypotheses are formulated to test the 
association between executive remuneration and (i) family participation on board, (ii) 
corporate governance mechanisms, and (iii) institutional ownership. 
 
This chapter reviews four strands of literature on family companies, executive 
remuneration, corporate governance mechanisms, and institutional ownership. The 
organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.1 reviews the literature on agency 
theory. Specifically, Type I agency conflict in the widely held companies and Type II 
agency conflict in the companies with concentrated ownership structure are reviewed. 
Section 3.2 discusses the family companies where the Type II agency conflict is their 
prevalent corporate governance issue. This section presents the operational definitions 
of family companies used by prior studies and provides a general understanding of the 
features that are unique to a family company. Section 3.3 reviews the past studies on 
executive remuneration. Section 3.4 provides an overview of family companies and 
executive remuneration in the Malaysian context. Section 3.5 discusses the literature 
related to family participation on board, corporate governance mechanisms, and 
institutional ownership; thereafter lead to the hypotheses development. Section 3.6 
shows the conceptual schema of this study. Lastly, section 3.7 provides the summary 
of this chapter. 
 
3.1 Agency Theory 
The mainstream literature explains accounting policy choices on the basis of agency 
theory (Godfrey et al. 2006). Although there are other economic theories, Morris (1987) 
states that these theories are closely linked and conceptually consistent with the agency 
theory tenets discussed below. Agency theory is cited most often to explain the 
managerial decision making (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). Agency theory, derived 
from the positivist accounting theory, is the most influential accounting research 
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approach in explaining and predicting economic-based phenomena. Agency theory has 
long been employed as the theoretical framework by the remuneration studies (Jensen 
and Murphy 1990; Conyon and Peck 1998; Murphy 1999; Cyert, Kang and Kumar 
2002; Elston and Goldberg 2003; Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Combs et al. 2007; 
Devers et al. 2007; Sapp 2008; Lim and Yen 2011; Theeravanich 2013; Veliyath et al. 
2016).  
 
The separation of ownership and control in large corporation is first popularised by 
Berle and Means (1932). It has since been examined extensively in the academic 
literature. Jensen and Meckling (1976) formalise the conflicts of interest arose due to 
the separation of ownership and control in their agency theory and define an agency 
relationship as a contract in which the principals delegate the authority to the agents to 
perform some tasks on their behalf. In the context of a company, the agents such as 
the board of directors and managers perform tasks on behalf of the principals such as 
shareholders (Godfrey et al. 2006).  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) postulate that the separation of ownership and control 
provides management with the incentive to pursue self-serving utility-maximising 
behaviour at the expense of shareholders’ interests. The cornerstone of classical 
agency theory is that the interests of shareholders and managers tend to diverge. The 
managers are self-motivated and the goals of shareholders and managers conflict due 
to the non-alignment of their interests. The  managers can use their discretion to benefit 
themselves personally via several ways such as empire building (Williamson 1964). 
Some actions of the managers may be hidden from the shareholders, known as moral 
hazard problem; the managers may pursue an agenda at the expense of shareholders 
without incurring punishment from the shareholders (Holmström 1999). 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) illustrates how the conflict between a company’s shareholders and 
its managers may arise. Generally, when the managers’ wealth is not tied directly to 
the firm value by share ownership, the managers may behave opportunistically to 
maximise their own welfare. They may misuse their power and influence for pecuniary 
benefits or other advantages, and may not take appropriate risks in pursuance of the 
shareholders’ long-term wealth maximisation interests. In the context of a company, 
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the crux of the matter is the possible information asymmetry between the managers 
and shareholders. The agency relationship dictates that the managers have an 
information advantage. The managers are opportunistic and are strongly motivated to 
take profit from the information asymmetry between them and the shareholders (Fama 
and Jensen 1983). Consequently, the shareholders may face dilemmas due to their 
inability to accurately evaluate and determine the value of decisions made. The 
managers may therefore take advantage of the unobservability of their actions to 
engage in the activities that enhance their personal goals. Losses resulting from the 
managers’ bounded self-interests motivate shareholders to bear agency costs in order 
to avoid suffering loss (Alchian and Woodward 1988). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
divide these agency costs as those comprising (i) monitoring cost incurred by the 
principals to control the agents’ behaviour, (ii) bonding costs whereby the agents try 
to show they are not self-serving, and (iii) residual loss as a result of agents’ decision 
that diverge from the principals’ interest. The managers bear these costs as the greater 
these costs, the lower the rewards. Hence, the focus of the classical agency theory is 
on determining the most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship 
in a company (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt 1989). 
 
Agency theory advocators suggest that an optimal remuneration contract could align 
the interests of managers with that of the shareholders (Jensen and Murphy 1990). In 
the agency model, shareholders set the remuneration of managers, and that 
remuneration should be based on the firm performance. However, Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004) refute this optimal contracting approach of remuneration. They argue that the 
managers have the power to influence their own remuneration packages and obtain 
remuneration more favourable than they would get under the arm’s length bargaining 
with shareholders. Their power enables them to extract rents23. Geiler and Renneboog 
(2011) coincide with the arguments of Bebchuk and Fried (2004) by providing the 
evidence of managerial self-dealing, abuse of managerial power and various forms of 
hidden remuneration. Succinctly, executive remuneration induces agency problem 
rather than mitigating it. 
 
                                                 
23  Rents refer to the excess returns that the individuals obtain due to their positional advantages 
(Bebchuk and Fried 2004). 
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The agency problem in a company gives rise to corporate governance issue (Hart 1995). 
Much discussions on corporate governance problem highlight the failure of managers 
to act in the best interests of the shareholders in widely held companies. The goal 
divergence and different risk preference between the shareholders and management 
are the fundamentals of agency problem. 
 
Agency problem arises due to the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Berle and Means 1932), thus theoretically, family companies face less 
severe agency conflict (McConaughy 2000) as the controlling shareholders tend to 
appoint their family members to the top management team (Moores and Craig 2008; 
Chen, Hsu and Chen 2014). In other words, there is a limited separation between the 
ownership and control in a family company. Schulze et al. (2001) refute Jensen and 
Meckling’s agency model as it ignores the agency threats in the owner-managed 
companies. Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri (2003) and Steier (2003) 
proclaim that the agency issues in family companies are more complex due to the 
juxtaposition of economic and non-economic goals. In the last decade, the researchers 
in finance and economies have increasingly realised that the traditional 
conceptualisation of principal-agent conflict does not account for the reality of 
principal-principal conflict (see section 3.1.2) that is prevailing in the companies with 
concentrated ownership structure (Young et al. 2008). The controlling shareholders 
(principals) may seek private benefits or expropriate at the expense of minority 
shareholders (another principals) in many ways, such as transfer of assets to the 
controlling shareholders at non-market price, consuming perquisites, special dividends, 
excessive remuneration arrangement, and tunneling activities (Johnson et al. 2000; 
Anderson and Reeb 2003; Faccio, Lang and Young 2001). 
 
In a nutshell, there are two types of agency conflicts: (i) principal-agent conflict or 
popularly known as Type I agency conflict (Jensen and Meckling 1976); and (ii) 
principal-principal conflict or best known as Type II agency conflict (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). The former exists between the shareholders (principals) and 
management (agents) when the ownership and control are separated, while the latter 
exists between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in the 
companies with concentrated ownership structure, such as family companies. Section 
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3.1.1 and section 3.1.2 discuss the principal-agent conflict and principal-principal 
conflict respectively. 
 
3.1.1 Principal – Agent Conflict / Type I Agency Conflict 
Principal-agent conflict, or known as the Type I agency conflict, spans from the notion 
that there is mismatching of interests between the shareholders (principal) and 
management (agent) of a company. Classical agency theory states that there is an 
inherent conflict between a company’s shareholders and its management; the 
management may not always act in the best interests of shareholders. The shareholders 
are interested in maximising firm value, but the managers tend to enhance personal 
wealth, job security, and prestige (Jensen and Meckling 1976). When the ownership 
and control are separated, the managers have substantial power. They may use their 
power and discretion to benefit themselves personally, which deviate from the 
shareholders’ interests (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
 
When this incongruence of interest exists, the shareholders find way to reduce the 
possibility of opportunistic actions undertaken by the managers. In order to ensure the 
managers act in the best interest of the shareholders, the agency theory advocators 
maintain that the remuneration of managers should depend on the firm performance 
(Murphy 1986; Jensen and Murphy 1990). An optimal remuneration contract will tie 
the managers’ utility to shareholders’ wealth by depending on verifiable performance 
benchmarks (Jensen and Murphy 1990). Under the optimal contracting approach, 
remuneration design is viewed as a remedy to mitigate the agency conflict between the 
shareholders and managers. Its notion is that, shareholders design optimal 
remuneration packages to provide the managers with incentives to align their mutual 
interests (Jensen and Murphy 1990).  
 
Nonetheless, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) criticise the optimal contracting view of 
remuneration, instead they propose managerial power approach. They argue that the 
managers in the publicly traded companies without a controlling shareholder could use 
their substantial power to extract remuneration more favourable than they could obtain 
under the arm’s length bargaining with the shareholders. In other words, the managers 
have the power to design their own remuneration packages when the ownership and 
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control are separated. Besides, prior studies have pointed out some features of 
remuneration design which seem to reflect managerial rent-seeking rather than the 
provision of efficient incentives (Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1994; 
Yermack 1997; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Geiler and Renneboog 2011). Thus, 
agency problem manifests itself in the remuneration design when the ownership and 
control are separated.  
 
One of the central problems in a principal-agent relationship is the executive 
behaviours are unobserved by the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The 
shareholders find it difficult to observe how the executives operate and manage the 
company. Fama and Jensen (1983) put forward that the board of directors can be 
considered as a monitoring mechanism to address the principal-agent problem. 
Shareholders elect the board of directors to act on their behalf, and the board in turn 
monitors the top management and ratifies major decisions (Hart 1995). However, the 
effectiveness of board is doubtful. This is because the board consists of executive 
directors and non-executive directors; it would hardly be reasonable to expect the 
executive directors to monitor themselves (Hart 1995). Hence, external or non-
executive directors are required to be part of a board in order to monitor board activities 
and represent shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983; Hassan, Christopher and Evans 
2003; Husnin, Nawawi and Salin 2016). 
   
Nonetheless, there are controversial views on the monitoring role played by the 
external or non-executive directors on board (Hart 1995). According to Hart (1995), 
they may not do a very good monitoring job for several reasons. Firstly, the non-
executive directors may hold more important or executive positions in other corporate 
boards and probably have little time to monitor the company’s affairs. Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) concur with the former by showing CEO remuneration 
is higher when the external directors serve on more than three other boards. Secondly, 
the non-executive directors may not have any significant financial interests in the 
company; hence, they may have little to gain personally from the improvement in firm 
performance (Hart 1995). Thirdly, the non-executive directors owe their positions to 
the management who proposed them as the directors. Thus, they would show their 
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loyalty to the management in order to be re-elected and continue to collect fee (Hart 
1995).  
 
To address the board ineffectiveness and alleviate the agency problems, the policy 
makers and regulators introduce several corporate governance principles and reports, 
among others, the Cadbury Committee Report 1992, Greenbury Report 1995, and 
Hampel Committee Report 1998. These codes on corporate governance principles 
recommend numerous best practices to enhance the board autonomy. For instance, the 
board chairman should be independent, the roles of board chairman and CEO should 
be separated, there should be a balance between executive and non-executive directors, 
there should be a formal selection procedure for non-executive directors, executive 
directors’ pay should be subject to the deliberations of a remuneration committee, the 
remuneration committee should consist mainly or entirely of non-executive directors, 
to state a few. (Cadbury Committee 1992; Greenbury Committee 1995; Hampel 
Committee 1998). In the similar vein, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(MCCG) stipulates several corporate governance recommendations such as the role 
separation of CEO and board chairman, independence reinforcement of independent 
directors, establishment of remuneration committee to design remuneration packages, 
to state a few. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) document that the companies 
with weaker corporate governance structures have greater agency problems, and that 
CEOs at companies with greater agency problems receive high remuneration. Their 
findings report that CEO remuneration is higher when the CEO is also the board 
chairman and the external directors are appointed by the CEO. Further, Basu et al. 
(2007) find out that the top executive remuneration is higher in the companies with 
weaker corporate governance mechanisms. Their results unveil that the companies 
with weaker corporate governance mechanisms have greater principal-agent problems, 
and the top executives in these companies receive higher pay. On this premise, 
corporate governance mechanisms are highly recognised and recommended by the 
policy maker and prior studies to ameliorate the principal-agent problem.  
 
Furthermore, prior literature suggests that institutional investors could serve as an 
external monitoring mechanism to mitigate the principal-agent problem (Janakiraman, 
Radhakrishnan and Tsang 2010; Hartzell and Starks 2003; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997), by comparing the effectiveness of institutional 
shareholders in monitoring corporate managers across different countries, conclude 
that institutional investors help to ameliorate agency problems and pressure the 
management of investee companies to improve the firm performance. Besides, 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) find out the institutional ownership is positively related to 
the pay-for-sensitivity. Janakiraman, Radhakrishnan, and Tsang (2010) report that the 
institutional ownership is more negatively associated with executive remuneration in 
the companies with low level of managerial ownership than in the companies with 
high level of managerial ownership. McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016) note that 
the intervention of institutional investors in management is primarily driven by the 
concerns about corporate governance or strategy rather than the short-term issue. 
Recognising the importance of institutional investors in enhancing the corporate 
governance and alleviating the agency conflict, the Securities Commission Malaysia 
and Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group launched the Malaysian Code for 
Institutional Investors (MCII) in 2014 (see section 2.5.3.3). Being the first of such code 
in the ASEAN region, the MCII provides guidance on the effective exercise of 
stewardship responsibilities towards the delivery of sustainable long-term value to the 
institutional investors’ ultimate beneficiaries or clients. 
 
The classical agency theory is based on the premise that the managers will not manage 
a company as diligently as the owners expected when the ownership and control are 
separated (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). Corporate governance 
mechanisms such as the board of directors and institutional investors are suggested by 
prior literature (Fama and Jensen 1983; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Hartzell and Starks 
2003; Basu et al. 2007; McCahery, Sautner and Starks 2016) and recommended by 
policy makers and regulators (Cadbury Committee 1992; Greenbury Committee 1995; 
Hampel Committee 1998; Securities Commission Malaysia 2012) to alleviate 
principal-agent problem.  
 
3.1.2 Principal – Principal Conflict / Type II Agency Conflict 
The theoretical analysis of the impact of family ownership on agency costs is that: 
compared to the widely held companies with a dispersed ownership structure, family 
companies with a concentrated ownership structure are less exposed to the agency 
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problem due to the limited degree of separation between ownership and control 
(Carrasco-Hernandez and Sánchez-Marín 2007; McConaughy 2000). According to 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), the founding family of a company tends to hold 
concentrated ownership and usually appoints their family members to hold the top 
management positions. The commitment of family would lead to more intense 
monitoring of managers’ behaviour, thereby minimising the principal-agent problem 
that frequently exists in the widely held companies. They find out the family 
companies perform better than the non-family companies.  
 
Nevertheless, there is an argument that the family ownership and control is detrimental. 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) document that there are potential agency costs to 
the minority shareholders from having an entrenched controlling shareholder. Faccio, 
Lang, and Young (2001) relate that family control leads to wealth expropriation and 
hampers the firm performance. In addition, Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, and 
Gutierrez (2001) report that family ownership and control is associated with greater 
managerial entrenchment in the Spanish companies.  
 
Another type of agency conflict arises when the controlling shareholders and/or their 
family members involved in the management. There is a probability of expropriation 
of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders who are managing the 
companies. This is known as principal-principal problem or Type II agency conflict 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). In a family company, the family enjoys substantial control 
as a result of concentrated ownership and domination of the board directorship (Ali, 
Chen and Radhakrishnan 2007). This control gives the family power to seek private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. 
 
In the last decade, the researchers in finance and economies have increasingly realised 
that the traditional conceptualisation of principal-agent conflict does not account for 
the reality of principal-principal conflict that is prevailing in the family companies 
(Young et al. 2008). Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri (2003) and Steier 
(2003) maintain that the agency issues in family companies are more complex due to 
the juxtaposition of economic and non-economic goals of the family. The restricted 
ownership weakens the external governance and gives rise to the problems of self-
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control when a company is led by a powerful shareholder (Schulze et al. 2001). 
Filatotchev, Zhang, and Piesse (2011) contend that family shareholders have the 
motivations of using private information to extract private benefits at the expense of 
minority shareholders for their own financial gain within a less transparent corporate 
structure. This contention concurs with the information asymmetry as advocated in 
extant literature (Berle and Means 1932; Akerlof 1970; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). In 
the context of the companies with concentrated ownership structure, the controlling 
shareholders have an information advantage over the minority shareholders. The 
minority shareholders are disadvantaged by their inability to accurately evaluate and 
determine the value of the decisions made by the owner-managers. Principal-principal 
conflict and the lack of protection of minority shareholders have been highlighted as 
the major corporate governance issues in the emerging economies (Fan and Wong 
2005; Young et al. 2008). 
 
Based on the studies of Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) on nine East Asian 
countries, Malaysia is among the four countries that shows a high degree of 
expropriation of minority shareholders. In Malaysia, the majority of public listed 
companies have concentrated ownership structure, and that ownership is typically 
concentrated in the hand of a family (Carney and Child 2013; Claessens, Djankov and 
Lang 2000). Thus, the principal-principal problem is likely to be more prevalent in the 
Malaysian context and is more applicable to this study. The prominent agency problem 
in family company is not that of diverging interests between the shareholders and 
management as suggested by classical principal-agent approach. Rather, it is the 
family’s incentive to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders 
(Barontini and Bozzi 2011). In the family companies, the major agency problem occurs 
between the controlling and minority shareholders (Young et al. 2008). The conflict is 
exacerbated due to the minority shareholders having little opportunity to monitor the 
activities of controlling shareholders or to check their power within the companies.  
 
The predominance of family companies shapes particular corporate governance 
challenges and opportunities not always considered in the markets where the 
ownership is dispersed and the management is mainly composed of external and hired 
specialists (OECD 2009). Arcot and Bruno (2012) report that the ownership structure 
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affects a company’s compliance with corporate governance provisions. In particular, 
they find out the family companies are less likely to comply with corporate governance 
standards, especially with the provisions related to the monitoring role of the board 
(e.g. the existence of independent non-executive directors). They also document that 
family shareholders endogenously choose the company’s optimal governance 
structure, which does not conform to the standard governance practices recommended 
or prescribed by law. Young et al. (2008) proclaim that the Type II agency conflict in 
companies with concentrated ownership structure alters the dynamics of the corporate 
governance process and hence, requires mechanisms different from those deals with 
traditional Type I agency conflict. On this premise, it is ambiguous whether the board 
of directors and institutional investors suggested by prior literature and policy makers 
to mitigate Type I agency conflict in widely held companies are applicable to lessen 
the Type II agency conflict in family companies with concentrated ownership structure. 
This study directly addresses these theoretical and empirical gaps over a period where 
there are changes in corporate governance landscape. The next section reviews the 
nature and dynamics of family companies which are considered as ubiquitous form of 
corporate establishment. 
 
3.2 Family Companies 
Family business is the most pervasive form of organisation in the world (LaPorta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999; Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer 2003; Lee 2006; 
OECD 2009) although the percentage they represent varies according to the 
operational definition being used and the country being studied. There is no universally 
accepted operational definition for a family company.  
 
Barnes and Hershon (1976, 106) define family companies as those ‘controlling 
ownership is rested in the hands of an individual or of the members of a single family’.  
Davis (1983, 47) defines family companies ‘are those whose policy and direction are 
subject to significant influence by one or more family units. This influence is exercised 
through ownership and sometimes through the participation of family members in 
management’. Barry (1989, 293) defines a family company as ‘an enterprise that, in 
practice, is controlled by the members of a single family’. Gallo and Sveen (1991, 181) 
define family business ‘as a business where a single family holds the majority of shares 
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and has total control, and that family members form part of the management and make 
the most important business decisions’. Anderson and Reeb (2003) use the 
shareholdings of a founding family and/or the presence of family members on the 
board of directors to identify a family company. Chrisman, Chua, and Litz (2004) 
measure a family company based on (i) ownership; (ii) management; and (iii) an 
expectation of trans-generational management succession within the family. Poza 
(2010) defines family companies as those in which (i) two or more members of a single 
family have an ownership control of 15% or more; (ii) strategic influence by family 
members on management; (iii) concern for family relationships; and (iv) the possibility 
of continuity across generations. Croci, Gonenc, and Ozkan (2012) measure a family 
company based on the shareholdings of a controlling shareholder – company with a 
controlling family shareholder who has at least 10% of outstanding shares, or 
alternatively, the largest shareholder owning at least 10% of outstanding shares who 
is ultimately controlled by a family. Fernando, Schneible, and Suh (2014) classify a 
company as a family company if the founder and/or his or her descendants hold 
positions in the top management or on the board of directors or are among the 
companies’ largest shareholders. 
 
Based on the definitions given in past literature, two common features characterise a 
family company, viz, controlling ownership and family management. In essence, 
extant literature generally concurs that family involvement via ownership and/or 
management is what makes the family companies distinctive from other forms of 
organisation. 
  
In the United States, approximate one-third of all companies in the S&P 500 index are 
family businesses (Anderson and Reeb 2003). Faccio and Lang (2002) report that 
about 44% of Western European companies are family-controlled24. Based on the 
studies by Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Carney and Child (2013) on nine 
East Asian countries 25 , namely Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
                                                 
24 The percentages of family companies of each Western European country examined by Faccio and 
Lang (2002) are shown in Appendix 1.1. 
25 The percentages of family companies of each East Asian country examined by Claessens, Djankov, 
and Lang (2000) and Carney and Child (2013) are shown in Appendix 1.2. 
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Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand, the most common form of corporation 
is family company. In Asia, most of the family businesses are first-generation 
companies, in contrast to many family companies in Europe and United States, which 
are already in their fourth or even fifth generation (Fan et al. 2011).  
 
According to Credit Suisse (2010), the Credit Suisse Family Index comprising the 
United States and European family-controlled stocks outperformed S&P 500 index, 
MSCI World index, and DJ Global Titans index from 2002 to 2010. Likewise, Asian 
family companies delivered superior return on equity (ROE) versus the regional 
average from 2001 to 2010 (Fan et al. 2011). Taken together, their findings show that 
family companies around the world deliver superior performance. According to Fan et 
al. (2011), family companies have been the key engine driving the remarkable 
development of the Asian economics since the Second World War. They are a crucial 
source of private wealth creation in Asia over the past few decades, as well as the key 
players in the strategic industries, commercial activities, and financial markets in the 
region. In addition, numerous studies attest family companies make an important 
contribution to a nation’s economic growth and wealth creation (Astrachan and 
Melissa Carey 2003; Basu 2004; Morck and Yeung 2004; Poza 2010; PWC 2016a).  
 
Steier, Chrisman, and Chua (2004) document that the agency issues in family 
companies are more complex due to the juxtaposition of economic and non-economic 
goals. There is a need to balance between the family personal goals and multiple 
stakeholders’ objectives such as profits growth. In family companies, the entrenched 
ownership and asymmetric altruism could create unique agency problems (Schulze, 
Lubatkin and Dino 2003; Schulze et al. 2001). The parent may be unusually generous 
to their children and enable them to free-ride, which aggravates the moral hazard 
problems. Furthermore, the identity, personal pride, and self-concept of family are 
closely tied to the business, as the family members see their images and reputations 
are intimately connected to the companies they own (Dyer and Whetten 2006). The 
perceptions of others on the company directly affect their reputations and images. Due 
to their intimate attachment to the company, the ability of family members to exercise 
authority and control over the business represent their emotional satisfaction (Schulze 
et al. 2001). Morck and Yeung (2004) posit that family companies are highly self-
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interested and merely want to protect their own parochial interests. Notwithstanding 
this, the embedded altruism in family businesses allows family shareholders 
(principals) and management (agents) to share common interests and be strategically 
aligned in building the business’s core competencies (Chrisman, Chua and Litz 2004; 
Eddleston, Kellermanns and Sarathy 2008).  
 
The overlap between ownership and management in family companies brings 
additional challenges to an effective corporate governance structure (Tam and Tan 
2007; Jiang and Peng 2011). Family business literature documents that family 
shareholders may adopt different corporate governance practices in order to protect 
the family’s interests, such as practising CEO-chairman role duality and electing 
family members to the board of directors rather than hiring external professionals (Tam 
and Tan 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011). The board of directors in family company is 
likely to be less effective in monitoring when family shareholders have strong 
involvement in the management (Kowalewski, Talavera and Stetsyuk 2010). Family 
shareholders has an informal yet powerful influence on the way that the companies are 
run, with both positive and negative outcomes (Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino 2003; 
Schulze et al. 2001). The family ownership and commitment to the business may be 
understood as adding value, provided that the company and the controlling family can 
respond to the concerns of the investor community (OECD 2009).  
 
Based on the prior studies, family companies possess certain advantages (Demsetz and 
Lehn 1985; Anderson and Reeb 2003; Fan et al. 2011; Zellweger 2017) and 
disadvantages (Johnson et al. 2000; Faccio, Lang and Young 2001; Villalonga and 
Amit 2006; Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino 2003). The following sections, 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, 
discuss the advantages and disadvantages respectively. 
 
3.2.1 Advantages of Family Companies 
The particular advantage of a family company, among others, is the alignment of 
interests between the shareholders and managers who are from the same family 
(Zellweger 2017; Jensen and Meckling 1976). According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), concentrated ownership and management in the same hands could bring about 
the alignment of interests between the shareholders and management. The family 
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relationships between shareholders and managers lead to particular level of trust and 
goal alignment. The interest alignment could spare family companies costly control 
and lessen the agency conflict between the shareholders and management, or Type I 
agency conflict (Zellweger 2017). In other words, having family members in the 
management and ownership could bring the advantage of aligning the interests of both 
groups.  
 
In addition, the long-term nature of family relationship is advantageous in monitoring 
and disciplining managers as the controlling family shareholders can act to mitigate 
managerial expropriation (Fama and Jensen 1983; Demsetz and Lehn 1985; LaPorta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999). According to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), the 
family’s historical presence, concentrated ownership, and the control of management 
place them in an advantageous position to monitor the company. These large and 
concentrated shareholders have more incentives than the diverse shareholders to avoid 
the conflicts between shareholders and managers and maximise the firm performance. 
Since the family’s welfare is closely tied to the firm performance, family members 
have strong incentives to monitor professional managers and the way the company is 
managed. In short, due to the economic incentive, controlling shareholders monitor the 
management intensely. Consequently, the free-rider problem associated with non-
family companies with diverse shareholders could be lessened. Besides, Credit Suisse 
(2007) documents that family shareholders often appoint family members to sit on the 
corporate board with the aim of improving corporate governance and influencing 
company’s strategic orientation. This can prevent the management from pursuing 
targets that might not be aligned with the interests of the company, such as maximising 
short-term share price rather than firm value. 
 
Further, James (1999) claims that controlling family has a longer investment horizon, 
leading to greater investment efficiency. He documents that family companies invest 
more efficiently than non-family companies because the family shareholders intend to 
pass the business to succeeding generations. Casson (1999) concurs with this argument 
by positing that founding families view their businesses as an asset to pass on to their 
descendants rather than wealth to consume during their lifetimes. Since the controlling 
family shareholders intend to pass their holdings to the descendants, they have a strong 
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ground to keep their companies in good condition and their interests lean towards 
longer term. Unlike the companies with a highly diversified shareholder base, family 
companies tend to focus less on the next quarterly results and implement strategies that 
are earnings-accretive over a much longer time horizon (Credit Suisse 2007). 
According to Fan et al. (2011), Asian family businesses typically focus on long-term 
investment horizons, rather than boosting current earnings. The long-term perspective 
Asian family companies do not head for exit during times of market turbulence. Their 
long-term commitment is exemplified by their frequent share buyback activities during 
market downturns (Fan et al. 2011). 
 
Moreover, previous studies evident the superior performance of family companies. By 
using S&P 500 companies, Anderson and Reeb (2003) report that family companies 
outperform non-family companies and have higher valuations. Besides, they also find 
out that the CEOs who are the founders or their descendants exhibit a positive relation 
with the accounting profitability measures. Similarly, Maury (2006), by using a sample 
of 1672 West European nonfinancial companies, reports that the valuation and 
profitability of family companies is respectively 7% and 16% higher than their non-
family counterparts. Andres (2008), by examining 275 German listed companies, 
documents that family-controlled companies are more profitable than both widely held 
companies and companies with other types of block-holders. Likewise, Amit et al. 
(2015) show that the family-controlled companies in China have significantly better 
performance than non-family companies, regardless of how the performance is 
measured – ROA, Tobin's q or industry-adjusted q. Moreover, according to Credit 
Suisse (2015), between 2006 and 2015, the CS Global Family 920 Universe 26 
demonstrate an excess return of 4.5% compound annual growth rate versus the MSCI 
All Countries World Index (ACWI). In the long term perspective, family companies 
with concentrated ownership structure tend to achieve superior returns and higher 
profitability than the companies with a fragmented shareholder structure. The OECD 
(2009) identifies several factors, known as ‘the family business edge’, that contribute 
                                                 
26  In order to analyse the family business model and establish whether the risks of concentrated 
ownership and limited control are justified by superior returns, the Credit Suisse established a database 
of 920 publicly listed companies globally that have a market capitalisation of at least US$ 1 billion and 
family-owned shareholding of at least 20% equity, which is known as ‘CS Global Family 900 Universe’. 




to the ability of family businesses generating value for all shareholders: (i) long-term 
view in decision-making, (ii) ability and willingness to adopt unconventional strategies, 
enabling family businesses to respond rapidly to the changing market circumstances 
and giving them the flexibility to take advantage of opportunities and address emerging 
risks, (iii) desire to build a business for future generations, translating to a focus on 
sustainability and reducing the risk that controlling shareholders will run down 
company assets and destroy value, and (iv) commitment of family management to their 
company, providing continuity in the way the business is run. 
 
Succinctly, family companies posit certain advantages compared to non-family 
companies: (i) interest alignment between the shareholders and management  (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Credit Suisse 2015; Zellweger 2017), (ii) better board monitoring 
by controlling shareholders due to economic incentive (Fama and Jensen 1983; 
Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Jensen and Meckling 1976), (iii) longer investment horizon 
(Casson 1999; James 1999), (iv) focus on long-term strategic goals and sustainability 
(Fan et al. 2011; OECD 2009), and (v) better firm performance compared to non-
family companies (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Fan et al. 2011; Credit Suisse 2015). 
  
On the other side of coin, family businesses face challenges which they need to address 
in order to obtain the trust of investors and make the business sustainable in the long 
run. There are numerous studies suggesting the disadvantages of family companies, 
which are discussed in section 3.2.2. 
 
3.2.2 Disadvantages of Family Companies 
Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino (2003) put forward that family companies are vulnerable 
to voting imperfection and entrenchment. The CEOs of family companies generally 
wield power that is disproportionate to their shares of ownership. The disproportionate 
power may come from familial sources such as the head of family or hierarchical 
sources such as the leader of company. Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel, and Gutierrez 
(2001) argue that family companies have higher managerial entrenchment compared 
to widely held companies because the emotions that the family have in running the 
business may bias the perception of directors’ competence, reducing the monitoring 
effectiveness. In other words, family status may cause biased judgment about the 
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appropriateness of executive decisions. McConaughy (2000) finds out that the tenure 
of the family members of controlling shareholders is almost three times longer than 
that of the non-family directors (17.6 versus 6.43 years). In the similar vein, Gomez-
Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel, and Gutierrez (2001) report that the family CEOs retain their 
tenure much longer than their performance justifies. They report that family CEOs 
remain on the job seven years longer than non-family CEOs when the probability of 
corporate failure is high. Besides, Sarbah, Quaye, and Affum-Osei (2016) note that the 
suggestions and decisions of non-executive directors to remove non-performing 
executive directors are usually ignored in Ghananian family companies because those 
executive directors have close ties with the controlling shareholder such as family and 
friends. The selection and removal of executive directors in family companies are 
featured by favouritism and nepotism. In short, due to the family entrenchment, family 
CEOs or directors remain powerful despite the firm performance does not justify their 
continued tenure.  
 
According to Backman (2006), apart from aiming for profits and market share, the 
Asian family companies exists to (i) give family members a job, (ii) hold the family 
together, (iii) honour the ancestral founders of the company, (iv) have the family’s 
prestige and honour. Consequently, the direction and management of family 
companies may be determined more by the families’ agenda rather than by the 
principles of corporate governance. In addition, Crespí–Cladera and Gispert (2003) 
report that the corporate governance of the US family companies is weaker than the 
non-family companies. They document that the emotional ties among family members 
affect the adoption of corporate governance best practices. Fernández-Aráoz, Iqbal, 
and Ritter (2015) relate that among others, the culprits of family businesses failure 
around the world are the inadequacy of corporate governance and poor talent 
management. Carney and Child (2013)27, by comparing the findings of Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang (2000), report that the percentages of listed family companies in 
East Asian countries decrease significantly after the 1998 financial crisis. Many family 
companies delisted because of the financial crisis. Their findings evident the 
                                                 




vulnerability of family companies to financial crisis due to the lack of sound corporate 
governance. 
 
Family shareholders tend to appoint unqualified family members to hold the key 
positions rather than hiring professional directors (Carney 1998; Claessens, Djankov 
and Lang 2000; Lee 2004; Park, Li and Lien 2015). Pinheiro and Yung (2015) 
document that family shareholders may be lax in evaluating their family members, 
promoting them over more skilled non-family directors. The appointment of 
incompetent family directors could be detrimental to the firm value. Anderson and 
Reeb (2004) show the evidence of poorer performance in the US family companies 
when the number of family directors exceeds the independent directors on the board. 
Jameson, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2014) also find out that Indian family 
companies have a lower Tobin’s Q compared to their non-family counterparts. In 
essence, the involvement of the controlling shareholders and their family on the board 
of directors appears to be costly for the minority shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) relate that the reluctance of family shareholders to fire incompetent family 
directors is likely to lead to higher agency costs. The dominant family philosophy gives 
the family CEOs and directors the benefit of relieve, where they are more likely to 
claim that disappointing results are due to the uncontrollable factors or unfortunate 
circumstances rather than their incompetence (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011). Further, 
Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel, and Gutierrez (2001) document that family shareholders 
are more likely to blame and dismiss the non-family directors when firm performance 
deteriorates. The family entrenchment protects the family directors and deflects the 
negative firm performance attribution to the non-family directors, despite the family 
CEOs or directors exercise more direct control over the decisions that lead to poor 
performance in the first place. 
 
Moreover, kinship reduces the effectiveness of board monitoring because the 
relationships between family shareholders and family directors are based on the 
emotions, sentiments and informal linkages (Schulze et al. 2001). Gomez-Mejia, 
Nuñez-Nickel, and Gutierrez (2001) document that sibling rivalry, generational envy, 
non-merit-based remuneration and irrational strategic decisions could harm the firm 
value. Apart from appointing family members, family shareholders also tend to 
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appoint directors who are their friends and/or have fiduciary relationship with the 
company such as attorneys and accountants. This further compromises the board 
autonomy and vigilance (Ford 1988; Nash 1988). DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) 
highlight that family shareholders will ensure that the management serves family 
interests, either through themselves or through professional managers.  
 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), controlling shareholders who gain nearly 
full control of the firm have the tendency to generate private benefits that are not shared 
by the minority shareholders. They may represent their own interests which do not 
coincide with the interests of other investors, such as stability and capital preservation 
(Lee 2004). Besides, the controlling shareholders have great potential to entrench 
themselves at managerial positions and expropriate economic wealth from the 
company. They could expropriate minority shareholders in many ways such as transfer 
of assets to controlling shareholders at non-market price, consuming perquisites, 
special dividends, excessive remuneration, related party transaction and tunneling 
activities (Johnson et al. 2000; Anderson and Reeb 2003; Faccio, Lang and Young 
2001). DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) show the evidence of family shareholders 
extract private benefits through special dividends, excessive incentive scheme, and 
related party transactions. Basu et al. (2007) find out that higher executive income is 
associated with greater family influence over the boards in Japanese companies. Taken 
together, their studies show the evidence of wealth transfer from outside shareholders 
to family shareholders. 
 
In a nutshell, family companies possess certain possible disadvantages: (i) family 
CEOs and directors are highly entrenched due to the incumbent relationships with 
controlling shareholders (Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel and Gutierrez 2001; Schulze, 
Lubatkin and Dino 2003), (ii) the direction and management of company may be 
determined more by the family’s agenda rather than by the principles of corporate 
governance (Backman 2006), (iii) distortion of effective board monitoring due to 
reserving board seats such as CEOs, board chairmen, or board directors for unqualified 
family members rather than hiring competent directors (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; 
Carney 1998; Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000; Lee 2004), as well as appointing 
external directors who are friends or have fiduciary relationship with controlling 
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family shareholders (Ford 1988; Nash 1988), (iv) expropriation of minority 
shareholders through several ways such as special dividends, lavish remuneration 
payout, related party transactions and tunneling activities (Johnson et al. 2000; Faccio, 
Lang and Young 2001; Lee 2004; Basu et al. 2007).  
 
Family companies face unique challenges. Many failures of family companies indicate 
that such companies face a multitude of challenges which risk destroying shareholders’ 
value and even the business itself (OECD 2009; Credit Suisse 2015). OECD (2009) 
documents that corporate governance mechanisms could lead to long-term success and 
keep peace in the family companies. Fernández-Aráoz, Iqbal, and Ritter (2015) 
maintain that family businesses around the world fall due to the inadequate corporate 
governance structure. It is ambiguous which corporate governance mechanisms best 
suit the family companies, especially in the countries with weak legal protection of 
minority shareholders, such as Malaysia. This thesis addresses this issue by 
investigating whether the board of directors and institutional investors could be the 
effective corporate governance mechanisms of executive remuneration in Malaysian 
listed family companies. 
 
3.3 Executive Remuneration 
Executive remuneration is one of the most debated topics in corporate governance 
literature. The sky-high executive pay has attracted the public attention and became a 
hot button issue among the academia, practitioners, policy makers, regulators, media, 
and institutional investors (Sapp 2008; Barontini and Bozzi 2011; Croci, Gonenc and 
Ozkan 2012; McCahery, Sautner and Starks 2016). Most of the remuneration studies 
focussed on CEO pay and conducted in the context of developed countries (Lewellen 
and Huntsman 1970; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989; DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1991; 
Boschen and Smith 1995; Finkelstein and Boyd 1998; Bryan, Hwang and Lilien 2000; 
Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri 2003; Khan, Dharwadkar and Brandes 
2005; Ozkan 2007; Stevens and Nina 2008; Jiang, Ahsan and Clive 2009; Fahlenbrach 
2009; Croci, Gonenc and Ozkan 2012; Kuo and Yu 2014). The directors’ remuneration 
has started to receive attention in the 2000s (Brick, Palmon and Wald 2006; Abdullah 
2006; Basu et al. 2007; Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman 2009). Despite a wealth of 
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research on CEO and directors’ remuneration, little is known about its determinants in 
family companies (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri 2003). 
 
The 2008 global financial crisis has fuelled the serious criticism of corporate 
governance pertinent to remuneration setting (Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2011). The 
ungoverned excessive remuneration payout in financial institutions is widely 
perceived as a core contributor to the crisis (Blinder 2009; Hoble 2014). The incentives 
given to the CEOs and top executives encouraged excessive risk-taking, which 
eventually led to the financial crisis. Furthermore, several high profile corporate 
scandals and collapses, which include Enron, WorldCom, HIH Insurance, and Tyco 
have heightened the importance of corporate governance. The executives and board 
directors of those companies have been subjected to criminal and civil actions over 
hidden debt, insider trading, inflated earnings, misuses of funds, and breaches of 
fiduciary duties  (Garg 2007). Ridiculously, the main culprits behind some of the 
corporate scandals such as Waste Management, Adelphia, and Satyam are the 
companies’ founders and family members. Few questions arise: Do they deserve their 
remuneration packages? Do they care for the firm sustainability, especially the family 
executives who often perceived to have the intention of passing the business to their 
next generations? 
 
The perception that directors are receiving lavish remuneration packages, which often 
seems to have little reward to the shareholders in terms of firm performance, has 
fuelled the interest in this area (Mallin 2004). The linkage between the executive 
remuneration and firm performance has been examined extensively as early as 1960s 
in the context of the developed countries, particularly the United States (Marris 1963; 
Williamson 1964). The number of studies on this subject rises significantly during 
1980s and 1990s (Lewellen, Loderer and Martin 1987; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989; 
Jensen and Murphy 1990; Mangel and Singh 1993; Finkelstein and Boyd 1998). 
Murphy (1999) documents that this is due to the emerging trend of the separation of 
ownership and control in corporation and the acceptance of agency theory by the 
scholars. This is evident in the United States’ literature where most of the studies 
employ agency theory as the tenet to examine pay-performance link (Lewellen and 
Huntsman 1970; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989). Nonetheless, those early studies 
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focus on the CEO pay rather than the remuneration of all directors. Directors’ 
remuneration has started to receive attention only in the 2000s (Brick, Palmon and 
Wald 2006; Basu et al. 2007; Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman 2009; Dah and Frye 
2017). Prior studies show mixed findings for the pay-performance link. There are 
numerous studies reporting a positive pay-performance relationship (Jensen and 
Murphy 1990; Conyon and Peck 1998; Kato and Long 2006; Ozkan 2011; Mendez, 
Garcia and Rodriguez 2011; Gregg, Jewell and Tonks 2012; Yatim 2013; Lin, Kuo 
and Wang 2013; Rampling, Eddie and Liu 2013). This is consistent with the notion of 
classical agency theory which suggests remuneration as a tool to align managerial 
interests with the shareholders’ interests.  
 
Nonetheless, there are also empirical studies showing a negative relationship between 
CEO remuneration and firm performance (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999; Brick, 
Palmon and Wald 2006; Abdullah 2006). The negative pay-performance relationship 
is interpreted using the rent extraction and managerial power argument (Bebchuk and 
Fried 2003; Bebchuk, Fried and Walker 2002). The managerial power approach claims 
that the excessive CEO remuneration is attributed to the greater power of CEO over 
the board of directors, which allows the former to set own remuneration packages and 
extract rents. Furthermore, the weak corporate governance structure and submissive 
board allow the CEOs to determine their remuneration partly or fully (Bebchuk and 
Fried 2003). Moreover, Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) explain their findings of 
negative pay-performance link as an evidence of cronyism between the CEO and 
directors.  
 
Over the years, corporate governance mechanisms have been identified as a 
complementary factor in influencing the executive remuneration. Core, Holthausen, 
and Larcker (1999) and Basu et al. (2007), by using the sample of American companies 
and Japanese companies respectively, report that top executive remuneration is higher 
in the companies with weaker corporate governance mechanisms. They claim that the 
companies with weaker governance mechanisms possess greater agency problems, as 
reflected in the higher remuneration which does not commensurate with the firm 
performance. Past studies show a positive association between EO remuneration and 
board size, an attribute of corporate governance mechanisms (Coakley and Iliopoulou 
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2006; Kashif and Mustafa 2012; Ozkan 2011; Ghosh and Sirmans 2005; Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker 1999; Jensen and Murphy 1990). They explain the findings in 
two ways. When the board size increases, the free rider problems among the directors 
also increase. Larger board size results in coordination and communication problems, 
and subsequently hinders the board effectiveness in monitoring CEO remuneration. 
Alternatively, another interpretation is that the larger board size results in better 
monitoring, which in turn improves the firm performance. CEO remuneration is hence 
increased as a reward. Kashif and Mustafa (2012) document that the increasing board 
size indicates more capable and eligible people which are well equipped with resources 
and skills become part of the company. This could subsequently improve the firm 
performance, market position, and company goodwill; thus, intensify the CEO pay.  
 
To date, the empirical studies in relation to the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms on executive remuneration in the context of non-US companies are 
limited  (Yoshikawa, Rasheed and Brio 2010; Kuo and Yu 2014). In order to contribute 
to the literature gap as well as theoretically contribute to the Type II agency problem, 
this study examines the influence of various corporate governance mechanisms on 
executive remuneration of family companies, which include independent non-
executive directors, tenure of independent non-executive directors, CEO-chairman 
role duality, remuneration committee, and institutional ownership. The literature 
review of each corporate governance mechanism is discussed in section 3.5.  
 
3.4 Family Companies and Executive Remuneration in Malaysia  
This section provides an overview of family companies and executive remuneration in 
the context of Malaysia. Section 3.4.1 presents the definition of family by Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirements; sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 discuss the pervasiveness and 
significant economic contribution of family companies in Malaysia respectively; and 
section 3.4.4 reviews the literature of remuneration studies in the Malaysian context. 
 
3.4.1 Definition of Family by Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 
Under Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements Chapter 1 – Definitions and 
Interpretation, Part A Section 1.01, family refers to an individual who is in relation to 
a person, in which such person falls within any one of the following categories: (a) 
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spouse, (b) parent, (c) child including an adopted child and step-child, (d) brother or 
sister, and (e) spouse of the person referred to in (c) and (d). Pursuant to the Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirements Chapter 9 – Continuing Disclosure, Appendix 9C, 
public listed companies (PLCs) are required to disclose the family relationships 
between the directors and/or major shareholders.  
 
The family relationships between the directors as well as the family relationships 
between the directors and major shareholders can be found under the section Profile 





3.4.2 Pervasiveness of Family Companies  
The Malaysian public listed companies are characterised by concentrated ownership 
structure, dominance of controlling shareholders in the management, and limited 
minority shareholders protection (Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000; Liew, Alfan and 
Devi 2014). Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), by using 20% as the equity 
threshold, report that 67.2% of the Malaysian public listed companies are family-
owned in 1996. A decade later, Carney and Child (2013) report a decrease in the 
percentage of family companies; family companies account for about 44.7% of public 
listed companies in 2008. Their findings reveal that the percentage of family 
companies declines modestly after the 1998 financial crisis. They unveil that large 
number of family companies delisted due to the vulnerability to financial crisis, and 
some companies change from family-owned to government-owned. Notwithstanding 
this, family ownership remains the prevalent type of corporate ownership in Malaysia. 
Specifically, the corporate ownership is dominated by family (44.7%), followed by 
government (33.5%), widely held (18.1%), and foreign state (3.7%). According to a 
recent research done by Credit Suisse (2017), Malaysia ranks the seventh globally in 
terms of the number of family-owned businesses. 
 
Amran and Che-Ahmad (2010), by using the data between 2003 and 2007, report that 
the mean value of family ownership of the Malaysian listed family companies is 
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approximately 42.79%, with the maximum value of 84.14%. Likewise, Azizan and 
Ameer (2012), by using the data from 2005 to 2009, report the mean family ownership 
of 45.05%.  
 
3.4.3 Significant Economic Contribution by Family Companies 
Family companies are the essential sources of wealth creation in Asia including 
Malaysia (Fan et al. 2011). According to Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), in 
1996, the corporate assets held by the largest 15 families in Malaysia contribute to 
approximate 76.2% of GDP.  Besides, they also report that the top 5 families controlled 
17.3% of total market capitalisation; the top 10 families controlled 24.8% of total 
market capitalisation; and the top 15 families controlled 28.3% of total market 
capitalisation. Their findings suggest that a relatively small number of families 
effectively control Malaysian economies. In recent year, a research done by the Credit 
Suisse reports that Malaysian listed family companies contribute approximately 67.0% 
of nominal GDP in 2010 (Fan et al. 2011).  
 
3.4.4 Executive Remuneration 
In order to govern the executive remuneration, the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance, Part 1 Section B, stipulates the following recommendations: 
 
I. The Level and Make-up of Remuneration 
Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract and retain the directors needed 
to run the company successfully. The component parts of remuneration should be 
structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance, in the case of 
executive directors.  
 
II. Procedure 
Companies should establish a formal and transparent procedure for developing policy 








The company’s annual report should contain details of the remuneration of each 
director. 
 
(High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance 2000; Securities 
Commission Malaysia 2007, 2012) 
 
Despite the existence of corporate governance principles, the actual and true directors’ 
remuneration in Malaysia is generally dubious (Lim and Yen 2011). There is only a 
handful of listed companies disclosing the exact amount of remuneration received by 
each director and the executive share options (Lim and Yen 2011; Chu and Song 2012; 
Bushon and Hassan 2015). According to the one of the MSWG reports prepared by 
Bushon and Hassan (2015), director remuneration has been receiving increased 
scrutiny by the shareholders. Specifically, the issue concerns expropriation of profits 
at the expense of minority shareholders through excessive remuneration. In addition, 
several empirical studies suggest the possible expropriation of shareholders through 
excessive remuneration. For instance, Abdullah (2006) reveals that the directors in the 
loss making companies receive excessive remuneration. Besides, Barrock (2002, cited 
in Abdullah 2006), show an evidence of fund misappropriation; a Malaysian company 
did not pay dividends to its shareholders in the past few years, but its directors receive 
lavish remuneration. Furthermore, Malaysian Business’s survey on the highest paid 
directors reports that the total director payout in top 20 companies increased by 22% 
from 2009 to 2010 (Hamsawi 2011). The survey also unveils that more than half of 
the highest paid directors in Malaysia are the CEOs or board chairmen of family 
companies, such as Genting, Berjaya, and YTL, to name a few.  
 
In 2013, the annual average income per capita is RM 33,010 (Economic Planning Unit 
2013), whilst the average remuneration per executive director is RM 1,164,727 
(Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 2014b). The huge disparity demonstrates the 
excessive remuneration paid to the executive director. In addition, about 62.1% of 
companies increase their director remuneration payout from 2012 to 2013 despite 
Malaysian economic growth drops from 5.6% in 2012 to 4.7% in 2013 (The Malaysia 
Insider 2014). Malaysian companies continue to pay high remuneration to their 
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directors despite making losses (Focus Malaysia 2014; Immanuel 2015). The Minority 
Shareholder Watchdog Group (2013a) finds out that the remuneration packages of a 
director skyrockets from RM8.4 million in 2011 to RM33.4 million in 2012, 
representing a humongous increase of 297.6% in one year. This exaggerated executive 
remuneration constitutes about 14% of the firm’s net profit of RM232.7 million for 
the year. In addition, the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (2012, 2013b, 2014b, 
2015) reports that the average remuneration per executive director has been on a rise 
in recent years, except a decline from 2012 to 2013. Table 3.1 shows the average 
remuneration per executive director from 2012 to 2015. 
 
Table 3.1: Average remuneration per executive director from 2012 to 2015  





Source: Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (2012, 2013b, 2014b, 2015) 
 
Furthermore, Table 3.2 shows the top 3 highest paid directors in 2003, 2009, and 2013 
(Arkib 2004; Hamsawi 2011; News Straight Times 2014).  
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The most lavish remuneration is paid to the chairman cum CEO of Genting Berhad, 
who is also the major shareholder of the company. His remuneration escalates from 
around RM40 million in 2003 to RM107 million in 2009, from 8-digit figure to 9-digit 
figure. In 2013, the remuneration of the top 3 highest paid directors are respectively 
about 4000 times, 1700 times, and 1575 times the national income per capita of 
RM33,010. Moreover, it is noted that a majority of the highest paid directors hold 
CEO-chairman role duality. This indicates the non-compliance of corporate 
governance practice recommended by the MCCG, that is, the positions of board 
chairman and CEO should be held by different individuals. The CEO may design own 
remuneration package at his discretion as there is no independent chairman to oversee 
his decisions and actions. Such role duality structure may erode the board autonomy 
in monitoring executive remuneration. In essence, the extravagant remuneration 
triggers the curiosity whether the wealth has been expropriated from the shareholders. 
 
Based on the abovementioned reports and surveys, it is noted that the executive 
remuneration of Malaysian companies is increasing over time. However, there are only 
a handful of empirical studies that examine its determinants. Prior studies include the 
remuneration of both executive and non-executive directors in their measurement 
(Dogan and Smyth 2002; Abdullah 2006; Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman 2009; 
Jaafar, James and Abdul-Wahab 2012; Yatim 2013). Besides, those studies employ 
agency theory, particularly Type I agency conflict, to investigate the directors’ 
remuneration prior to the issuance of the revised MCCG 2012. For instance, Dogan 
and Smyth (2002), by using the study periods from 1989 to 2000, report that the board 
remuneration is positively associated with sales turnover, but negatively associated 
with ownership concentration. Their sample sizes vary over the study periods; they 
only include the companies disclosing the required data. The variation of sample size 
over the study periods casts doubt pertaining to the generalisation of their results.  
 
Abdullah (2006), by using a sample of 86 distressed companies and matched 86 non-
distressed companies, reveals that directors’ remuneration is not associated with the 
firm performance measured by ROA. In addition, he reports that the shareholdings of 
executive directors and external block-holders do not have significant influence on 
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directors’ remuneration. His study is based on single-year data – 2001. Longitudinal 
study should be conducted to validate the results. 
 
Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman (2009), by using the panel analysis of 434 
companies from 1993 to 2003, report a negative association between the institutional 
ownership and directors’ remuneration, suggesting the monitoring effectiveness of 
institutional investors. Further, they note that the negative association becomes less 
significant in politically connected companies. They suggest that political connections 
mitigate the institutional monitoring in a relationship-based economy.  
 
Lim and Yen (2011), by examining a sample of 191 Malaysian PLCs over the period 
from 2002 to 2007, report a non-linear relationship between the share ownership of 
executive directors and their salary levels. The model exhibits a negative, positive, and 
negative relationship, which corresponds to the occurrence of convergence-of-interests 
(ownership level between 0% and 22%), managerial entrenchment (ownership level 
between 23% and 76%), and convergence-of-interests (ownership level above 76%). 
Their findings indicate that controlling shareholders of Malaysian PLCs expropriate 
other shareholders by setting their own salary at the ownership levels of between 23% 
and 76%. This suggests the existence of Type II agency conflicts. Nevertheless, at a 
lower level of executive ownership, convergence-of-interests effect is found to take 
place. Besides, they report that the external block-holders do not possess any 
significant influence on the executive remuneration. 
 
Jaafar, James, and Abdul-Wahab (2012), by using a sample of 537 PLCs from 2007 to 
2009, examine the association between remuneration committee and directors’ 
remuneration. Their study is the only study in the Malaysian context that takes into the 
consideration of family and non-family companies. The overall results report that the 
size of remuneration committee has a significant positive influence on the directors’ 
remuneration, indicating that remuneration committee performs an effective 
monitoring role. Nonetheless, they find out that the positive influence becomes less 
significant in family companies, suggesting that controlling family combines the 
power and control to mitigate the effective monitoring of remuneration committee; this 
provides them an opportunity to expropriate via directors’ remuneration.  
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Yatim (2013), in her working paper, reports that directors’ remuneration is positively 
associated with the firm performance measured by ROA, CEO tenure, board size, and 
the existence of remuneration committee; and negatively associated with board 
independence. Similar to Abdullah (2006), her study is based on single-year data – 
2008.  
 
To a large extent, previous studies include overall companies in their sample sets 
(Dogan and Smyth 2002; Abdullah 2006; Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman 2009; 
Lim and Yen 2011; Yatim 2013). Little attention is focused on the family companies 
despite its pervasiveness, structural uniqueness, and significant economic contribution 
(Carney and Child 2013; Fan et al. 2011; Ibrahim, Abdul-Samad and Amir 2008). 
Since most of the companies in Malaysia are family-based, there is a tendency for 
biasness and crony capitalism to exist in the determination of remuneration packages 
(Lim and Yen 2011). The measurement of directors’ remuneration by previous studies 
include both executive and non-executive remuneration packages (Dogan and Smyth 
2002; Abdullah 2006; Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman 2009; Yatim 2013), only Lim 
and Yen (2011) specifically examine the executive remuneration. According to PWC 
(2016c), executive remuneration is one of the concerns of the investors nowadays. 
Hence, this study specifically investigates the executive remuneration. The extent of 
executive remuneration and its determinants in family companies have to be 
empirically studied as Malaysia’s economic growth depends, to an extent, on family 
companies28. A strong corporate governance landscape is essential for the inflows of 
foreign capital funds. The inadequate corporate governance system and the fund 
misappropriation via executive remuneration in family companies would deter the 
investment preferences of foreign investors and other investors; this could indirectly 
hamper Malaysia’s economic growth.  
 
To date, there is limited empirical study examining the executive remuneration after 
the introduction of the revised MCCG 2012. Among others, the revised MCCG 2012 
emphasises the governance of directors’ remuneration. This study examines the period 
from 2010 to 2014; two years pre- and post – 2012 would enable the assessment of the 
                                                 
28 In Malaysia, family companies account for about 44.70% of listed companies (Carney and Child 2013; 
Ibrahim, Abdul-Samad and Amir 2008) and contribute around 67.00% of nominal GDP (Fan et al. 2011). 
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influence of the revised MCCG 2012 on executive remuneration. As such, this study 
analyses the following overarching research proposition:  
 
Research proposition: The executive remuneration of listed family companies in 
Malaysia is decreasing from 2010 to 2014. 
 
3.5. Hypotheses Development 
As discussed in section 3.1, the board of directors and institutional investors are 
suggested by the agency theory, policy makers, and prior literature to mitigate the 
agency problem between the shareholders and management (Type I agency conflicts) 
in widely held companies. It is ambiguous whether these corporate governance 
mechanisms could ameliorate the agency problem between the controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders (Type II agency conflict) in family companies 
with concentrated ownership structure. In order to contribute theoretically and 
empirically, this study examines the influence of board of directors and institutional 
investors on executive remuneration in family companies. Specifically, this study 
sheds light on the association between executive remuneration and (i) family 
participation on board; (ii) independent non-executive directors on board; (iii) tenure 
of independent non-executive directors; (iv) CEO-chairman role duality; (v) 
remuneration committee; and (vi) institutional ownership – domestic and foreign, in 
the context of Malaysian listed family companies. The following sections (3.5.1 to 
3.5.6) provide the literature review for each independent variable. 
 
3.5.1 Family Participation on Board 
Barnett (1960) puts forward that controlling family uses a narrow kinship network in 
making recruiting decisions. Family shareholders tend to keep the board seats for their 
family members as to ensure the company serves their interests (Demsetz and Lehn 
1985; LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999; Mackie 2001; Lins 2003; Moores 
and Craig 2008). LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), in their authoritative 
study of corporate ownership around the world, report that among the companies with 
concentrated ownership structure (using 10% of equity as the threshold), more than 
69% have the controlling shareholders and their family members to hold the positions 
of  CEO, chairman, honorary chairman, or vice-chairman. Anderson and Reeb (2004) 
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note that the controlling family of the US family companies often seek to reduce the 
proportion of independent directors on board and tend to appoint family members as 
the top executives. They report that the boards of family companies comprise 
significantly fewer independent directors than the non-family companies (44% versus 
61%). Similarly, in East Asian countries, which include Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang (2000) report that the separation of ownership and control is rare, 
and the top executives of about 60% of companies that are not widely held have family 
relationships with the controlling shareholders.  
 
Family directors are benefited from incumbent family ties with controlling 
shareholders and enjoy high employment security in family companies (Allen and 
Panian 1982; Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel and Gutierrez 2001; Schulze et al. 2001; 
Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri 2003). Based on the agency theory’s logic, 
the risk-averse agents will trade higher job security for lower remuneration if they are 
related to the principals. This idea is buttressed by the fact that the family directors are 
more likely to be emotionally attached to the company than the professional 
counterpart, thus the agency contract should be less calculative and utilitarian for the 
former than the latter (Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel and Gutierrez 2001; James 1999). 
Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri (2003), by using 253 family companies 
from COMPUSTAT database over the periods from 1995 to 1998, note that family 
CEOs receive lower total remuneration compared to non-family CEOs in family 
companies. They explain that family CEOs do not need remuneration that follows 
external market trends because their family ties make them less likely to exit the 
companies to pursue other career opportunities. Family CEOs are less disposed to 
leaving and are willing to receive less remuneration in exchange for the additional job 
security. Due to the family ties, family CEOs are unlikely to leave for higher 
remuneration elsewhere, which makes it unnecessary to remunerate family CEOs 
market rates for their service. In other words, the family handcuff lessens the need to 
reward family executives with remuneration packages that are comparable to those of 




In addition, Sapp (2008) finds out that an increasing number of family directors on 
board is associated with a decrease in CEO remuneration in Canadian public listed 
companies, suggesting that the presence of controlling shareholders and their family 
on board is associated with lower level of remuneration. Besides, Combs et al. (2010), 
by using S&P 500 companies,  report that CEOs in the companies with multiple family 
directors on board are paid less than the CEOs in non-family companies. Taken 
together, their findings suggest that family representation of controlling shareholders 
on board provides an important source of CEO remuneration monitoring. 
 
On the other hand, a contradicting view about family companies is that the family 
directors are capable of redistributing wealth for their own advantages (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997; Barontini and Bozzi 2011). Generally, the CEO of family company 
wields power that is disproportionate to his or her stake of ownership; this 
disproportionate power stems from familial sources and hierarchical sources such as 
the head of family (Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino 2003). Moreover, altruism and kinship 
can create a sense of entitlement among family directors by encouraging  the CEO who 
is usually a parent or head of household of the controlling family to use the  company’s 
resources to provide family members with employment, perquisites and privileges that 
they would not otherwise receive (Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino 2003). Altruism can 
also bias CEOs’ perception of their employed children, which hampers their ability to 
monitor and discipline them.  
 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) report that the owner-managers in NYSE or AMEX 
listed companies receive marginally higher salaries than other officers. Barontini and 
Bozzi (2011) report that Italian family companies pay a higher remuneration to their 
CEOs compared to non-family companies, and the family CEOs are paid more than 
the professional CEOs in family companies. Besides, they find out that high board 
remuneration is associated with a higher proportion of family directors on the board 
and the excess remuneration is never positively related to future firm performance. 
They interpret these findings as an evidence of rent extraction, arguing that family 
CEOs are over-compensated at the expense of minority shareholders. Chen, Hsu, and 
Chen (2014) maintain that family CEOs tend to extract private benefits of control, 
because they are allowed to spend other people’s money without committing too much 
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equity. In short, past studies show the evidence the family entrenchment via 
remuneration payout; the direction of controlling family deviates from maximising 
profit to wealth expropriation. Schulze et al. (2001) point out that the owner-managers 
do not necessarily minimise the agency cost, in some cases, can exacerbate it. Agency 
problems may be more severe in family companies due to self-control and other 
agency threats engendered by altruism. They argue that owner-managers reduce the 
effectiveness of external governance mechanisms. 
 
Husnin, Nawawi, and Salin (2016) document that family-controlled companies tend to 
elect their own family members as the directors and management team, inflicting weak 
governance. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) document that in 1996, 94.6% of 
Malaysian listed family companies appoint the family members of controlling 
shareholders to hold the top management positions. After a decade, Carney and Child 
(2013), by using the data of 2008, report a decrease of 23.7%; 70.9% of Malaysian 
listed family companies have the family members of controlling shareholders to 
involve in the management. None of the past studies examines the influence of family 
directors on board in Malaysian listed family companies, particularly on executive 
remuneration. 
 
Around the world, the controlling shareholders and their family members generally 
hold the positions of CEO, chairman, and board director in family companies (LaPorta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999; Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000; Faccio and 
Lang 2002; Lins 2003; Maury and Pajuste 2005; Bhaumik and Gregoriou 2010). 
Malaysia is of no exception. PWC (2016b) report that 69% of Malaysian listed family 
companies have next generation family members working in the business. Despite the 
significant participation of family members on board, the empirical study on the 
association between family directors on board and executive remuneration is limited. 
Of the few studies, Barontini and Bozzi (2011), by examining the Italian listed 
companies, report that there is a positive association between the proportion of family 
members on board and total board remuneration, which include the remuneration 
packages of both executive and non-executive directors. Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-
Kintana, and Makri (2003) use the ratio of family members on board as a control 
variable to investigate CEO remuneration of family companies listed in 
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COMPUSTAT; no significant association is reported. In view of the limited empirical 
evidence on the association between family participation on board and executive 
remuneration, particularly in the context of developing countries, this study fills the 
literature gap. Based on prior literature, there are two contradicting views with regard 
to the executive remuneration in family companies. On the one hand, the family 
directors are willing to receive lower remuneration due to the loyalty family ties and 
job stability (Allen and Panian 1982; Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel and Gutierrez 2001; 
Schulze et al. 2001; Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri 2003). On the other 
hand, family directors have the propensity to expropriate wealth via remuneration 
arrangements at the expense of minority shareholders (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer 1999; DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2000; Basu et al. 2007; Barontini and Bozzi 
2011). This study adopts the latter notion as the Type II agency conflict in family 
companies can take the form of excessive salaries or perquisites for family members. 
As such, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H1: Family directors on board have a positive association with the executive 
remuneration. 
 
H2: Family CEO has a positive association with the executive remuneration. 
 
3.5.2 Board Independence 
Board independence is an essential aspect of corporate governance that ensures the 
effectiveness of board (Weisbach 1988; Coles, Daniel and Naveen 2008; Zattoni and 
Cuomo 2010; Bouras and Gallali 2016). However, the board effectiveness has become 
a global concern due to several corporate scandals, corporate collapse, fraud cases and 
questionable board decisions (Zattoni and Cuomo 2010; Sarbah, Quaye and Affum-
Osei 2016). Generally, there are three proxies used by previous studies to measure the 
board independence: (i) the proportion of non-executive directors on board (Conyon 
and Peck 1998; Ghosh 2006; Yatim 2013; Haniffa and Hudaib 2006); (ii) the 
proportion of independent directors on board ; and (iii) the proportion of outside or 
external directors on board (Fama and Jensen 1983; Brickley and James 1987; 
Weisbach 1988; Byrd and Hickman 1992; Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999; Mishra, 
Randøy and Jenssen 2001; Coles, Daniel and Naveen 2008; Duchin, Matsusaka and 
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Ozbas 2010). Thus, the following discussion on board independence consists of non-
executive directors, independent directors, and outside directors measured by prior 
studies.  
 
Non-executive directors are recommended by the agency theory (Fama and Jensen 
1983) as well as Cadbury Committee Report 1992, Greenbury Committee Report 1995, 
and Hampel Committee Report 1998 as a mechanism to reduce the Type I agency 
problem between the shareholders and management. According to Hishammuddin 
(2004), the term ‘non-executive director’ has traditionally been used to describe a 
director who is not in the full-time employment of company. However, a director who 
is not in the company’s full-time employment may still be intertwined with its 
operations; for instance, the director may be interested in major contracts of the 
company, or may have a major shareholding in the company, or may be a former 
employee (Hishammuddin 2004). According to Hart (1995), the non-executive 
directors may represent the companies that do business with this company, such as 
major purchasers, suppliers, company's lawyers, and consultants, etc. As such, their 
independence is compromised. The non-executive directors may not be truly 
independent in nature due to the business or fiduciary relationship.  
 
The term ‘independent director’ refers to a director who is not in the full-time 
employment of the company, has no affiliation with the company other than being on 
the board, and has no family, business or professional ties with the directors or top 
managers of the company (Byrd and Hickman 1992; Beasley 1996; Hishammuddin 
2004; Zattoni and Cuomo 2010). According to Hishammuddin (2004), an independent 
director is detached from the company’s daily operations, hence, is expected to bring 
a variety of strengths to the board, such as: (i) a wider general experience of strategy 
formulation; (ii) have independent views that are not influenced by the consideration 
of career, status or personal empire; (iii) have the professionalism to ensure that the 
board uses adequate systems to safeguard the interests of company even where these 
may conflict with the personal interests of the executive directors, for instance, setting 




Jensen (1993) postulates that the board of directors represents shareholders and serves 
as their first line of defence against a self-serving management. Board of directors is 
the primary internal corporate governance mechanism of a company (Zattoni and 
Cuomo 2010; Méndez, García and Pathan 2017). According to Fama and Jensen 
(1983), outside directors are competing in the directors’ labour market. Thus, they 
have the incentives to establish and maintain the reputation of being professional 
experts who have the managerial competence and can effectively monitor the 
management as well as look after the shareholders’ best interests. Agency scholars 
proclaim that outside directors are usually expert monitors; poor firm performance 
may undermine their reputation and future career (Fama and Jensen 1983). Earlier, 
Kaplan and Reishus (1990) find out that the directors in poorly performing companies 
(dividend reducing companies) have fewer opportunities to serve as outside directors 
for other companies. Gilson (1990) notes that the directors who leave distressed 
companies hold about one-third fewer directorships three years after their departures 
than the number of directorships they held at the time of resignation. These empirical 
evidences highlight the existence of an external market that punishes directors for poor 
performance. 
 
Bhagat and Black (2002) note that the low-profitability American companies increase 
their proportion of independent directors on board, however, there is no evidence that 
greater board independence leads to better firm performance. In the Singaporean 
context, Nguyen, Locke, and Reddy (2014) also find no association between non-
executive directors and firm performance, indicating that non-executive directors play 
tokenism role and add no value to the companies. These empirical findings challenge 
the conventional tenet that non-executive or independent directors add beneficial value 
to the companies. On the other hand, Brickley and James (1987) note that the presence 
of outside directors reduce the managerial consumption of perquisites. Moreover, Byrd 
and Hickman (1992) find out that independent outside directors monitor firm decisions 
on behalf of shareholders during the acquisition process.  
 
Pertaining to the association between board independence and executive remuneration, 
the majority of related studies are based on the Type I agency conflict in widely held 
companies. The findings are inconclusive. Crystal (1991) put forward that the board 
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of directors is ineffective in setting appropriate level of remuneration because outside 
directors are generally hired by the CEO and can be removed by the CEO. The outside 
directors owe their positions to management who elected them to the board. Thus, they 
have the tendency to show their gratefulness and loyalty to the management in order 
to be re-elected and continue to collect fee (Hart 1995; Fahlenbrach 2009). Besides, 
the non-executive directors may hold more important or executive positions on other 
corporate boards and probably have little time to monitor the company’s affairs (Hart 
1995). Their arguments are supported by empirical findings. Core, Holthausen, and 
Larcker (1999) report that the CEO remuneration in the US companies are higher when 
the outside directors serve more than three other boards and are appointed by the CEO. 
They explain that the corporate governance is weak due to the lack of independence 
of outside director, thus the CEO is able to extract additional remuneration. They find 
no evidence that independent outside directors can create an effective board. Ozkan 
(2007), by examining 414 large UK companies, report that higher proportion of non-
executive directors is positively associated with higher CEO remuneration, suggesting 
that non-executive directors are not an effective monitoring mechanism. 
 
On the other hand, Ghosh (2006) shows that when the proportion of non-executive 
directors on board in Indian companies increases, the board remuneration decreases 
significantly for small companies and group-affiliated companies. However, his study 
is not confined to family companies. Lim and Yen (2011), by examining the Malaysian 
companies with a single largest shareholder who own at least 10% of equity, report 
that the independent non-executive directors are able to rein the bonus and cash 
remuneration paid to the executive directors. However, they do not take into 
consideration the family directors on board. Besides, their criterion is based on single 
largest shareholder but not a family as a whole. Abdullah (2006) finds that independent 
directors have a negative influence on the directors’ remuneration in Malaysian listed 
companies. Similarly, Yatim (2013) reports a negative association between the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board and directors’ remuneration in 
Malaysian listed companies. The empirical studies by Abdullah (2006) and Yatim 
(2013) are based on single-year data, 2001 and 2008 respectively. Taken together, the 
negative association reported by prior studies suggests that greater board independence 
could provide an effective governing function on the remuneration arrangement. 
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Nonetheless, none of the studies specifically examine the governing role of 
independent directors in family companies, particularly concerning executive 
remuneration. While extant studies focus on the role of independent non-executive 
directors in mitigating principal-agent problem (Type I agency conflict), this study 
explores the potential of independent non-executive directors in ameliorating the 
principal-principal problem (Type II agency conflict) in family companies, meanwhile 
protecting the minority shareholders from the expropriation by family controlling 
shareholders via executive remuneration. 
 
In order to limit the family’s discretion over firm resources and protect the interests of 
minority shareholders, prior literature emphasises the need of oversight by an 
independent board with the formal authority to scrutinise and challenge the family’s 
decisions and behaviours (Anderson and Reeb 2004; Chen and Hsu 2009; Bammens, 
Voordeckers and Gils 2010). Mishra, Randøy, and Jenssen (2001) find that outside 
directors do not improve the firm value of Norwegian family companies, arguing that 
outside directors do not improve the corporate governance and the board is perceived 
less as a governance mechanism in family companies. Anderson and Reeb (2004) note 
that the US family companies often seek to reduce the proportion of independent 
directors on board. Moreover, Croci, Gonenc, and Ozkan (2012) report that family 
companies only allocate about 20.5% of the board seats to the independent non-
executive directors in the context of Continental Europe. Leung, Richardson, and Jaggi 
(2014) also report that the proportion of independent directors on board of Hong Kong 
family companies is lower than their non-family counterparts (38.8% versus 40.3%). 
Likewise in Malaysia, Ibrahim, Abdul-Samad, and Amir (2008) note that the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors on board of Malaysian listed family 
companies is lower compared to non-family companies (36.1% versus 40.3%). 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) relate that hiring outside directors to involve in the decision 
making will erode family’s socio-emotional wealth by increasing information 
asymmetries, raising the possibility of conflicting goals, and diminishing the authority. 
In family companies, family directors are well positioned to have a strong control over 
material information. The monitoring role of independent directors may be slashed if 
they are unable to obtain timely information (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011; Jiang and Peng 
2011). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) document that family shareholders generally view 
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outside directors as a source of expertise, not monitoring. On this premise, it is curious 
whether the independent non-executive directors in family companies are an effective 
governing mechanism and good representation of minority shareholders. 
 
In the context of Malaysia, Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements mandate that one-
third of the board to be independent directors. In addition, the MCCG recommends 
that the board must comprise a majority of independent directors when the board 
chairman is not an independent director as to ensure the balance of power and authority 
on the board (Securities Commission Malaysia 2012). This recommendation is 
typically crucial for family companies as their board chairman are generally family 
directors (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999). The minority shareholders 
must have power to counter family control; a potential power base for minority 
shareholders to oppose family opportunism is the relative influence of independent 
directors in the company. The ability of independent directors to monitor family 
activities is one of the salient issues in assessing the vulnerability of minority 
shareholders to family opportunism (Anderson and Reeb 2004). They reveal that 
controlling family shareholders often seek to minimise the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on board, while outside shareholders seek more independent 
non-executive director representation. Their findings pinpoint the importance of 
independent non-executive directors in lessening the conflicts between shareholder 
groups, and imply that the interests of minority shareholders are best protected when 
the independent non-executive directors have power relative to family shareholders. 
This study proposes that independent non-executive directors are potentially one of 
the mechanisms that minority shareholders could rely on in protecting their interests 
against family opportunism via executive remuneration. Independent non-executive 
directors should perform objective scrutiny on behalf of minority shareholders, 
maintain integrity, and possess strong independent principles in governing executive 
remuneration. Hence, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
 




3.5.3 Tenure of Independent Non-Executive Directors 
Tenure is an observable characteristic that reveals additional information about an 
independent director’s capabilities and expertise. The independent director with long 
tenure accumulates greater company-specific knowledge and experience. This could 
enhance the commitment and monitoring effectiveness, thus better serve the interest 
of shareholders (Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi 2010; Liu and Sun 2010; Li et al. 2013; 
Chan, Liu and Sun 2013; Bonini et al. 2017). Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi (2010) 
postulate that effective monitoring is an internally acquired skill, the directors with 
longer tenure are likely to provide more effective governance relative to those with 
shorter tenure. An efficient market for director talent suggests that the most capable 
directors should accumulate longer tenure (Li et al. 2013). Vance (1983) posit that 
forced retirement of long-tenured directors will lead to a waste of valuable experience. 
 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) document that the acquisition of firm-specific 
knowledge over time by outside directors improves the firm performance of New York 
companies. Beasley (1996), by using 150 companies listed in SEC over the period 
from 1980 to 1991, reports that the likelihood of fraud decreases as the average tenure 
of outside directors’ increases. Yang and Krishnan (2005), by using 896 firm-year 
observations over the period from 1996 to 2000 in the US context, report a negative 
association between the average tenure of independent directors on audit committee 
and earnings management. Similarly, Liu and Sun (2010), by examining 7,700 firm-
year observations over the period from 1998 to 2005 in the US context, show that the 
proportion of long-tenured outside directors on audit committee is negatively 
associated with earnings management. Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi (2010), by 
studying 770 sample companies from COMPUSTAT and Board Analyst databases 
over the period from 2004 to 2006, report that the average tenure of audit committee 
members is positively associated with accruals quality, suggesting that the firm 
specific knowledge gained by long-tenured directors enhances their ability to monitor 
the financial reporting process. Taken together, these past findings corroborate the 
notion that long-tenured independent directors have greater expertise to effectively 




On the other hand, Vafeas (2003), by examining 483 companies listed on the 1994 
Forbes list, reports that the companies with the presence of long-tenured outside 
directors (serve twenty or more years) in the remuneration committee pay CEOs 
significantly higher salaries. The findings suggest that long-tenured outside directors 
compromise shareholders’ interests by inflating CEO salaries. The presence of long-
tenured outside directors appears to be a sign of CEO entrenchment. Thus, he proposes 
management friendliness hypothesis, suggesting that long-tenured outside directors 
are more likely to befriend and less likely to monitor the management. Vafeas (2003) 
proclaims that the length of outside directors’ tenure serves as an observable proxy for 
what is truly at issue but remains unobserved. His study highlights the independent 
directors’ tenure as an interesting and relevant public policy issue concerning effective 
board.  
 
Li et al. (2013), by studying the associations between family companies, director 
tenure, and firm value of S&P 1500 companies, note that the average tenure of 
independent directors in family companies is significantly higher than the non-family 
companies (7.7 years versus 6.8 years). They find a significant positive association 
between the tenure of independent directors and firm value in non-family companies, 
but insignificant association in family companies. Li et al. (2013) put forward that 
long-tenured independent directors in family companies are likely to be friends of the 
controlling family and their presence does not maximise general shareholders’ wealth. 
Family companies, motivated by the incentive to consume private benefits, will choose 
to keep friendly independent directors and let these directors to accumulate longer 
tenure. 
 
Huang (2013) note that the average tenure of outside directors possesses an inverted 
U-shaped relationship with the firm value measured by Tobin’s Q in the US companies, 
suggesting that directors’ on-the-job learning improves the firm value up to some 
threshold, at which point entrenchment dominates and firm value suffers. He finds out 
that firm value reaches the maximum at the average tenure of nine years, after 
controlling the corporate governance characteristics, CEO characteristics, and firm 
characteristics. Beyond the average tenure of nine years, the oversight by outside 
directors starts to decline and the management engages in value-destroying activities. 
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Bonini et al. (2017) report that the average tenure of independent directors is not 
associated with firm value of the US companies, and in some cases, it appears to have 
a negative impact on the firm performance and firm stability. Taken together, their 
findings heighten the need for setting a tenure limit for the independent directors as 
long tenure may be detrimental to the shareholders’ interests. 
 
Prior studies show inconclusive findings with regard to the monitoring effectiveness 
of long-tenured independent directors. On the positive front, long-tenured directors 
accumulate greater firm specific knowledge and expertise, which can enhance the 
monitoring effectiveness (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Beasley 1996; Liu and Sun 
2010; Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi 2010; Li et al. 2013). On the negative front, long 
tenure undermines the governing effectiveness of independent directors as they may 
develop friendly relationship with the management (Vafeas 2003; Huang 2013; Bonini 
et al. 2017). All of these past studies are conducted in the context of developed 
countries. This study fills the literature gap by examining the influence of average 
tenure of independent directors on executive remuneration in the context of a 
developing country, Malaysia.  
 
A number of foreign jurisdictions have introduced a corporate governance principle 
related to independent director’s tenure. For instance, the UK Corporate Governance 
Code requires the company to explain in its annual report the reason(s) for keeping the 
independent directors that serve more than nine years (Financial Reporting Council 
2014). Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited stipulates that if an independent 
non-executive director serves beyond nine years, his/her further appointment is subject 
to a separate resolution to be approved by shareholders (Hong Kong Exchanges and 
Clearing Limited 2014). Similarly, in Malaysia, the revised MCCG 2012 introduces a 
new corporate governance practice, which is, the tenure of an independent director 
should not exceed a cumulative term of nine year. The board must justify and seek 
shareholders’ approval for retaining an independent director who has served in the 
same capacity for more than nine years. (Securities Commission Malaysia 2012). 
However, the MCCG is principle-based, not rule-based. The companies can choose to 
retain independent directors that exceed nine-year tenure. Bursa Malaysia, in its review 
of PLC’s annual reports for the years 2012 and 2013, note that 55% of PLCs retain 
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independent non-executive directors that serve more than nine years (Mahalingam 
2015). This finding is consistent with the finding of Minority Shareholder Watchdog 
Group (2014b) that 459 out of 873 PLCs keep the independent non-executive directors 
who has served more than nine years in the same capacity. 
 
Except the empirical studies by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Beasley (1996), 
the tenure of independent directors only starts to receive the attention of the researchers, 
regulators, and policy makers in the 2000s (Vafeas 2003; Yang and Krishnan 2005; 
Liu and Sun 2010; Li et al. 2013; Huang 2013; Bonini et al. 2017; Securities 
Commission Malaysia 2012; Financial Reporting Council 2014; Hong Kong 
Exchanges and Clearing Limited 2014). The empirical evidence on the governing 
effectiveness of long-tenured independent directors is scarce, thus offering an avenue 
to explore. Of the numerous studies that examine the executive remuneration, only a 
few has given serious thought to the influence of the tenure of independent non-
executive directors. Vafeas (2003) examines its influence on CEO remuneration by 
using the companies listed on the 1994 Forbes list. Till date, there is limited empirical 
study pertaining to the influence of the tenure of independent non-executive directors 
on executive remuneration. This study proposes that long-tenured independent non-
executive directors not only inflate the CEO remuneration, but also executive directors’ 
remuneration. This is because the independent non-executive directors would develop 
friendly relationship with all board directors, not just the CEO. Over time, they become 
less effective to monitor the remuneration packages of their ‘friends’.  
 
Moreover, the empirical studies that examine the influence of the tenure of 
independent directors in family companies are limited. Li et al. (2013) report that the 
influence of long-tenured independent directors on the firm value in the US context 
appears to be positive in non-family companies but negative in family companies. 
Family companies tend to keep friendly independent directors and let them to 
accumulate longer tenure; this enables the family to consume private benefits. In light 
of their findings, this study casts doubt pertaining to the effectiveness of the long-
tenured independent directors in governing executive remuneration in family 
companies. Sarbah, Quaye, and Affum-Osei (2016) document that family companies 
tend to retain loyal employees. In this instance, it is ambiguous whether the long-
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tenured independent directors in family companies are kept for the allegiance to the 
family or their ability to monitor. This study adopts the tenet that long tenure 
compromises the independent function of independent non-executive directors. As 
such, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H4: Tenure of independent non-executive directors has a positive association with 
executive remuneration. 
 
3.5.4 CEO-Chairman Role Duality  
CEO-chairman role duality structure exists when a company’s CEO also serves as the 
board chairman (Bliss, Gul and Majid 2011). Prior studies on CEO-chairman role 
duality are based on two approaches from agency theory and stewardship theory29. 
These two theories have different viewpoints where agency theory argues against the 
CEO-chairman role duality, while stewardship theory supports the CEO-chairman role 
duality. Agency theory, which stems from an economics-based paradigm, views 
individual as a rational actor who tends to maximise self-interest which deviates from 
shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976). On the other hand, stewardship 
theory, which stems from the sociology and psychology paradigm, provides an 
alternative view – CEO-chairman role duality enables the CEO to gain full structural 
power and the authority to mobilise the company’s resources to attain excellent 
corporate performance (Donaldson and Davis 1991; Hernandez 2012). This study 
adopts agency theory, thus supports separating the roles of CEO and board chairman. 
 
The board chairman is responsible to run board meetings and oversee the process of 
recruiting, evaluating, terminating, and remunerating the executive directors including 
CEO, while the CEO is responsible for the day-to-day business operation as well as 
setting and implementing corporate strategy (Jensen 1993; Weir and Laing 2001). 
Fama and Jensen (1983, 18) postulate that when CEO-chairman role duality exists, 
there is an ‘absence of separation of decision management and decision control’. In 
other words, CEO-chairman role duality precludes the clear separation of the decision 
                                                 
29 Stewardship theory postulates that effective management is based on the principle of the unity of 
command. CEO-chairman role duality facilitates greater understanding and knowledge of the operations 
and result in better corporate performance because the responsibilities and decisions are restricted to 
one person (Donaldson and Davis 1991). 
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making and the monitoring functions. In this instance, the board is ineffective in 
providing oversight over managerial decisions and activities. CEO-chairman role 
duality structure gives the CEO increased levels of influence which exacerbates the 
agency problems. Jensen (1993) and Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) document 
that when the CEO is also the board chairman, agency problems become more severe 
as it is difficult for shareholders and board of directors to challenge the CEO’s 
decisions. Combining the positions of CEO and chairman makes an individual 
powerful to control the flow of information to the board and manipulate the agenda of 
board meetings easily (Essen, Oosterhout and Carney 2012; Dunn 2004). Such 
powerful CEO may be driven by self-interest and will undertake self-serving activities 
that could be detrimental to the economic welfare of shareholders (Rashid 2010). In 
short, CEO-chairman role duality structure compromises the effectiveness of board 
governance.  
 
Prior studies show that the board’s function to oversee management is compromised 
when the CEO is also the board chairman. For instance, Goyal and Park (2002), by 
examining S&P companies, note that when the CEO is also board chairman, he/she is 
less likely to be removed following the poor firm performance because the board 
becomes less effective in making CEO replacement; Dunn (2004) report that the 
companies with role duality structure are more likely to publish fraudulent financial 
statements; Bassett, Koh, and Tutticci (2007) report that CEO-chairman role duality is 
associated with lower levels of mandatory disclosure in the Australian companies; Kim 
et al. (2009) show that CEO-chairman role duality is associated with higher levels of 
unrelated diversification in the US companies; Bliss (2011) document that the CEO-
chairman duality structure compromises the board independence of Australian 
companies because he finds out that the positive association between board 
independence and audit fees only exists in the companies without CEO-chairman role 
duality; Duru, Iyengar, and Zampelli (2016), by drawing samples from ExecuComp, 
ISS (formerly RiskMetrics) and Compustat databases, report that CEO-chairman role 
duality has significant negative influence on the firm performance due to managerial 
entrenchment. Overall, past studies clearly evident that CEO-chairman role duality 
diminishes the extent of board monitoring; excessive power enables the CEO cum 
chairman to control the management decisions and actions in his/her interest. Adrian, 
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Wright, and Kilgore (2016) document that the directors and shareholders strongly 
prefer the roles of CEO and board chairman to be held by different individuals. Among 
other corporate governance attributes, CEO-chairman duality is regarded as the most 
important governance attribute (Adrian, Wright and Kilgore 2016).  
 
To date, there are limited and inconclusive findings with regard to the association 
between CEO-chairman role duality and executive remuneration (Conyon and Peck 
1998; Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999; Ramaswamy, Veliyath and Gomes 2000; 
Cyert, Kang and Kumar 2002; Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Ghosh 2006; Theeravanich 
2013). Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002), by 
examining the US companies, find out that CEO remuneration is higher when the CEO 
is also the board chairman. Grinstein and Hribar (2004), by studying the bonuses of 
the CEOs who involve in the merger and acquisition activities in the US context, report 
that CEOs who are also the board chairmen receive higher bonuses than the CEOs who 
are not. Ghosh (2006), by using 462 Indian manufacturing companies over the period 
from 1997 to 2002, reports that when the CEO is also the board chairman, board 
remuneration increases by 16.4%. Taken together, their findings substantiate that 
CEO-chairman role duality compromises the board governance on remuneration 
arrangement.  
 
On the other hand, Conyon and Peck (1998), by using 94 UK companies over the 
period from 1991 to 1995, find out that CEO-chairman role duality is not a robust 
driver of top management remuneration, suggesting that role duality does not fully 
capture CEO power in relation to establishing remuneration packages. Abdullah 
(2006), by using 2001 single-year data, report an insignificant association between the 
CEO-chairman duality and directors’ remuneration in Malaysian listed companies. 
Thus far, there are only few empirical studies in the context of family companies. 
Ramaswamy, Veliyath, and Gomes (2000), Connelly, Limpaphayon, and Nagarajan 
(2012) and Theeravanich (2013) report that CEO-chairman role duality has no 
significant bearing effect on CEO remuneration in Indian family companies, executive 
remuneration in Thai family companies, and  director remuneration in Thai family 





The prominent corporate governance principles, such as the Cadbury Committee 
Report 1992 and Hampel Committee Report 1998, recommend the roles of board 
chairman and CEO to be separated as to ensure a balance of power (Cadbury 
Committee 1992; Hampel Committee 1998). Likewise in Malaysia, the MCCG 
requires the positions of board chairman and CEO to be held by different individuals, 
and the chairman must be a non-executive member of the board (Securities 
Commission Malaysia 2012). In general, policy makers, regulators, and agency theory 
advocators urge for the separation of CEO and board chairman positions in order to 
ensure the effectiveness of board governance. 
 
Voordeckers, Gils, and Heuvel (2007) note that CEO-chairman role duality structure 
is prevalent in Belgian family companies. This study proposes that CEO-chairman role 
duality structure would enable the CEO, particularly the family CEO, to exercise 
strong control in the family companies. Holding the highly symbolic position of board 
chairman provides the family CEO with a wider power and control. CEO-chairman 
role duality in family companies could be a sign of family entrenchment. The board 
effectiveness in governing executive remuneration will be compromised when the 
CEO is also the board chairman, as he or she is able to control the board agenda. 
Consequently, the following hypothesis is considered: 
 
H5: CEO-chairman role duality has a positive association with executive 
remuneration. 
 
3.5.5 Remuneration Committee 
As the primary internal governing mechanism, board of directors plays a critical role 
in safeguarding the shareholders’ interests by designing optimal remuneration 
contracts. The determination of remuneration packages is typically delegated to a 
subcommittee – remuneration committee. Remuneration committee concerns with the 
setting of remuneration packages that attract and retain top management, meanwhile 
provide the right incentives for directors to operate in shareholders’ interests (Main 





Williamson (1985) posits that without an independent remuneration committee, the 
directors would appear to write their own remuneration contracts with one hand and 
sign them with the other hand. The regulators and activist investors regularly call for 
the reform in remuneration committee composition (Anderson and Bizjak 2003; 
Appiah and Chizema 2015; Catuogno, Arena and Viganò 2016). The concern about 
the composition of remuneration committee arises from the fact that executive 
remuneration is the most crucial contracting tool that aligns the interests of managers 
and shareholders. Remuneration committee that does not optimally structure the 
remuneration packages can impose huge agency costs and inefficiencies (Anderson 
and Bizjak 2003). Remuneration committee should be made up of the independent 
directors and they are expected to act as the objective decision makers as to ensure the 
appropriate levels of executive remuneration (Mangel and Singh 1993; Cybinski and 
Windsor 2013; Appiah and Chizema 2015). Lee (2014), by using 2,795 observations 
from seven East Asian economies namely Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines, reports that the positive association between the 
CEO remuneration and CEO power is attenuated by the proportion of independent 
directors on the remuneration committee. The finding indicates that in the companies 
helmed by powerful CEOs, CEOs receive lower level of remuneration when the 
remuneration committees monitor CEO remuneration setting process effectively.  
 
Main and Johnston (1993), by using 220 large publicly held British companies, note 
that the presence of remuneration committee is associated with higher levels of 
remuneration. Conyon and Peck (1998), by using panel data on large publicly traded 
UK companies, also find that the companies with the presence of remuneration 
committee or with a higher proportion of outside directors on remuneration committee 
pay higher levels of top management pay. Moreover, Sapp (2008), by using 416 
Canadian public listed companies, reports that the proportion of independent directors 
on remuneration committee is positively associated with CEO remuneration. Słomka-
Gołębiowska (2016) reports that the larger the proportion of independent directors on 
the remuneration committee, the higher the level of total executive cash remuneration 
in Poland banks. He notes that the executive directors at banks where there are greater 
number of independent directors on remuneration committee are paid above the market 
rate. Taken together, their findings provide little empirical support for the notion that 
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remuneration committee can be an extension of governance mechanism that tailors 
executive remuneration to produce incentive effects that are to the benefit of 
shareholders. To some extent, the remuneration committee may have been captured by 
the executive directors or management (Crystal 1991; Main and Johnston 1993; Sapp 
2008; Słomka-Gołębiowska 2016).  
 
On the other hand, Benito and Conyon (1999) report that the presence of remuneration 
committee has no significant influence on the highest paid director’s remuneration in 
the UK companies. Similarly, Anderson and Bizjak (2003), by using 110 companies 
listed on the NYSE, find no evidence that outside directors on remuneration committee 
play significant role in determining CEO pay mix, pay level, and pay sensitivity. 
Gregory-Smith (2012), by studying FTSE 350 companies, finds no association 
between the remuneration committee independence and CEO pay level. These findings 
show the ineffectiveness of remuneration committee in governing remuneration 
arrangement.  
 
To a large extent, the studies pertaining to the remuneration committee focus on CEO 
remuneration and are conducted in the context of developed countries. This study fills 
the literature gap by examining the association between remuneration committee and 
executive remuneration in the context of a developing country, Malaysia. To date,  
there are only a handful empirical studies in the Malaysian context (Lim and Yen 2011; 
Yatim 2013). Lim and Yen (2011), by using 191 listed companies over the study period 
from 2002 to 2007, show that the bonuses paid to executive directors in the companies 
with a higher proportion of independent directors on remuneration committee is 
lowered by 0.2% compared to those with a lower proportion. In contrast, Yatim (2013), 
by using 2008 single-year data, finds a significant positive association between the 
existence of remuneration committee and directors’ remuneration. Her finding 
indicates that the establishment of remuneration committee does not help to reduce the 
remuneration level or achieve efficiency in remuneration contracts. These 
inconclusive findings cast doubt pertinent to the governing role of remuneration 
committee. Most of the past studies refer to the companies with dispersed ownership 
structure, little is known about the effectiveness of remuneration committee in the 
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companies with concentrated ownership structure, particularly family companies. This 
study fills this literature gap. 
 
Jaafar, James, and Abdul-Wahab (2012) suggest that the uniqueness of family 
company may affect the role played by the remuneration committee. Family directors 
could use their control and power to mitigate the effective monitoring of remuneration 
committee. The non-executive directors on remuneration committee may face the 
conflict of interest during their job: either to follow the instructions of family directors 
to increase their personal wealth, or to be the independent representative of minority 
shareholders. KPMG Malaysia (2012) documents that when the remuneration 
committee consists of both executive and non-executive directors, there is a genuine 
fear that the latter may find it hard to confront the former. By using 537 listed 
companies over the period from 2007 to 2009, Jaafar, James, and Abdul-Wahab (2012) 
report that the remuneration committee is less effective in family-owned companies, 
suggesting that family ownership reduces the monitoring effect of remuneration 
committee and enables the manipulation of power and control for expropriation via 
remuneration arrangement. They measure remuneration committee in terms of size of 
remuneration committee and non-family non-executive directors. 
 
Under Malaysian legislation, directors’ remuneration, with the exception of fees, is not 
subject to shareholders’ approval even though the amounts may be substantial. Thus, 
the shareholders have to rely on the remuneration committee to recommend the 
remuneration framework (KPMG Malaysia 2012). The revised MCCG 2012 
recommends that the board should establish remuneration committee, which consists 
exclusively or a majority of non-executive directors (Securities Commission Malaysia 
2012). This is adopting the Cadbury Committee Report 1992 which seeks to rein in 
executive influence over the pay-setting process by strengthening the role of non-
executive directors (Cadbury Committee 1992), and also the Greenbury Committee 
Report 1995 which recommends the establishment of a subcommittee of the board that 
comprises solely non-executive directors to determine executive remuneration 
(Greenbury Committee 1995). To date, there are limited empirical studies on the 
association between the remuneration committee and executive remuneration in family 
companies and developing countries. This study fills the literature gaps by 
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investigating the governing role of independent non-executive directors on 
remuneration committee in Malaysian listed family companies. The following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H6: Independent non-executive directors on remuneration committee have a 
negative association with executive remuneration. 
 
3.5.6 Institutional Ownership 
The outbreak of several corporate scandals reflects the ineffectiveness of board of 
directors as a governance mechanism. Hence, instead of relying on the board of 
directors, institutional investors have become increasingly willing to use their 
ownership rights to pressure the managers to act in the best interest of shareholders 
(Cornett et al. 2007). Ivanova (2017) document that it is now widely accepted that one 
of the culprits of the 2008 global financial crisis is the failure of institutional investors 
to monitor their investee companies.  
 
A recent survey by McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016) report that poor corporate 
governance and excessive remuneration, among others, are the essential interests of 
institutional investors around the world. They document that the intervention of 
institutional investors is mostly triggered by the concerns about corporate governance 
issues or strategies rather than short-term issues such as profitability. Recently, the 
Norway’s wealth fund - the world largest sovereign wealth fund, announces that it 
plans to scrutinise executive pay of the companies under its portfolio due to the 
shareholders’ concern (Milne 2016). The institutional investors have been pushing to 
be more active in corporate governance issues.  
 
Institutional investors are different from individual investors in several ways. 
Institutional investors manage a large pool of investment funds and have fiduciary 
duties to serve their contributors (Hawley and Williams 1997; Ozkan 2007). 
Institutional investors have cost advantages to monitor the management because of 
economies of scale and diversification (Diamond 1984). In contrast, individual 
investors do not have big enough stake in the companies to absorb the costs of 
monitoring management (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Besides, individual investors 
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have less time and resources to gather firm-specific information, and the small size of 
their investments precludes them from obtaining direct access to the management 
(Schnatterly, Shaw and Jennings 2008).  
 
The growing presence of institutional investors in the equity markets has grabbed the 
attention of researchers and regulators regarding their role in the monitoring, 
disciplining, and influencing the companies (Graves and Waddock 1990; Black 1992; 
Hawley and Williams 1997; Hartzell and Starks 2003; Cornett et al. 2007; Ozkan 2007; 
Aggarwal et al. 2011). Aggarwal et al. (2011), by examining the role of institutional 
investors in 23 30  countries over the periods from 2003 to 2008, report that the 
companies with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly 
performing CEOs and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Their results 
suggest that institutional investors promote good corporate governance practices 
around the world. 
 
As early as Hirschman (1970), past studies document two options that the institutional 
investors use when they are dissatisfied with the investee companies: (i) voice – direct 
intervention to affect the management, or (ii) exit – selling shares and leave the 
company (Graves and Waddock 1990; Black 1992; Hawley and Williams 1997; 
Parrino, Sias and Starks 2003; Gillan and Starks 2003; Aggarwal et al. 2011; Edmans 
2014; Dasgupta and Piacentino 2015; McCahery, Sautner and Starks 2016). 
Institutional investors can direct intervene through several ways, such as discussing 
with management, proposing specific actions to the management, criticising and 
voting against the management during annual meetings (McCahery, Sautner and 
Starks 2016). Alternatively, institutional investors can use the threat of exit to 
influence the management. Block share selling by institutional investors would have 
an impact on the corporate governance via several potential effects, such as depressing 
the share price, signalling information of bad news to other investors and causing the 
changes in shareholder composition. (Dasgupta and Piacentino 2015; Brown and 
Brooke 1993). These effects punish the management ex post.  
                                                 
30 The 23 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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Notwithstanding that, prior studies point out that the monitoring by institutional 
investors may not be effective as there are potential liquidity costs (Coffee 1991; Bhide 
1994; Maug 1998; Manconi, Massa and Yasuda 2012; McCahery, Sautner and Starks 
2016). Liquid stock market may reduce the incentives of institutional investors to 
monitor because it allows them to sell their stocks more easily. McCahery, Sautner, 
and Starks (2016) proclaim that the investors who care more about stock liquidity 
engage less with the investee companies. They contend that stock liquidity discourages 
monitoring; stock liquidity allows investors to exit or sell the shares quickly rather 
than intervene in the management.  
 
Further, Pound (1988) postulates that institutional investors face the conflict of 
interests and may vote with the management against their fiduciary interests due to the 
absence of regulations for disclosing their voting behaviour. Institutional investors’ 
voting behaviours are frequently swayed by the existing or potential business 
relationships with investee companies (Pound 1988; Brickley, Lease and Smith 1988; 
Aggarwal et al. 2011; CvijanoviĆ, Dasgupta and Zachariadis 2016). For instance, an 
insurance company may hold a significant block of a company’s shares and at the same 
time is its primary insurer. Voting against the management may affect existing 
business relationship (Pound 1988). Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) evident that 
institutional investors such as banks, trusts, and insurance companies are less likely to 
oppose management when voting on antitakeover amendments due to the existing 
business relationship with the investee companies. Similarly, CvijanoviĆ, Dasgupta, 
and Zachariadis (2016) report that the business ties between the mutual funds and 
investee companies lead to pro-management voting.  
 
In addition, the conflict of interests also exists within the institution itself. Ivanova 
(2017) reveals that often times the socially responsible investment department of an 
institution expresses interests to engage on specific topics, but encounter disagreement 
from the equities department or lack support from the senior management. Moreover, 
Ivanova (2017) documents that there are several challenges institutional investors face 
when trying to monitor and influence the investee companies, such as lack of investee 
company’s transparency, low client demand for engagement, lack of investor 
experience on activism and how to effectively engage with investee companies.   
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Past studies show inconclusive findings pertaining to the effectiveness of institutional 
investors in monitoring remuneration arrangements. Hartzell and Starks (2003), and 
Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005), by examining S&P companies, report that 
institutional ownership is positively associated with the performance sensitivity of 
managerial remuneration, and negatively associated with the level of managerial 
remuneration. Ozkan (2007), by studying 414 large UK companies, finds out that 
institutional ownership and block-holder ownership have a significant negative 
influence on CEO remuneration, suggesting that the block-holders and institutional 
investors play an active monitoring role. These findings evident that institutional 
investors are an effective external mechanism that help to mitigate the agency problem 
by strengthening the pay-performance link and ensuring the remuneration 
arrangements are in the best interests of shareholders. 
 
On the other hand, Cosh and Hughes (1997) reveal that the presence or absence of 
institutional investors makes no appreciable difference on the pay-performance 
sensitivity and remuneration level in the UK companies. Similarly, Dong and Ozkan 
(2008) report that institutional ownership, as a whole, does not have any significant 
influence on the director’s remuneration and pay-performance link in the UK 
companies. These findings challenge the conventional tenet that institutional investors 
are an effective monitoring mechanism that could rein in remuneration level and 
alleviate the agency problem.  
 
Overall, the empirical findings with regard to the effectiveness of institutional 
investors in governing CEO or directors’ remuneration are mixed. The majority of 
studies are conducted in the context of developed countries, particularly the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The related empirical studies in the context of 
developing countries are limited. It is ambiguous whether the institutional investors in 
developing countries are as effective as those in developed countries. In the Malaysian 
context, Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman (2009) find a negative association between 
institutional ownership and director remuneration, indicating the governing 
effectiveness of institutional investors. However, they note that the negative 
association becomes less significant in politically connected companies, suggesting 
that political connection mitigates institutional monitoring in the relationship-based 
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economies. Lim and Yen (2011) report that external block-holder does not have any 
significant influence on executive directors’ salary, suggesting they play a passive 
governing role. These inconclusive findings cast doubt pertaining to the monitoring 
role of institutional investors in Malaysia. Institutional investors are expected to play 
a significant role in relation to shareholders’ protection in Malaysia especially after the 
Asian Financial Crisis 1997, which is caused by the weak institutional environment, 
lack of corporate governance mechanisms, and crony capitalism (Abdul-Wahab and 
Abdul-Rahman 2009; Abdul-Rahman 2006). 
 
To a large extent, the measurement of institutional ownership by the past studies do 
not differentiate between domestic and foreign institutional investors. For instance, 
Hartzell and Starks (2003), and Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) measure 
institutional ownership by using the ownership of the five largest investors or based 
on Herfindahl index of institutional fractional holdings. Dong and Ozkan (2008) 
measure institutional ownership by using the sum of the significant financial 
institutional shareholdings that exceed 3%. Lim and Yen (2011) use the ownership of 
the largest single external block-holder that exceeds 5% of the firm’s equity to measure 
an external block-holder ownership. This study extends the existing literature by being 
the first study in a developing country, particularly Malaysia, which segregates the 
institutional ownership into domestic and foreign.  
 
Past studies point out the differences between domestic and foreign institutional 
investors in monitoring and influencing the companies (Gillan and Starks 2003; 
Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005; Ferreira and Matos 2008; Aggarwal et al. 2011; Croci, 
Gonenc and Ozkan 2012). Foreign institutional investors can use both exit and voice 
to make their interests clear to management. The threat of exit by foreign investors is 
salient. They have an inordinate influence on the share price because they are much 
more active in buying and selling shares (Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005). Yoshikawa, 
Rasheed, and Brio (2010) maintain that although foreign institutional investors hold 
relatively small block of shares, they tend to have a disproportionate effect on the 




Gillan and Starks (2003) and Aguilera and Cuervo-cazurra (2004) postulate that the 
companies as well as the countries may be motivated to improve their corporate 
governance in order to attract foreign investments. Aguilera and Cuervo-cazurra 
(2004), by collecting data from 49 31  countries, note that the presence of foreign 
institutional investors is positively related to the number of corporate governance 
practices adopted by the companies. Ferreira and Matos (2008), by examining the 
institutional investors in 2732 countries, find that the companies with a higher level of 
foreign institutional ownership have higher firm valuations, better operating 
performance, and lower capital expenditures, suggesting foreign institutional investors 
are involved in monitoring corporations worldwide. Aggarwal et al. (2011), by 
studying the influence of institutional investors in 2333 countries, report that firm-level 
governance is positively associated with foreign institutional ownership. They find that 
foreign, but not domestic, institutional investors make the boards more likely to have 
a majority of independent directors and less likely to adopt staggered board provision. 
They maintain that domestic institutional investors play a dominant role in improving 
the governance of the companies located in countries with strong shareholders’ 
protection, however in the countries with weak shareholder’s protection, the main role 
of improving governance is played by the foreign institutional investors. Overall, these 
past studies suggest that foreign institutional investors play an influential role in 
promoting and enhancing the corporate governance systems around the world. 
Pertaining to the remuneration payout, Croci, Gonenc, and Ozkan (2012) report that 
foreign institutional investors possess a positive significant influence on CEO 
remuneration in Continental Europe, while domestic institutional investors do not have 
any significant influence. Their findings suggest that internationalised companies offer 
a larger CEO remuneration. In light of these studies, this study expects that domestic 
                                                 
31 The 49 countries are Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
32 The 27 countries are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Germany, Sweden, 
Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Norway, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, Hong Kong, Spain, 
Singapore, Finland, Luxembourg, South Africa, Australia, India, Austria, Portugal, Liechtenstein, 
Poland and Greece. 
33 The 23 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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and foreign institutional investors would have a different influence on the executive 
remuneration in Malaysian family companies.  
 
In 2009, Malaysian government has disbanded the FIC (an agency associated with 
foreign equity restrictions) and lifted all the foreign equity ownership restrictions in 
27 service subsectors. These initiatives are to stimulate the growth of foreign 
investments (Hill, Tham and Zin 2012). According to the Emerging Markets 
Committee (2012), approximate 31% of Malaysia’s market capitalisation is accounted 
by the foreign institutional investors’ investment in 2010. Foreign institutional 
investors, in complying with investment criteria, demand higher standards of corporate 
governance in investee companies (Emerging Markets Committee 2012). Malaysia is 
the fourth largest recipient of FDI in ASEAN, behind Singapore, Indonesia, and 
Thailand. In Asia, as a whole, Malaysia ranks the seventh top FDI recipient (Kok 2014). 
In 2016, the foreign investments account for 46.8% or amount to RM27.4 billion for 
the total investments approved for the year (Malaysian Investment Development 
Authority 2016). The growing presence of foreign institutional investors in Malaysia’s 
equity market and their demand for strong corporate governance practices raise 
interesting question with regard to their role in influencing and monitoring the 
companies. By covering the period from 2010 to 2014, this study provides a timely 
contribution by examining the role of foreign institutional investors in governing 
executive remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies, immediate after the 
government’s liberalisation of foreign investment in 2009.   
 
To date, there are only a handful of studies that examine the influence of institutional 
ownership in the context of family companies. Of the few studies, Maury and Pajuste 
(2005), by using 136 non-financial Finnish listed companies, report that when the 
financial institution is the second or third largest shareholder in a family-controlled 
company, the firm value is enhanced and the tendency of controlling family to extract 
private benefits is reduced due to the effective monitoring by institutional investor. 
Similarly, Jara-Bertin, Lopez-Iturriaga, and Lopez-de-Foronda (2008), by examining 
1,208 companies from 11 European countries, unveil that the firm value of a family 
company increases when the second largest shareholder is an institutional investor. 
They document that the family shareholders may pressure managers to prioritise their 
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interests even though such actions may be detrimental to the interests of other 
shareholders. The large non-family shareholders in family companies are likely to play 
an active monitoring role not only due to their relevant stake but also due to the need 
to protect themselves from the possible excess use of power by the family shareholders. 
In addition, Filatotchev, Lien, and Piesse (2005) find out that institutional ownership 
is positively associated with the firm performance of Taiwanese family-controlled 
companies. In general, these studies show that the institutional investors are effective 
monitors in family companies. However, there are limited studies pertaining to their 
role in governing executive remuneration in family companies (Croci, Gonenc and 
Ozkan 2012). This study contributes to the extant literature by examining the influence 
of institutional ownership on executive remuneration in Malaysian listed family 
companies. 
 
To reiterate, this study extends the existing literature on institutional ownership in two 
ways: (i) segregate institutional ownership into domestic and foreign, and (ii) 
specifically examine their monitoring role in family companies. This study 
hypothesises that institutional investors could enhance the corporate governance of 
family companies and protect the minority shareholders from the expropriation by 
family shareholders via executive remuneration. The following hypotheses are 
proposed: 
 
H7: Domestic institutional ownership has a negative association with executive 
remuneration. 
 
H8: Foreign institutional ownership has a negative association with executive 
remuneration. 
 
3.5.7 Revised MCCG 2012 
As discussed in section 2.5.3, the MCCG has gone through second round of revision 
in 2012 after taking into account the changing market dynamics, international 
developments and the need to continuously recalibrate and enhance the effectiveness 
of the corporate governance framework (Securities Commission Malaysia 2013). 
Among others, the key amendments and areas that have been strengthened in the 
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revised MCCG 2012 include independence of independent directors, nine-year tenure 
cap for independent directors, role separation of board chairman and CEO, directors’ 
remuneration, remuneration committee, and the relationship between company and 
shareholders (Securities Commission Malaysia 2013). The MCCG 2012 takes effect 
on 31st December 2012.  
 
On this premise, it is expected that the revised MCCG 2012 would enhance the 
corporate governance of remuneration policy and rein in executive remuneration, at 
the same time, lessen the Type II agency conflict. Accordingly, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H9: The revised MCCG 2012 has a negative association with executive 
remuneration. 
 
3.6 Conceptual Schema 
Based on the literature review and hypotheses development, the following conceptual 







Agency theory is employed by this study as the theoretical framework. A theory helps 
to identify relevant variables and associations, interpret and understand the 
observations, and advance explanations. A theory describes (i.e. what, how, when, who, 
where) and explains (why) (Whetten 1989). This positivist study examines the 
influence (how) of family participation on board (what), corporate governance 
mechanisms (what), and institutional ownership (what) on the executive remuneration 
(what) of listed family companies (who) in Malaysia (where). The coefficient results 
will answer the why. 
 
The board of directors and institutional investors are suggested by classical agency 
theory to mitigate the conflict between shareholders and management (Type I agency 
conflict). As such, voluminous studies premise on Type I agency conflict to examine 
the influence of board of directors and institutional ownership on executive 
remuneration. Limited studies examine the roles of board of directors and institutional 
investors in governing executive remuneration in the companies with concentrated 
ownership structure, specifically family companies. Succinctly, there are theoretical 
and literature gaps whether the board of directors and institutional investors could 
govern the executive remuneration and alleviate the Type II agency conflict in family 
companies. 
 
This predominance of family companies shapes particular corporate governance 
challenges not always considered in the markets where the ownership is widely 
dispersed and the board of directors is mainly composed of external and professional 
directors. Family involvement in ownership, governance, and management makes a 
family company different from non-family company. The Type II agency conflict 
alters the dynamics of corporate governance process. This casts doubt pertaining to the 
roles of board of directors and institutional investors in governing executive 
remuneration in family companies. 
 
Executive remuneration in Malaysia has been on the rise over time, and family 
companies are among the top companies that paid the highest directors’ remuneration. 
This raises a concern about the possibility of wealth expropriation at the expense of 
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minority shareholders. The institutional investors and minority shareholders invest the 
capital into family companies, and the controlling family could misappropriate the 
funds through ungoverned remuneration payout. On this premise, executive 
remuneration of family companies has to be studied empirically as Malaysia’s 
economy depends heavily on the family companies. The unaccountability of family 
companies would deter the institutional investors’ preference, particularly foreign 




CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.0 Introduction 
Chapter four presents the research methodology employed to test the influence of (i) 
family participation on board, (ii) corporate governance mechanisms, and (iii) 
institutional ownership on executive remuneration of Malaysian listed family 
companies. This chapter is organised as follows: section 4.1 illustrates the research 
design; section 4.2 discusses the sample selection; sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 present the 
measurements of the dependent variable, independent variables, and control variables 
respectively; section 4.6 outlines the model specification; sections 4.7 and 4.8 describe 
the statistical analysis methods and additional analyses respectively; and section 4.9 
provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
4.1 Research Design 
Prior studies on executive remuneration employ quantitative approach using secondary 
data (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri 2003; Cheng and Firth 2006; Abdul-
Wahab and Abdul-Rahman 2009; Jiang and Peng 2011; Croci, Gonenc and Ozkan 
2012; Yatim 2013; Wang, Zhao and Chen 2017). The main causes impeding the use 
of qualitative approach are the difficulties in gaining access to the individuals involved 
in remuneration setting, and the sensitivity of the subject matter to the respondents. 
The executive directors would be reserved on what they reveal and may avoid 
discussing remuneration in detail. Therefore, the use of questionnaires or interviews 
would generate less, bias, and incomplete responses from the executive directors.  
 
This study investigates the factors influencing executive remuneration of Malaysian 
listed family companies, in particular, family participation on board, corporate 
governance mechanisms, and institutional ownership. This study uses a positivist 
empirical research methodology seeking to answer the ‘what’ (the extent of executive 
remuneration over time in Malaysia) and the ‘why’ (factors influencing such extent) 
questions rather than the ‘how’ question. The questions require a considerable number 
of samples in order to generalise the results. Hence, this study employs quantitative 




The majority of prior studies in the Malaysian context use a single-year data to 
examine the association between corporate governance mechanisms and executive 
remuneration (Yatim 2013; Abdullah 2006). Different from past studies, this study 
employs longitudinal analysis using five-year panel data from 2010 to 2014 in an 
enhanced corporate governance regime. Panel data refers to the pooling of 
observations on a cross-section of households, countries, companies, etc., over several 
time periods (Baltagi 2005; Gujarati and Porter 2010). Baltagi (2005) documents there 
are several benefits of using panel data, which include: (i) the ability to control 
individual heterogeneity; (ii) more informative data, more variability, less collinearity 
among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency; and (iii) the 
capability to identify and measure effects that are simply not detectable in pure cross-
section or pure time-series data. The rationale for choosing the period from2010 to 
2014 is to provide insight into the efficacy of the revised MCCG 2012 in governing 
executive remuneration of listed family companies. To date, there is a lack of empirical 
studies examining the effectiveness of the revised MCCG 2012. 
   
This study obtains secondary data from two main sources: (i) individual sample family 
company’s annual reports, and (ii) DataStream database. The annual reports can be 
found and downloaded from Bursa Malaysia’s authoritative website: 
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/market/listed-companies/list-of-companies/main-
market/. The DataStream database is available at Curtin University Malaysia. Annual 
reports are the main source to obtain the data of dependent variables namely executive 
remuneration; independent variables comprising family participation on board, 
corporate governance mechanisms, and institutional ownership; and control variables 
of family ownership and board size. Meanwhile, the DataStream database is the main 
source to extract financial data: total assets, total debts, return on assets, and market 
value to book value of equity. 
 
4.2 Sample Selection 
This thesis focuses on the companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange. 
The original sampling frame covers the population of listed companies on the Main 
Board of the stock exchange. Companies in the financial sector including banks, 
finance, and insurance are excluded from the population as they have unique 
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characteristics and operate in a different and more stringent compliance and regulated 
environment (Yatim, Kent and Clarkson 2006). In order to be selected for this thesis 
analysis, a family company has to meet the following criteria: 
 
1. The family has to hold some identifiable shares and involve in the management, 
for instance, as the CEO, board chairman, or board directors (Anderson and Reeb 
2003; Fernando, Schneible and Suh 2014); 
2. The family has to hold at least 20% of the equity directly or indirectly through 
private company (Sendirian Berhad) or public listed company (Berhad). (Amran 
and Che-Ahmad 2013; Azizan and Ameer 2012; Barontini and Bozzi 2011; Sraer 
and Thesmar 2007; Faccio and Lang 2002). Claessens et al. (1999) maintain that 
20% of equity held by a family is sufficient to ensure a conclusive influence over 
the business; 
3. The family remains the biggest shareholder throughout the study period; and 
4. Annual reports and information for all variables must be available throughout 
the study period. 
 
The family relationships between the directors as well as the family relationships 
between the directors and major shareholders are disclosed under the section Profile 
of Directors in the annual report. Appendix 4 .1 shows an example of Profile of 
Directors of 2010 annual report of a sample family company, OKA Corporation Bhd, 
which shows the presence of parents and children from a family on the board. 
 
Pursuant to Chapter 9 – Continuing Disclosure Section 9.25 of Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements, the identities of the shareholders and the actual total shareholdings in 
excess of 5% have to be disclosed in the annual reports. These shareholders are deemed 
to be substantial shareholders of the PLCs. Further, Section 134(12)(c) of the 
Companies Act 1965 requires the PLCs to disclose the total indirect equity stakes of 
substantial shareholders that are held by other related family members in the company. 
Consequently, the requirements by Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements and the 
Companies Act 1965 facilitate the identification of family ownership for this study. 
This information can be obtained under the section List of Substantial Shareholdings 
in the annual report. Appendix 4.2 shows an extract of List of Substantial 
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Shareholdings of a sample family company, OKA Corporation Bhd, in which the 
parents and children collectively hold 58.41% of the equity. 
 
Applying criteria 1 and 2 stated in the preceding paragraph, 445 listed family 
companies are identified in the base year 2010.  This is approximately 45% of the total 
978 companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia in 2010. This proportion 
of family companies concurs with prior studies (Carney and Child 2013; Ibrahim, 
Abdul-Samad and Amir 2008). 
 
The 445 family companies are further subjected to filtering to ensure all the criteria 
for sample selection is being adhered to throughout the five-year study period. Out of 
the 445 family companies, 41 companies do not have the annual reports and the 
relevant information; 75 companies have undergone changes in ownership structure 
and/or board structure, rendering the first and second criteria not satisfied; and 50 
companies are delisted during the five-year study period. After excluding the PLCs 
that do not fulfil the criteria, the final sample comprises a total of 279 family 
companies, representing about 63% of the family PLCs and approximately 30% of the 
total PLCs in 2010. Over the five-year study period, the sample size of 279 companies 
per year makes up a total of 1,395 firm-year observations. Table 4.1 summarises the 
sampling procedure followed in this research. 
 
The data used for testing the hypotheses is obtained from the annual reports of these 
279 listed family companies for each year from 2010 to 2014, as well as from the 
DataStream database. This longitudinal data is explicitly used to examine the 





Table 4.1: Family companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia 
 Number 
Total family PLCs in the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia in 2010 445 
Minus:  
Annual reports and the information for certain variables are unavailable34 41 
Changes in ownership and/or board structure due to: 
(i) family shareholders are no longer the biggest shareholders 
and hold little stake of shares; 
(ii) the ownership structure changes and family shareholders are 
no longer the shareholders; 
(iii) the board structure changes and family directors are no longer 
on the board of directors 
75 
Delisted during the study periods 50 
Sample family PLCs for this study 279 
Percentage of sample companies over total family PLCs in 2010 63% 
  
4.3 Dependent Variable – Executive Remuneration 
Pursuant to Appendix 9C Item (11) of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements, ‘the 
remuneration of directors of the listed issuer for the financial year and in the following 
manner: (a) the aggregate remuneration of directors with categorisation into 
appropriate components (e.g. directors' fees, salaries, percentages, bonuses, 
commission, compensation for loss of office, benefits in kind based on an estimated 
money value) distinguishing between executive and non-executive directors; and (b) 
the number of directors whose remuneration falls in each successive band of 
RM50,000 distinguishing between executive and non-executive directors’. This is the 
only legislative requirement for the disclosure of aggregate remuneration of directors 
in the annual reports. PLCs are not mandated to disclose the remuneration details of 
each director. According to the Malaysia-ASEAN Corporate Governance Report 2014 
by the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (2014), only about 8% of the PLCs 
assessed in 2014 disclose the remuneration details of each director. Due to the lack of 
mandatory requirement, a majority of Malaysian PLCs report only the total executive 
directors’ remuneration and total non-executive directors’ remuneration in their annual 
reports. Appendix 4.3 shows an example of the disclosure of directors’ remuneration 
of a sample family company, PJ Development Holdings Berhad. 
                                                 
34  4 companies do not disclose the shareholdings; 6 companies do not disclose the executive 
remuneration, 1 company do not have executive director in 2014; 11 companies do not have 2010 annual 
report; 5 companies do not have 2011 annual reports; 3 companies do not have 2012 annual reports; 7 
companies do not have 2013 annual report; 4 companies do not have 2014 annual report. 
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As such, this study uses the total executive directors’ remuneration instead of 
individual executive director’s remuneration due to limited disclosure of Malaysian 
PLCs. In this study, executive remuneration is operationalised as the total 
remuneration received by executive directors, which includes salaries, fees, bonuses, 
allowances, benefits in kind, and other emoluments. Share options are excluded from 
the measurement due to the inadequacy and non-disclosure of this information in the 
annual reports. Bacha et al. (2009) identify only 26 PLCs disclose the Employee Share 
Options. Malaysian PLCs are passive to disclose the remuneration details especially 
equity-based remuneration. Likewise, past studies exclude share options from the 
remuneration measurement due to the data unavailability (Hassan, Christopher and 
Evans 2003; Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong 2005; Leone, Wu and Zimmerman 2006; 
Kato and Kubo 2006; Ozkan 2007; Basu et al. 2007; Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-
Rahman 2009; Yatim 2013). In fact, neither the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 
nor the MCCG requires the PLCs to disclose share options granted to the directors. 
Hence, the executive share options have never been adequately disclosed in the 
Malaysian PLCs annual reports. The exclusion of share option underestimates the true 
executive remuneration and poses the main drawback of this study. In order to reduce 
the non-normality and heteroscedasticity, the total executive remuneration is 
transformed using natural logarithm (Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman 2009; Croci, 
Gonenc and Ozkan 2012; Yatim 2013).  
 
4.4 Independent Variables 
The independent variables included in this study are categorised into: (i) family 
participation on board; (ii) corporate governance mechanisms; and (iii) institutional 
ownership. Family participation is proxied by the family directors on board and family 
CEO. Corporate governance mechanisms include board independence, tenure of 
independent non-executive directors, CEO-chairman role duality, and remuneration 
committee. Institutional ownership is segregated into domestic and foreign 
shareholdings. The following sections explain the measurements of each variable.  
 
4.4.1 Family Participation on Board 
The data pertaining to family participation on board is available in Profile of Directors 




i. Family directors on board (FD) is measured by the proportion of controlling 
shareholders and their family members over the total number of board directors 
(Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri 2003). 
 
ii. Family CEO (FCEO) is measured by the presence of CEO who is the family 
member of controlling family. In order to capture this variable into regression, 




4.4.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The data of corporate governance mechanisms is extracted from Profile of Directors 
and Corporate Governance Statement in the annual report. 
 
i. CEO-chairman role duality (RD) is measured using dummy variable. 1 is given 
when the positions of board chairman and CEO are held by the same person; 
and 0 if otherwise (Rechner and Dalton 1991; Haniffa and Hudaib 2006; 
Fahlenbrach 2009; Kamarudin, Wan Ismail and Samsuddin 2012; Yatim 2013; 
Goh, Rasli and Khan 2014). 
 
ii. Board independence (ID) is measured by the proportion of independent non-
executive directors over the total number of board directors (Lim and Yen 2011; 
Husnin, Nawawi and Salin 2016). 
 
iii. Tenure of independent non-executive directors (IDT) is measured by the 
average tenure of the independent non-executive directors on the board 
(Beasley 1996; Yang and Krishnan 2005; Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi 2010; 
Li et al. 2013).  
 
iv. Remuneration committee (IDRC) is measured by the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors over the total number of directors in remuneration 
committee (Lim and Yen 2011). This measurement is more precise and goes 
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beyond those suggested by various codes of corporate governance and 
measured by prior studies, which are the existence of remuneration committee 
and the proportion of non-executive directors on remuneration committee 
(Cadbury Committee 1992; Greenbury Committee 1995; Conyon and Peck 
1998; Jaafar, Abdul-Wahab and James 2012; Yatim 2013). This is because 
around 95% of Malaysian PLCs have established the remuneration committee 
(Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 2014b), thus it seems to be 
meaningless to investigate the existence of remuneration committee. Further, 
instead of non-executive directors, this study precisely measures the proportion 
of independent non-executive directors in remuneration committee. This is 
because the non-executive directors may be interested in major contracts of the 
company, or may have a major shareholding in the company, or may be a 
former employee (Hart 1995; Hishammuddin 2004). This will compromise 
their independence role in setting remuneration. 
 
4.4.3 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership data is obtained from List of Thirty (30) Largest Registered 
Shareholders in the annual report. The two categories of institutional ownership are 
measured as follows:  
 
i. Domestic institutional shareholdings (DIS) is measured by the proportion of 
domestic institutional shareholdings to the total shares outstanding.  Appendix 
4.4 shows an example of the domestic institutional ownership of a sample 
family company, Notion Vtec Berhad. 
 
ii. Foreign institutional shareholdings (FIS) is measured by the proportion of 
foreign institutional shareholdings to the total shares outstanding. Appendix 
4.5 shows an example of the foreign institutional ownership of a sample family 




4.4.4 Revised MCCG 2012 
A year dummy variable is used as the proxy for the revised MCCG 2012, where 0 is 
given for 2010, 2011, and 2012; while 1 is given for 2013 and 2014. This is because 
the revised MCCG 2012 takes effect on 31st December 2012.  
 
4.5 Control Variables 
The regression model of this thesis includes several control variables that have been 
ascertained by previous studies to have significant influence on executive 
remuneration. These variables include family ownership, board size, firm size, firm 
leverage, lagged firm performance, and growth opportunities.  
 
(i) Family ownership 
There have been inconclusive findings on the influence of family ownership on 
remuneration payout. Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri (2003), by studying 
the companies extracted from COMPUSTAT database, report a negative association 
between family ownership and CEO remuneration. In contrast,  Haid and Yurtoglu 
(2006) report a positive association between family ownership and CEO remuneration 
in the German context. Moreover, Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005) show a 
positive association between family managerial ownership and executive 
remuneration (cash emoluments received by the CEO and the board chairman) in the 
context of Hong Kong; family control appears to be associated with lower executive 
remuneration when the CEO and the chairman hold a small stake of ownership, and 
with higher executive remuneration when they hold significant shareholdings in the 
companies. Similarly, Lim and Yen (2011) find that when the executive ownership 
level is less than 23%, a unit increase in ownership will lead to approximately 1.1% 
decrease in salary; however when the ownership level is between 23% and 76%, a unit 
increase in ownership will result in approximately 0.8% increase in salary. Therefore, 
this study includes family ownership as a control variable because the expropriation 
via executive remuneration could happen at different points of ownership level. Family 





(ii) Board size 
Agency theory advocators suggest that large board size impedes board effectiveness 
and weakens the corporate governance of executive remuneration (Ozkan 2011; 
Coakley and Iliopoulou 2006; Ghosh and Sirmans 2005; Core, Holthausen and Larcker 
1999). They report a positive association between board size and executive 
remuneration, arguing that a large board size is associated with communication and 
coordination problems, and is less effective in monitoring remuneration arrangement. 
On the other hand, Kashif and Mustafa (2012) provide an alternative explanation for 
the positive association; a large board size indicates that more capable and skilful 
people become part of corporate boards, which results in enhanced firm performance 
and market position, thus, intensifies executive remuneration. Accordingly, this study 
controls the board size effect and measures it as the total number of directors on board. 
 
(iii)  Firm size 
Murphy (1985) posits that firm size reflects managerial responsibilities. Executive 
directors of large firms are paid more than those in small firms because of greater 
management complexities. Previous studies show a positive association between the 
firm size and executive remuneration, asserting that firm size is a strong determinant 
of executive remuneration (Yatim 2013; Lim and Yen 2011; Ghosh 2006; Tosi et al. 
2000; Hassan, Christopher and Evans 2003). In this study, firm size is measured by 
the natural logarithm of total assets of the company (Chu and Song 2012; Yatim 2013; 
Yunos, Ismail and Smith 2012). 
 
(iv) Firm Leverage 
Jensen (1986) postulates that agency conflicts between the shareholders and managers 
over the payout policies are severe when the company has substantial free cash flow35. 
He documents the use of debt could lessen agency costs by reducing the cash flow 
available for discretionary spending by managers. In addition, Crespí–Cladera and 
Gispert (2003) suggest that debt or firm leverage can be served as a governance 
mechanism. Empirically, Dong and Ozkan (2008) and Yoshikawa, Rasheed, and Brio 
(2010) report a negative association between firm leverage and director pay in the 
                                                 
35 Free cash flow is the cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net 
present values when discounted at relevant cost of capital. 
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context of the United Kingdom and Japan respectively. Their findings indicate that 
firm leverage could exert a downward pressure on executive remuneration. Therefore, 
this study controls the firm leverage effect, which is measured by the ratio of total 
debts to total assets (Yatim, Iskandar and Nga 2014; Chung, Firth and Kim 2002). 
 
(v) Lagged firm performance  
Return on assets, ROA, is a performance measure of accounting income generated for 
shareholders (Wu 2013). The standard agency model suggests that the level of 
remuneration is an increasing function of firm performance (Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker 1999). Executive remuneration paid in the current year is determined by 
previous year’s firm performance. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Lilling (2006) 
document that lagged performance measure reduces the potential endogeneity or 
reverse causality between executive remuneration and firm performance. In addition, 
Crespí–Cladera and Gispert (2003) maintain that lagged accounting measure is more 
powerful than current accounting measure in explaining the directors’ remuneration. 
They show a positive association between directors’ remuneration and lagged ROA in 
Spanish companies. Moreover, Basu et al. (2007) report similar finding in Japanese 
companies. Their findings indicate that lagged firm performance is a significant 
determinant of remuneration level. Hence, this study includes lagged ROA as a control 
variable. It is measured as the ratio of net income to total assets (Gomez-Mejia, 
Larraza-Kintana and Makri 2003; Croci, Gonenc and Ozkan 2012).  
 
(vi) Growth opportunities  
Growth opportunities is a market measurement of firm performance (Lim and Yen 
2011; Cheng and Firth 2006). Extant studies which premise on agency theory 
document that remuneration payout should be linked to the company’s growth 
opportunities, which add value for the shareholders. (Smith and Watts 1992; Conyon, 
Core and Guay 2011; Croci, Gonenc and Ozkan 2012; Fernandes et al. 2013). They 
show that the companies with a higher growth opportunities reward their executive 
directors with higher levels of remuneration. Therefore, growth opportunities, 
measured by the ratio of market value to book value of equity (Abdul-Wahab and 
Abdul-Rahman 2009; Croci, Gonenc and Ozkan 2012), is included as a control 
variable in this study. 
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Table 4.2 summarises the measurements of the dependent variable, independent 
variables and control variables, as well as the hypothesised direction of each 
independent variable and expected direction of each control variable.  
 
Table 4.2: Measurements of variables 








Natural logarithm of total remuneration 














0 = CEO is non-family director 















Average tenure of independent non-executive 






0 = Different individuals hold board chairman 
and CEO positions 
1 = Same individual holds both board 






Proportion of independent non-executive 






















0 = 2010, 2011 and 2012 
1 = 2013 and 2014 
** This variable is included in the panel 

































Ratio of market value to book value of equity Positive 
 
4.6 Models Specification 
The first multivariate model is constructed to examine the cross-sectional association 
between executive remuneration and explanatory variables. For each-year 
observations, estimates of the regression equation is as follows: 
 
LNEXREMx = β0 + β1FDx1 + β2 FCEOx2 + β3IDx3 + β4IDTx4 + β5RDx5 + 
β6IDRCx6 + β7DISx7 + β8FISx8 + β9FOx9 + β10BSx10 + β11LNTAx11 
+ β12LEVx12 + β13ROA(-1)x13 + β14MVx14 + εx 
 
In order to examine the influence of family participation on board, corporate 
governance mechanisms, institutional ownership, revised MCCG 2012, and control 
variables on the executive remuneration of listed family companies in Malaysia over 
the five-year period from 2010 to 2014, this study uses the following panel regression: 
 
LNEXREMit = β0 + β1FDit + β2 FCEOit + β3IDit + β4IDTit + β5RDitt + β6IDRCit 
+ β7DISit + β8FISit + β9YEARit + β10FOit + β11BSit + β12LNTAit + 







β  =  estimated coefficient for each variable  
LNEXREM =  natural logarithm of total remuneration received by executive  
directors  
FD  =  proportion of family directors on board 
FCEO  =  family CEO 
ID  =  proportion of independent non-executive directors on board 
IDT  =  average tenure of independent non-executive directors 
RD  =  CEO-chairman role duality  
IDRC =  proportion of independent non-executive directors on the  
remuneration committee  
DIS  =  percentage shareholdings of domestic institutional investors  
FIS  =  percentage shareholdings of foreign institutional investors 
YEAR  =  year dummy (proxy for the revised MCCG 2012) 
FO  =  percentage shareholdings of family 
BS  =  total number of directors on board (proxy for board size) 
LNTA  =  natural logarithm of total assets (proxy for firm size) 
LEV  =  ratio of total debts to total assets (proxy for firm leverage) 
ROA(-1) =  ratio of lagged net income to total assets (proxy for firm  
accounting performance) 
MV =  ratio of market value to book value of equity (proxy for firm  
market performance and growth opportunities) 
ε  =  error term 
 
The aforementioned regression models are designed to test the hypotheses stipulated 
in Chapter Three.  
 
4.7 Statistical Analysis 
This thesis utilises several statistical techniques to test the research proposition and 
hypotheses. In Chapter 5, descriptive statistics provide information about the mean, 
median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values of the variables included 
in this study. Tests of the mean values of executive remuneration between reporting 
periods are conducted to evaluate of the change in the extent of executive remuneration 
over the five-year period. A correlation matrix provides information on the 
associations between dependent, independent, and control variables, and assesses the 
potential multicollinearity issue. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple regression 
model is used to test the statistical significance of the association between the 
dependent and independent variables. Control variables are included to control for any 





4.7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are used to describe the basic characteristics of the data. In 
particular, the descriptive statistics provide a general understanding of the executive 
remuneration, family participation on board, corporate governance mechanisms, 
institutional ownership, and some firm attributes of Malaysian listed family companies.  
 
4.7.2 Spearman’s Rank Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis is used to describe the strength and direction of the linear 
relationship between two variables. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is a 
statistical measure of the strength of a monotonic relationship between paired data. 
When data is not normally distributed or when the presence of outliers gives a distorted 
picture of the association between two random variables, the Spearman’s rank 
correlation can be used instead of the Pearson’s correlation (Laerd Statistics 2017).  
 
Spearman’s rank correlation is a non-parametric test that can be used in many cases 
when the assumptions of Pearson's correlation are not met, such as continuous-level 
variables, linearity, heteroscedasticity, and normality. Compared to Pearson's 
correlation, the Spearman’s rank correlation does not require continuous-level data 
(interval or ratio), because it uses ranks instead of the assumptions about distributions 
of the two variables. Moreover, it is not very sensitive to outliers so the presence of 
these data points will not invalidate the results from running a Spearman’s correlation 
(Laerd Statistics 2017).  
 
4.7.3 Paired T-Test and One-Way Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Paired t-tests are conducted to examine whether the mean values of executive 
remuneration differ significantly between a two-year period, which are: 2010 and 2011, 
2011 and 2012, 2012 and 2013, and 2013 and 2014. 
 
One-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), or known as within-
subjects ANOVA36, is used to compare the mean values of three or more groups where 
                                                 
36 In the repeated measure ANOVA, there are three potential sources of variability: (i) variance between 
treatments, (ii) variance within subjects, and (iii) variance expected by chance/ error. The logic of 
repeated one-way repeated measures ANOVA is that, any differences found between treatments can be 
explained by only two factors: (i) treatment effect and (ii) error or chance. This formula leaves only 
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the subjects in each group are the same. It involves repeated measures and comparisons 
of the same subjects over time. One-way repeated measures design control for 
individual differences by comparing the scores of a subject in one period with the 
scores of the same subject in other periods. (Lane 2015). It is conducted in this study 
to investigate whether there is a significant increase in executive remuneration over 
the five-year period from 2010 to 2014. This technique facilitates the assessment of 
the extent of executive remuneration of listed family companies in Malaysia over time. 
 
4.7.4 Detecting Outliers and Influential Points  
Detecting outliers and influential points is one of the most essential statistical 
diagnostics for ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. Outliers are the 
observations with unique combinations of characteristics identified as distinctly 
different from other observations (Hair et al. 2010). In the face of a heavy-tailed 
(outlier-prone) error distribution, a predicted regression line tends to track more 
closely to outlying observations, fitting them at the expense of the rest of the sample 
data in order to minimise the sum of squared errors. Consequently, the estimated 
results are likely to lead to making incorrect inferences about the data. In short, outliers 
can have a serious effect on coefficient estimates (Belsley, Kuh and Welsh 1980; 
Gujarati 2003; Hamilton 2004; Hair et al. 2010; Brooks 2014).  
 
To identify the influential points, statistical test based on Cooks’ Distance is conducted. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) define influential points as those with Cooks’ Distance 
above 1. Besides, the graph of leverage-versus-residual-squared is inspected to detect 
the presence of outliers and any influential points. Any outliers detected are traced 
back to the original source of data to ensure that the data is accurate. If the outliers are 
                                                 
differences due to treatment/observation effects. A large F value indicates the differences between 
treatments/observations are greater than would be expected by chance or error alone (Khelifa 2016). 
There are five assumptions that underlie the one-way repeated measures ANOVA (Laerd Statistics 
2016). If the assumption of sphericity is violated, there are three correction factors to choose from, 
namely Huynh-Feldt, Greenhouse-Geisser, and Box’s conservative, so the result from the one-way 





found to be influential where the Cooks’ Distance is above 1, the outliers will be 
removed from the data as they can lead to erroneous estimates in regression models.  
 
4.7.5 Assumptions of OLS Multiple Regression Model 
Before conducting the ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression model, the 
underlying assumptions are checked, which are the normality of residuals, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, and multicollinearity (Hair et al. 2010).  
 
(i) Normality of Residuals 
Multiple regression model requires the assumption of normally distributed errors or 
residuals. Residuals, or sometimes referred to as errors, are the difference between the 
observed value and the predicted value of dependent variable (Pallant 2011). In this 
study, the normality of residuals is checked by inspecting the normal probability plot 
(PP) of residuals (Gujarati and Porter 2010; Pallant 2011) and statistical test based on 
Shapiro Wilk test. 
 
(ii) Linearity 
The residuals should have a straight line relationship with the predicted dependent 
variable scores (Pallant 2011). According to Hair et al. (1998), linearity can be 
examined using a residual plot. This study tests the linearity assumption using the 
scatterplot of standardised predicted value against the standardised residuals (Williams, 
Grajales and Kurkiewicz 2013). 
  
(iii) Homoscedasticity 
Another important assumption of a multiple regression model is homoscedasticity, in 
which the variance of regression residuals is constant. When this assumption is 
violated, the residuals are heteroscedastic; a condition of heteroscedasticity exists 
(Gujarati and Porter 2010). The homoscedasticity assumption implies that the variance 
of the residuals is unrelated to any single predictor or any linear combination of the 
predictor variables (Hayes and Cai 2007). Gujarati and Porter (2010) posit that in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, the usual hypothesis-testing routine is not reliable, 
giving rise to the possibility of drawing misleading conclusions. The scatterplot of 
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standardised predicted value against the standardised residuals is used to assess the 
assumption of homoscedasticity (Osborne and Waters 2002; Hayes and Cai 2007). 
 
(iv) Multicollinearity 
According to Gujarati and Porter (2010), one of the assumptions of the linear 
regression model is no perfect multicollinearity. In other words, there is no exact linear 
relationships among the independent variables included in a multiple regression model. 
Multicollinearity can cause large variances and standard errors of OLS estimators, 
insignificant t ratios, high R2 value but few significant t ratios and wrong signs for 
regression coefficients (Gujarati and Porter 2010). Multicollinearity can be detected 
using correlation coefficient. Multicollinearity exists if the correlation coefficient 
exceeds 0.8 (Gujarati 1995; Hair et al. 1998). This study examines multicollinearity 
by inspecting the Spearman correlation matrix. Moreover, this study also assesses the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance of each variable to investigate the 
multicollinearity (Gujarati and Porter 2010). Multicollinearity exists if the VIF is 
above 10 or the tolerance is below 0.1 (Pallant 2011).  
 
4.7.6 Multiple Regression Model 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis is used to test the statistical 
significance of the association between the dependent and independent variables. 
There are two main multiple regression models in this study: (i) multiple regression 
model for each period, 2010 to 2014; and (ii) panel regression model which pools the 
data from 2010 to 2014, as shown in section 4.6. Multiple regression analysis is the 
most appropriate analysis method when the research problem involves a single metric 
dependent variable, which is presumed to be related to two or more metric independent 
variables. Non-metric variables can be included in regression analysis by creating 
dummy variables (Hair et al. 2010). The multiple regression model is used to explore 
and analyse the relationship between a single dependent variable and several 
independent variables (Hair et al. 2010; Pallant 2011). Its basic formula is  




Hair et al. (2007) define OLS as a relatively simple mathematical technique that makes 
sure the straight line will best represent the relationship between the multiple 
independent variables and the single dependent variable.  
 
Longitudinal analysis is employed to examine the panel data. Panel data refers to the 
pooling of observations on a cross-section of households, countries, companies, etc., 
over several time periods. Hsiao (2014) indicates that the pooling of data could provide 
more accurate predictions of individual outcomes than generating predictions using 
the data on the individual in question if individual behaviours are similar conditional 
on certain variables. When the data on individual history are limited, panel data could 
provide the possibility of learning an individual’s behaviour by observing the 
behaviour of others. As such, this study pools the observations of 279 listed family 
companies over the five-year period from 2010 to 2014. The panel regression model 
is shown in section 4.6. 
 
Three tests are conducted to choose the most efficient estimator for panel data analysis, 
which are F test, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, and Hausman specific test. 
Specifically, F test evaluates the presence of individual specific effects; Breusch-
Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test is to choose between pooled OLS model and random 
effects model (REM); Hausman specific test is to choose between FEM and REM 
(Hsiao 2014; Wooldridge 2013; Baltagi 2005). Of importance, the focus of the panel 
data analysis is how to control the impact of individual specific effects or unobserved 
heterogeneity to obtain valid inference on the common parameters, β (Hsiao 2014).  
 
Pooled OLS model is simply an OLS technique run on panel data. Hence, it completely 
ignores all individual specific effects. Hsiao (2014) suggests that F test can be used as 
the preliminary step to explore the source of variability. According to Baltagi (2005), 
F test can assess the fixed individual effects. Under its null hypothesis of equality, the 
efficient estimator is pooled OLS. The rejection of null hypothesis means there is a 
presence of individual specific effects. The validity of F-tests are based on the 
assumption that the errors of the equation are independently, identically distributed, 




When the presence of individual specific effects is identified, the next question is how 
to treat them. REM assumes the exogeneity of all independent variables with the 
individual specific effects, which means the individual specific effects or error terms 
are uncorrelated with the past, current, and future values of the independent variables. 
In contrast, FEM allows the endogeneity of independent variables with individual 
specific effects, which means individual specific effects or error terms are correlated 
with the independent variables. Thus, it is an ‘all’ or ‘nothing’ choice of exogeneity of 
the independent variables and the individual specific effects (Hsiao 2014; Baltagi 2005; 
Mundlak 1978).  
 
In addition, REM assumes the differences between companies have some influence on 
the dependent variable. REM uses generalised least squares (GLS) estimation to 
identify the possible correlation between the unobserved differences and the error 
terms. The GLS estimator is a weighted average of the between-group and within-
group estimators (Hsiao 2014). On the other hand, the FEM uses the changes in the 
variables over time to estimate the effects of independent variables on the dependent 
variable. FEM removes the effect of those time-invariant characteristics and assesses 
the net effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable. In short, the REM 
allows the estimation of the coefficients of both time-varying and time-invariant 
variables; while the FEM only allows the estimation of the coefficients of time-varying 
variables (Hsiao 2014). 
 
4.7.7 Endogeneity Issue 
The concern of the possible endogenous determination of corporate governance 
structure is addressed in this study. According to Wooldridge (2013), the sources of 
endogeneity problems include model specification error and simultaneity. The linktest 
is conducted to examine the model specification (Stata 2017). 
 
Simultaneity arises when one or more of the explanatory variables is jointly 
determined with the dependent variable, typically through an equilibrium mechanism 
(Wooldridge 2013). In this study, there could be a possibility that the high level of 
executive remuneration leads to the changes in institutional ownership; the 
institutional investors may be dissatisfied with the remuneration arrangement and exit 
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the companies. Clay (2000) document that if the institutional investors are averse to 
bad corporate governance practices, their investment preference may be based on the 
measures of corporate governance. This implies that a higher level of institutional 
shareholdings may be the effect of good corporate governance, but not the cause. 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) document that the adoption of certain remuneration 
structures by companies to attract institutional investors could cause an endogeneity 
between the executive remuneration and institutional ownership. To examine the 
possibility of endogeneity, this study adopts the method of Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
to check whether the lagged executive remuneration would predict subsequent 
institutional shareholdings. 
 
Listokin (2008) document that there is an absence of corporate governance model that 
specifies the sources and effects of potential endogeneity problems. Corporate 
governance literature shows few ways to treat endogeneity problem when the samples 
respond to corporate governance heterogeneously – e.g., when the corporate 
governance mechanism affects one company differently than another. The cures for 
endogeneity include subsample estimates, instrumental variable techniques, and fixed 
effect model. Nonetheless, valid instruments are very hard to identify, particularly in 
the corporate governance context (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003).  
 
Different companies will have different needs for different types of governance, thus, 
what is optimal for one company may not be optimal for another. The differences in 
governance maximisation may or may not be correlated with other attributes of the 
company, e.g., the nature of industry sector. For instance, family companies in some 
industry sectors may prefer CEO-chairman role separation whilst those in another 
industry sectors may prefer CEO-chairman role duality. In order to address this 
potential governance choice heterogeneity caused by the industry heterogeneity, panel 
regression model is run separately for different industry sectors.  
 
Moreover, family companies may differ in their optimal choices of board tenure. Some 
family companies may prefer to retain the existing independent non-executive 
directors and let them to accumulate tenure. The observed relationship between 
average tenure of independent non-executive directors and executive remuneration 
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arises as a result of optimal board tenure chosen by the family companies, which may 
vary across companies. The regression result of IDT may be generalised by the samples 
with high and low IDT. In order to address this concern, panel regression model is run 
separately for the subsamples with (i) IDT of more than nine years as stipulated by the 
revised MCCG 2012, and (ii) IDT of less than nine years.  
 
4.8 Additional Analyses  
Additional analyses are conducted to provide more insights into the factors influencing 
the executive remuneration of Malaysian listed family companies. The first additional 
analysis is to run the multiple regression model separately for different industry sectors: 
properties, construction, trading/services, consumer products, industrial products, and 
plantation. This could yield insights into whether the influence of family participation 
on board, corporate governance mechanisms, and institutional ownership on executive 
remuneration are the same across different industry sectors.  
 
The second additional analysis entails the segregation of sample into two subsample 
sets: (i) companies with family CEO, and (ii) companies with non-family CEO. This 
is to examine the efficacy of corporate governance mechanisms and institutional 
ownership when the management is led by family CEO (or non-family CEO). It is 
ambiguous whether the governing role of institutional investors would be different 
when the CEO is related, or not related, to the controlling family shareholders. 
  
During the data collection, it is noted that some family companies do not have 
institutional ownership. There is a concern; family companies without institutional 
ownership may generalise or weaken the coefficient results of institutional 
shareholdings. Thus, the third additional analysis involves running regression model 
specifically for the family companies having institutional ownership. Besides, this 
study also investigates the influence of total institutional shareholdings (both domestic 
and foreign) on the executive remuneration.  
 
The fourth additional analysis involves the segregation of sample according to various 
levels of family ownership. Lim and Yen (2011) note that for executive ownership 
levels of less than 23%, a unit increase in ownership will lead to approximately 1.1% 
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decrease in salary; for the ownership levels of 23% to 76%, a unit increase in 
ownership will bring approximately 0.8% increase in salary. In light of their study, this 
study suspects that the family participation on board, corporate governance 
mechanisms, and institutional ownership may have different influences on executive 
remuneration at different ranges of family ownership. 
 
The fifth additional analysis segregates the companies into two groups in which the 
average tenure of independent non-executive directors is (i) less than and equal to nine 
years as stipulated by the revised MCCG 2012, and (ii) more than nine years. In 
addition, this study uses alternative measurement to measure the tenure of independent 
non-executive directors and re-run the panel regression. The main regression measures 
the tenure using the average tenure of the independent non-executive directors on 
board. This measurement may suffer from skewness and fail to reflect the board 
dynamics. For instance, a board of 4 independent directors who each has tenure of ten 
years will have the same average tenure as a board of 2 independent directors with 
fifteen years of tenure each and 2 independent directors with five years of tenure each. 
In order to deal with the limitation of this measurement, additional analysis is 
conducted using an alternative measurement – the proportion of independent non-
executive directors whose tenure exceeded nine years over the total number of 
independent non-executive directors on board (Liu and Sun 2010).  
 
The sixth additional analysis examines the interaction effects between variables. 
Downes, Houminer, and Hubbard (1999) contend that institutional investors prefer to 
invest in the companies with independent board. Aggarwal et al. (2011) document that 
the changes in institutional ownership over time drive the changes in firm-level 
governance. This study investigates whether the interaction effects between 
institutional investors and independent non-executive directors could enhance the 
governance of executive remuneration. Further, this study also examines whether the 
interaction effect between family ownership and family directors on board would lead 
to a higher level of executive remuneration. In essence, this additional analysis could  
shed light whether the institutional investors and independent non-executive directors 
could interact well to protect the interests of minority shareholders (mitigate Type II 
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agency problem); or on the other hand, family shareholders interact with family 
directors on board to extract higher remuneration (exacerbate Type II agency problem).  
 
The additional analyses outlined above should provide better insights of the 
hypotheses tested in this study in the unique Malaysian setting over a five-year period. 
 
4.9 Summary 
This chapter provides a description of research methodology adopted in this study. 
Primarily, this study employs quantitative technique to test the hypotheses. Data is 
obtained from the companies’ annual reports published on the Bursa Malaysia official 
website and Datastream database. Only PLCs that fulfilled the four criteria form the 
sample of this study. The study period from 2010 to 2014 is chosen to investigate the 
influence of the revised MCCG 2012 on executive remuneration of listed family 
companies in Malaysia. Various statistical techniques are employed, which include 
descriptive statistics, Spearman’s rank correlation, paired t-test, one-way repeated 
measures ANOVA, and multiple regression model. The underlying assumptions of 
multiple regression model are tested before running the model. The following two 
chapters present the descriptive statistics of variables and the statistical results from 




CHAPTER FIVE: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics for all variables included in this study. 
The analysis aims to study the characteristics of the sample listed family companies in 
Malaysia, in particular, provides a general understanding of executive remuneration, 
family participation on board, corporate governance mechanisms, institutional 
ownership, and firm characteristics.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 5.1 discusses the descriptive statistics of 
executive remuneration; sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 report the descriptive statistics of 
family participation on board, corporate governance mechanisms, and institutional 
ownership, respectively; section 5.5 presents the descriptive statistics of control 
variables; and section 5.6 analyses the Spearman’s rank correlations between the 
variables and checks for the presence of multicollinearity.  
  
5.1 Executive Remuneration  
This section discusses the univariate descriptive statistics relating to executive 
remuneration (EXREM) of 279 sample family companies over the five-year period 
from 2010 to 2014. This analysis includes the frequency distribution of Malaysian 
listed family companies for different ranges of EXREM, descriptive statistics and 
percentile distribution. Paired t-test and one-way repeated measures ANOVA are 
conducted to examine whether the increase in mean EXREM over the study period is 
significant. The EXREM is composed of salaries/fees, bonuses, allowances, and other 
benefits37 .  As well, this section presents the composition of each component of 
EXREM and the changes over the five-year period. Further, this section reports that 
the EXREM varies for different industry sectors, specifically properties, industrial 
products, construction, consumer products, trading/services, and plantation. 
 
Figure 5.1 depicts the frequency distribution of Malaysian listed family companies for 
different ranges of EXREM over the five-year period. As illustrated, about 30.00% of 
                                                 




the sample family companies pay between RM1,000,000 and RM2,000,000. The 
number of family companies remunerating their executive directors more than 
RM10,000,000 has increased from 8 companies (2.87% of sample companies) in 2010 
to 19 companies (6.81% of sample companies) in 2014. On the other hand, the number 
of family companies paying executive remuneration of less than RM1,000,000 has 
decreased over the five-year period, from 77 companies (27.60% of sample companies) 
in 2010 to 47 companies (16.85% of sample companies) in 2014. 
 
Figure 5.1: Frequency distribution for different ranges of EXREM 
 
 
Table 5.1 summarises the descriptive statistic for EXREM of 279 sample family 
companies. The EXREM shows an increasing trend over the five-year period. 
Malaysian listed family companies pay an average executive remuneration of 
RM2,634,729 in 2010 and an average of RM4,197,305 in 2014, representing a 
significant increase of 59.31%38 over the five-year period.  
 
  
                                                 
38 Calculation: RM4,197,305 (in 2014) minus RM2,634,729 (in 2010), then dividend by  RM2,634,729 
























2010 77 94 41 27 15 6 6 4 1 0 8
2011 61 94 43 24 20 13 6 4 2 3 9
2012 59 83 54 23 18 9 7 6 4 1 15
2013 52 85 52 21 23 9 8 5 6 2 16














Table 5.1 Descriptive statistic for EXREM 
Period Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
2010 2,634,729 1,595,428 4,457,529 20,000 55,807,000 
2011 3,034,317 1,792,387 5,344,227 19,000 59,872,000 
2012 3,464,478 1,971,068 6,883,148 5,000 58,646,000 
2013 3,732,510 2,029,793 6,868,993 21,500 69,549,000 
2014 4,197,305 2,105,161 9,427,528 28,700 126,768,000 
2010-2014 3,412,668 1,898,767 6,596,285 5,000 126,768,000 
 
The mean value of EXREM over the five-year period is RM3,412,668, ranging from 
RM5,000 in 2012 to RM126,768,000 in 2014. This indicates a huge disparity of 
EXREM among Malaysian listed family companies. This finding is higher than the 
mean values reported by prior studies, which include both family and non-family 
companies in their sample sets. Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman (2009), Lim and 
Yen (2011), and  Jaafar, Abdul-Wahab, and James (2012) report the mean values of 
RM1,570,000,000, RM2,570,000, and RM1,850,000 with the maximum values of 
RM66,740,000, RM101,000,000, and RM69,620,000, respectively. The findings of 
this study show that executive directors in Malaysian listed family companies receive 
comparatively higher remuneration than the overall companies.  
 
Figure 5.2 displays the percentile distribution of EXREM, which yields more 
information about the range of EXREM for each year. As shown in Figure 5.2, there is 
a huge gap (more than 4000.00%) between the minimum value and the 1st quarter of 
EXREM for each year. This indicates that some family companies pay relatively low 
to their executive directors. Moreover, every year the EXREM increases drastically 
after 3rd quarter of percentile, particularly in 2014 where it escalates from a 7-digit 
figure to 9-digit figure.  
 
Table 5.2 shows the results of paired t-tests and one-way repeated measures ANOVA. 
Paired t-tests are conducted to examine whether the increase in mean EXREM is 
statistically significant between two periods, in this case: between 2010 and 2011, 
between 2011 and 2012, between 2012 and 2013, and between 2013 and 2014. One-
way repeated measures ANOVA is run to examine whether the increase of mean 




Figure 5.2: Percentile distribution of EXREM
 
 
Table 5.2: Paired t-tests and one-way repeated measures ANOVA result 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Panel A – Paired t-tests    
Observations 279 279 279 279 279 
Mean 2,634,729 3,034,319 3,464,478 3,732,510 4,197,305 
% change  15.17 14.18 7.74 12.46 
Hypothesised mean 
difference 
 0 0 0 0 
Degree of  freedom   278 278 278 278 
t-statistic  3.97 3.26 1.32 1.75 
p-value   0.00*** 0.00*** 0.19 0.08* 
      
Panel B - One-way repeated measures ANOVA result (2010 – 2014) 
Observations 1395     
% change 59.31     
F statistic  14.34     
p-value  0.00***     
H-F 0.00***     
G-G 0.00***     
Box 0.00***     
Note: ***, ** and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. 
 
Panel A of Table 5.2 reports that the increase of mean EXREM is statistically 
significant (p-value < 0.01) between 2010 and 2011, and between 2011 and 2012. 
Minimum
value
1st quarter 2nd  quarter 3rd quarter
Maximum
value
2010 20,000 959,170 1,595,428 2,900,712 55,807,000
2011 19,000 1,049,069 1,792,387 3,359,272 59,872,000
2012 5,000 1,113,390 1,971,068 3,640,581 87,814,000
2013 21,500 1,198,890 2,029,793 3,812,459 69,549,000









2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
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However, the increase of mean EXREM between 2012 and 2013 is not statistically 
significant (p-value > 0.10). This suggests that the revised MCCG 2012 is effective in 
reining in executive remuneration between 2012 and 2013. The increase of mean 
EXREM between 2013 and 2014 is statistically significant (p-value < 0.10), implying 
that the revised MCCG 2012 is effective in restraining executive remuneration during 
the first year of its implementation only. Notwithstanding this, the 0.10 significance 
level at the 2013-2014 period is weaker than the 0.01 significance level shown in the 
preceding periods, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. 
 
Panel B of Table 5.2 shows the result of one-way repeated measures ANOVA. The p-
value at 0.00 significance level indicates the increase of mean EXREM over the five-
year period from 2010 to 2014 is statistically significant. The large F statistic value at 
14.34 indicates that the differences between observations are greater than would be 
expected by chance or error alone. The results of Huynh-Feldt (H-F)39, Greenhouse-
Geisser (G-G), and Box’s conservative validate the result is statistically significant as 
their p-values are less than 0.01.  
 
The executive remuneration comprises salaries/fees, bonuses, allowances, and other 
benefits. Figure 5.3 shows the composition of each component: salaries/fees account 




                                                 
39  Huynh-Feldt (H-F), Greenhouse-Geisser (G-G), and Box’s conservative correct the violation of 
sphericity. Sphericity (one of the assumptions of one-way repeated measures ANOVA) means the 
variances of the differences between all combinations of related groups are equal (Laerd Statistics 2016). 
Their results are shown in Appendix 5.1 
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Figure 5.3: Components of EXREM 
 
Figure 5.4 presents the average of the components of EXREM from 2010 to 2014. Each 
component of EXREM has experienced continuous increase over the five-year period, 
except for a decrease of 20.89% in allowances and other benefits from RM734,162 in 
2012 to RM607,279 in 2013. Table 5.3 shows the percentage change of the 
components of EXREM for each of the study periods. The bonuses increase by 51.53% 
from RM455,139 in 2010 to RM938,974 in 2014, which is comparatively higher than 
the increases in salaries/fees (34.34%), and allowances and other benefits (28.66%). 
By using the study period from 1999 to 2003, Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman (2009) 
show that the mean bonuses of overall Malaysian listed companies is RM140,000. The 
findings of this study reveal that the average bonuses paid to executive directors in 
listed family companies is substantially higher than of the overall companies in 











Figure 5.4: Average of the components of EXREM from 2010 to 2014 
 
 
Table 5.3: Percentage change of the components of EXREM 
Period Salaries/ 
Fees 
Bonuses Allowances and 
other benefits 
2010 - 2011 14.26% 20.25% 1.09% 
2011 - 2012 5.79% 13.17% 30.45% 
2012 - 2013 12.46% 13.17% -20.89% 
2013 - 2014 7.14% 19.39% 14.23% 
2010 - 2014 34.34% 51.53% 28.66% 
 
The average EXREM across different industry sectors varies. Figure 5.5 shows the 
proportion of Malaysian listed family companies according to industry sector. 
Malaysian listed family companies are mostly involved in industrial products 
(34.05%), followed by consumer products (21.51%), trading/services (16.85%) and 
properties (12.90%). The involvement of family companies in construction, plantation, 
and other sectors40 are less than 10.00%.  
 
                                                 
40 Other sectors include infrastructure projects (1 family company), technology (4 family companies) 




2010 1,674,531 455,139 505,059
2011 1,952,990 570,684 510,643
2012 2,073,081 657,235 734,162
2013 2,368,281 756,950 607,279











Figure 5.5: Proportion of family companies according to industry sectors
 
 
Table 5.4 and Figure 5.6 show the mean EXREM for each industry sector41. The mean 
EXREM of each industry sector increases over the five-year study period. The mean 
values of the EXREM over the five-year period for the properties (RM4,464,790), 
construction (RM5,305,430), and plantation (RM7,092,891) sectors are higher than 
the average RM3,412,668 reported in Table 5.1. On the other hand, the industrial 
products (RM2,401,455), consumer products (RM2,772,979), trading/services 
(RM2,812,364) sectors pay lower-than-average EXREM. 
 
  
                                                 
41 The mean exrem statistic for the other sectors (infrastructure projects, hotel and technology) are not 





































2010 2,654,540 1,912,849 3,605,079 2,233,643 2,816,274 5,674,247 
2011 3,244,083 2,268,361 4,900,242 2,567,130 2,645,720 6,358,213 
2012 4,316,839 2,423,292 5,398,858 2,986,323 2,657,292 6,145,772 
2013 5,974,176 2,614,866 6,307,507 2,903,621 2,798,507 6,464,223 
2014 6,134,314 2,787,909 6,315,466 3,174,179 3,144,025 10,821,998 
2010-
2014 
4,464,790 2,401,455 5,305,430 2,772,979 2,812,364 7,092,891 
 
Figure 5.6: Mean EXREM for each industry sector 
 
 
Figure 5.7 to Figure 5.12 present the average of the components of EXREM for each 
industry sector42 from 2010 to 2014. 
 
  
                                                 
42 The statistic of the average of the components of exrem for the other sectors (infrastructure projects, 
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Figure 5.7 shows the average of the components of EXREM for the properties sector 
from 2010 to 2014. Each component of EXREM in the properties sector increases over 
the five-year period, except a decrease in bonuses by 20.61% from RM1,478,909 in 
2013 to RM1,174,129 in 2014.  
 
Figure 5.7: Average of the components of EXREM for properties sector  
 
 
Table 5.5 shows the percentage change of the components of EXREM for the properties 
sector. Over the five-year period, the percentage increase in the average bonuses is the 
highest (73.77%), followed by the allowances and other benefits (63.45%), and 
salaries/fees (47.84%). 
 
Table 5.5: Percentage change of the components of EXREM for properties sector 
Period Salaries/ 
Fees 
Bonuses Allowances and 
other benefits 
2010 - 2011 19.31% 48.87% 14.40% 
2011 - 2012 10.83% 82.74% 41.29% 
2012 - 2013 43.70% 76.54% 6.65% 
2013 - 2014 0.89% -20.61% 22.10% 







2010 1,783,086 307,931 563,523
2011 2,127,376 458,413 658,294
2012 2,357,877 837,704 1,121,258
2013 3,388,228 1,478,909 1,201,157













Figure 5.8 shows the average of the components of EXREM for the industrial products 
sector from 2010 to 2014. Each component of EXREM in the industrial products sector 
increases over the five-year period, except for a slight decrease in allowances and other 
benefits between 2012 and 2013 by 7.13%, and between 2013 and 2014 by 1.65%. 
  
Figure 5.8: Average of the components of EXREM for industrial products sector  
 
 
Table 5.6 shows the percentage change of the components of EXREM for the industrial 
products sector. Similar to the properties sector, the percentage increase in the average 
bonuses (61.91%) over the five-year period is the highest among the other components 
of EXREM. 
 




Bonuses Allowances and 
other benefits 
2010 - 2011 20.29% 25.62% 7.88% 
2011 - 2012 5.64% -9.04% 22.75% 
2012 - 2013 8.74% 31.61% -7.13% 
2013 - 2014 8.35% 7.66% -1.65% 






2010 1,357,492 204,516 350,841
2011 1,632,951 256,918 378,492
2012 1,725,008 233,703 464,581
2013 1,875,813 307,574 431,478










Figure 5.9 shows the average of the components of EXREM for the construction sector 
from 2010 to 2014.  
 
Figure 5.9: Average of the components of EXREM for construction sector   
 
 
Table 5.7 shows the percentage change of the components of EXREM for the 
construction sector. The percentage increase of each component over the five-year 
period is  more than 50.00%, with the highest percentage increase in bonuses by 115.37% 
from RM595,076 in 2010 to RM1,281,642 in 2014. 
 




Bonuses Allowances and 
other benefits 
2010 - 2011 14.92% 125.11% 34.42% 
2011 - 2012 7.59% 20.94% 6.05% 
2012 - 2013 19.17% 2.55% 31.79% 
2013 - 2014 7.98% -22.85% 9.69% 






2010 2,488,794 595,076 521,209
2011 2,860,089 1,339,562 700,591
2012 3,077,155 1,620,008 742,970
2013 3,667,031 1,661,320 979,156














Figure 5.10 shows the average of the components of EXREM for the consumer 
products sector from 2010 to 2014. 
 




Table 5.8 presents the percentage change of the components of EXREM for the 
consumer products sector. Unlike the other industry sectors, the percentage increase 
of the average bonuses (35.72%) in the consumer products over the five-year period is 
the lowest among the other components of EXREM. However, the percentage increase 
in the average bonuses between 2011 and 2012 is 84.79%. 
 




Bonuses Allowances and 
other benefits 
2010 - 2011 19.33% -7.34% 15.34% 
2011 - 2012 4.23% 84.79% 24.76% 
2012 - 2013 7.93% -22.54% -28.63% 
2013 - 2014 5.77% 2.32% 46.18% 







2010 1,623,466 325,993 284,183
2011 1,937,274 302,072 327,784
2012 2,019,185 558,202 408,937
2013 2,179,369 432,401 291,851










Figure 5.11 shows the average of the components of EXREM for the trading/services 
sector from 2010 to 2014. 
 
Figure 5.11: Average of the components of EXREM for trading/services sector 
 
 
Table 5.9 shows the percentage change of the components of EXREM for the 
trading/services sector. This is the only sector showing a percentage decrease in the 
average bonuses and average allowances and other benefits over the five-year period. 
These two components of EXREM only experience a percentage increase between 
2012 and 2013.  
 




Bonuses Allowances and 
other benefits 
2010 - 2011 3.93% -14.46% -27.65% 
2011 - 2012 4.28% -1.65% -12.25% 
2012 - 2013 4.67% 21.17% 0.75% 
2013 - 2014 20.51% -12.08% -9.74% 






2010 1,818,791 255,917 741,566
2011 1,890,306 218,906 536,508
2012 1,971,207 215,286 470,799
2013 2,063,318 260,872 474,317












Figure 5.12 shows the average of the components of EXREM for the plantation sector 
from 2010 to 2014. 
 
Figure 5.12: Average of the components of EXREM for plantation sector 
 
 
Table 5.10 reports the percentage change of the components of EXREM for the 
plantation sector. The 134.62% increase in bonuses is the highest among all the 
industry sectors. In addition, the average allowances and other benefits in plantation 
sector show a substantial increase of 182.45% between 2011 and 2012.  
 




Bonuses Allowances and 
other benefits 
2010 - 2011 16.70% 12.77% 3.64% 
2011 - 2012 12.32% -13.95% 182.45% 
2012 - 2013 7.85% 2.77% -62.68% 
2013 - 2014 0.75% 135.23% 39.00% 
2010 - 2014  42.42% 134.62% 51.84% 
 
To sum up, the executive remuneration of Malaysian listed family companies, which 
includes salaries/fees, bonuses, allowances, and other benefits; has increased from 




2010 1,674,151 2,855,091 1,145,727
2011 1,953,668 3,219,798 1,187,377
2012 2,194,336 2,770,746 3,353,690
2013 2,366,550 2,847,609 1,251,531













remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies may be due to the improved firm 
performance over time, or may signal the possible wealth expropriation by controlling 
family shareholders via executive remuneration. This is contrary to the research 
proposition of this study, which is, the executive remuneration of listed family 
companies in Malaysia is decreasing from 2010 to 2014. 
 
5.2 Family Participation on Board 
This section discusses the statistics relating to the participation of the controlling 
shareholders and their family members on the board of directors. Table 5.11 shows the 
statistics of family directors on board (FD), which includes both executive directors 
and non-executive directors. Panel A of Table 5.11 shows the frequency distribution 
of FD, whilst panel B presents the descriptive statistics for FD. The overall average of 
FD over the five-year period is 40.89%. The highest mean value of FD is reported in 
2012, 41.15%. In comparison to the average 20.09% for the FD in American family 
companies (Anderson and Reeb 2004), Malaysian family companies have a noticeably 
higher involvement of controlling shareholders and their families on boards. Thus far, 
there is limited study reporting the percentage of controlling shareholders and their 
family members on the board of directors.  
 
Table 5.11: Descriptive statistics for family directors on board 
Panel A: Frequency distribution of FD  
Range  N  %  
0% - 9%  1  0.36  
10% - 19%  13  4.66  
20% - 29%  44  15.77  
30% - 39%  75  26.88  
40% - 49%  54  19.35  
50% - 59%  69  24.73  
60% - 69%  20  7.17  
70% - 79%  3  1.08  
  279  100.00  
      
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for FD 
Period Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
2010 40.68 40.00 13.08 9.09 72.73 
2011 41.09 40.00 12.83 9.09 75.00 
2012 41.15 40.00 12.56 9.09 71.43 
2013 40.91 40.00 12.80 9.09 71.43 
2014 40.64 40.00 13.09 9.09 71.43 




Table 5.12 shows the statistics about the proportion of family executives over the total 
number of executive directors on corporate board (FEX). Panel A of Table 5.12 
presents the frequency distribution of FEX, whilst panel B summarises the descriptive 
statistics for FEX.  
 
Table 5.12: Descriptive statistics for family executives on board 
Panel A: Frequency distribution for FEX  
Range  N  %  
0% - 9%  5  1.79  
10% - 19%  0  0.00  
20% - 29%  4  1.43  
30% - 39%  13  4.66  
40% - 49%  8  2.87  
50% - 59%  24  8.60  
60% - 69%  47  16.85  
70% - 79%  24  8.60  
80% - 89%  14  5.02  
90% - 99%  0  0.00  
100%  140  50.18  
  279  100.00  
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for FEX 
Period Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
2010 79.18 100.00 24.97 0.00 100.00 
2011 79.57 88.89 24.40 0.00 100.00 
2012 79.29 87.50 24.49 0.00 100.00 
2013 78.95 88.89 25.03 0.00 100.00 
2014 78.11 85.71 25.21 0.00 100.00 
2010 - 2014 79.02 90.20 24.83 0.00 100.00 
 
Panel A of Table 5.12 shows that the executive director positions in more than 50.00% 
of sample family companies are all held by the controlling shareholders and their 
family members. As indicated in Panel B, the overall average of FEX over the five-
year period is 79.02%. The findings imply that the family businesses in Malaysia are 
predominantly executed by the controlling shareholders and families, and the 
executive remuneration is presumed to be largely accounted for family executives.  
 
Table 5.13 reports the frequency distribution of family CEO. A large majority of the 
sample family companies (about 90.00%) elect family CEO. This finding is higher 
than 47.70% reported in Indian family companies (Jameson, Prevost and 
Puthenpurackal 2014) and 44.97% reported in American family companies (Anderson 
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and Reeb 2003). This suggests that controlling family shareholders and the families of 
Malaysian listed family companies are more involved in leading the management than 
their counterparts in developed and other developing countries. 
 
Table 5.13: Frequency distribution of family CEO 









2010 254 91.04 25 8.96 
2011 256 91.76 23 8.24 
2012 254 91.04 25 8.96 
2013 252 90.32 27 9.68 
2014 250 89.61 29 10.39 
 
Based on Table 5.11, Table 5.12, and Table 5.13, the proportions of family directors 
and family executives on boards as well as the nomination of family CEO slightly 
decline after 2013. This may be due to the implementation of the revised MCCG in 
2012 which emphasises the board independence and further heightens the importance 
and compliance to the corporate governance best practices. 
 
In summary, the prevalence of controlling shareholders and their family members on 
corporate boards among Malaysian listed family companies are in accordance with 
past findings (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000; Mackie 
2001; Lins 2003; Moores and Craig 2008).  
 
5.3 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
This section explains the descriptive statistics of corporate governance mechanisms: 
(i) board independence; (ii) tenure of independent non-executive directors; (iii) CEO-
chairman role duality; and (iv) remuneration committee. 
 
(i) Board Independence 
Table 5.14 summarises the descriptive statistic for board independence (ID), which is 
measured by the proportion of independent non-executive directors over the total 
number of board directors.  
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Table 5.14: Descriptive statistic for board independence 
Period  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
2010  42.03 40.00 10.44 25.00 75.00 
2011  42.14 42.86 10.38 23.08 75.00 
2012  42.41 42.86 10.55 23.08 75.00 
2013  42.65 42.86 10.84 16.67 75.00 
2014  43.08 42.86 11.03 16.67 75.00 
2010 - 2014  42.46 42.29 10.66 16.67 75.00 
 
The mean value of ID over the five-year period is 42.46%. The mean value of ID 
among Malaysian listed family companies increases from 42.03% in 2010 to 43.08% 
in 2014. The mean values of ID for each period surpasses the threshold of one-third 
recommended by the MCCG and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements, indicating 
that Malaysian listed family companies go beyond complying with the basic 
governance requirement. The findings are higher than the mean values reported by 
Ibrahim, Abdul-Samad, and Amir (2008) who examine the period from 1999 to 2005, 
and Lim and Yen (2011) who examine the period from 2002 to 2007. The former 
shows that the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board are 
40.30% and 36.10% for non-family and family companies respectively, whilst the 
latter reports an average of 40.50%. The increasing mean ID over time may be 
attributed to the introduction of MCCG in year 2000, and its subsequent revisions in 
2007 and 2012, with the emphasis on board independence. Notwithstanding the 
increasing mean ID, the minimum ID of 16.67% is observed in 2013 and 2014. This 
indicates there are cases where the family companies do not comply with the 
requirement of one-third recommended by the MCCG and Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements. For each of the study periods, the maximum ID is 75.00%, indicating 
that more than half of the boards of some family companies are comprised of outside 
directors.  
 
The findings of this study pertaining to the composition of corporate boards of family 
companies show contradiction to prior literature (Husnin, Nawawi and Salin 2016; 
Leung, Richardson and Jaggi 2014; Croci, Gonenc and Ozkan 2012; Barnett 1960; 
Anderson and Reeb 2004). Husnin, Nawawi, and Salin (2016), by studying the period 
from 2006 to 2008, report that Malaysian listed family companies tend to elect family 
members to the board of directors and management team, inflicting weak governance. 
Anderson and Reeb (2004) document that the US family companies often seek to 
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reduce the proportion of independent directors on board. Croci, Gonenc, and Ozkan 
(2012) report that family companies give fewer board seats to the independent non-
executive directors (20.50% of the board) in the context of Continental Europe. Leung, 
Richardson, and Jaggi (2014) report that the proportion of independent directors in 
Hong Kong family companies is lower than that in the non-family companies (38.80% 
versus 40.30%). In contradiction, this study reports that Malaysian listed family 
companies appoint more independent non-executive directors than family directors to 
sit on the boards. The mean value of ID (42.46%, as reported in Table 5.14) is higher 
than FD (40.89%, as reported in Panel B of Table 5.11). Essentially, these findings 
refute the argument of Barnett (1960) that controlling family shareholders use a narrow 
kinship network in making recruiting decisions; they prefer to recruit their own family 
members to the boards. These findings trigger the curiosity on whose voice is more 
influential in the determination of executive remuneration. Does this board 
composition improve the corporate governance of executive remuneration in 
Malaysian listed family companies? In order to answer this literature gap, the influence 
of ID and FD on executive remuneration are investigated using the multiple regression 
model in the next chapter.  
 
(ii) Tenure of Independent Non-Executive Directors 
Table 5.15 presents the descriptive statistics for the tenure of independent non-
executive directors. Panel A reports the average tenure of independent non-executive 
directors on board (IDT) while Panel B summarises the descriptive statistics about the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors whose tenure exceeded 9 years over 
the total number of independent non-executive directors on board (IDT#).  
 
Based on Panel A of Table 5.15, the average tenure of independent non-executive 
directors over the five-year study period is 8.87 years, with the maximum tenure of 
24.67 years. This is higher than the average tenure of 6 years reported by the MSWG 
for overall Malaysian PLCs (Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 2015, 2014b, 
2013b). Besides, this finding is higher than the average tenure of 7.70 years reported 
by Li et al. (2013) in the context of American family companies. The IDT exceeding 
nine years is found between 2012 and 2014. This implies the non-compliance to the 
new governance practice introduced by the revised MCCG 2012, which is, the tenure 
of independent director should be capped at nine years. The maximum IDT for each 
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period is more than 20.00 years. This suggests that Malaysian listed family companies 
are reluctant to retire or dismiss the excessively long-tenured independent non-
executive directors as they may have built relationship with trust during their time with 
the company.  
 
Table 5.15: Descriptive statistics for the tenure of independent non-executive 
directors 
Period Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistic for IDT (year) 
2010 8.02 8.00 3.70 1.00 21.00 
2011 8.58 8.50 3.82 1.00 24.67 
2012 9.07 9.00 3.70 1.00 22.00 
2013 9.13 8.70 3.98 1.00 23.00 
2014 9.53 9.00 4.07 2.00 24.00 
2010 – 2014 8.87 8.50 3.90 1.00 24.67 
      
Panel B: Descriptive statistic for IDT# (%) 
2010 35.15 33.33 35.60 0.00 100.00 
2011 42.19 33.33 37.71 0.00 100.00 
2012 44.77 50.00 36.70 0.00 100.00 
2013 47.21 50.00 35.89 0.00 100.00 
2014 48.22 50.00 35.25 0.00 100.00 
2010 – 2014 43.51 43.33 36.56 0.00 100.00 
 
Panel B of Table 5.15 reports the mean value of IDT# is 43.51%. The mean values of 
IDT# in the last three years of the study period (47.77% in 2012, 47.21% in 2013, and 
48.22% in 2014) are higher than the overall Malaysian PLCs (34.00% in 2012, 38.00% 
in 2013, and 46.00% in 2014) (Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 2014b, 
2013b)43. The minimum value of 0.00% indicates that all of the independent non-
executive directors of some family companies serve less than nine years. On the other 
hand, the maximum value of 100.00% indicates that all of the independent non-
executive directors of some family companies serve more than nine years. Figure 5.13 
provides more information about the IDT#.  
 
Based on Figure 5.13, there is an increasing number of family companies that have at 
least 50.00% of independent non-executive directors who served more than nine years, 
                                                 
43 The MSWG starts to use the ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard to assess the PLCs in 2012. 
Hence, there is no Malaysia-ASEAN Corporate Governance Report for 2010 and 2011. 
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from 39.78%44 in 2010 to 53.05%45 in 2014. The number of family companies that 
have 100% of IDT# increases from 35 companies in 2010 to 54 companies in 2014.  
 
Figure 5.13: Frequency distribution of IDT# 
 
 
These findings are consistent with the findings of authoritative parties. Bursa Malaysia, 
in its review of corporate governance disclosures of 300 listed companies’ annual 
reports for 2012 and 2013, reports that 55.00% of those companies retain independent 
non-executive directors beyond nine-year tenure (Mahalingam 2015). Similarly, 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (2014b) report that 52.58% of Malaysian listed 
companies have independent non-executive directors who serve more than nine years 
in the same capacity.  
 
Overall, the findings suggest that the new corporate governance best practice 
introduced by the revised MCCG 2012, which is, the cumulative tenure of independent 
non-executive directors should be capped at nine years, has yet to be widely accepted 
by the Malaysian PLCs including family companies. As such, the findings of this study 
could be used by future studies to compare this particular corporate governance best 
practice and examine how long will it take for the Malaysian PLCs to well accept and 
adopt the nine-year tenure cap.  
                                                 
44 Calculation: 76 (50%-99%) plus 35 (100%), then divided by 279 sample companies 
45 Calculation: 94 (50%-99%) plus 54 (100%), then divided by 279 sample companies 
0%-49% 50%-99% 100%
2010 168 76 35
2011 145 83 51
2012 125 105 49
2013 132 94 53













In addition, this study finds out that 237 out of the 279 sample family companies or 
approximately 84.95% have independent non-executive directors over the age of 60, 
which is the minimum retirement age stipulated by the Ministry of Human Resources 
(2013). The independent non-executive directors in some family companies even reach 
86 years old. Moreover, some family companies have two or more independent non-
executive directors who are older than 60. 5 out of the 279 sample family companies 
or 5.38% have all of the independent non-executive directors over the minimum 
retirement age. These findings imply that Malaysian listed family companies not only 
tend to retain existing independent non-executive directors and let them to accumulate 
tenure, they also tend to keep or recruit those who have reached the retirement age. It 
is questionable whether they are kept or recruited due to their valuable expertise or due 
to their allegiance to family interests.  
 
On the positive front, long-tenured directors have accumulated greater firm specific 
knowledge and experience; forcing them to retire might lead to a lack of talent and 
experience on the board. Lin (2017) postulates that today’s 60+ are in much better 
health than their grandparents are at the same age. He documents that today’s 60+ are 
in fact not ‘old’, e.g. sick, worn-out, or inactive. They work to improve their financial 
security and to remain productive longer because they can and want to, not because 
they have to. Malaysian listed family companies may appreciate the valuable expertise 
and experience of long-tenured directors and senior citizens, and hence recruit and 
retain them. On the negative front, family companies are averse to recruit new 
independent non-executive directors as this may influence the friendly board and affect 
the existing management style, which is in accordance with the family’s interests. It is 
ambiguous whether the long-tenured independent non-executive directors are willing 
to monitor and challenge the family directors, particularly concerning their executive 
remuneration. 
 
(iii) CEO-Chairman Role Duality 
Table 5.16 presents the frequency distribution of CEO-chairman role duality from 
2010 to 2014. The findings show that more than 75.00% of Malaysian listed family 




Table 5.16: Frequency distribution of CEO-chairman role duality 
 Period  Yes % No % 
2010 69 24.73 210 75.27 
2011 67 24.01 212 75.99 
2012 67 24.01 212 75.96 
2013 65 23.30 214 76.70 
2014 63 22.58 216 77.42 
 
These findings contradict the findings of Voordeckers, Gils, and Heuvel (2007) that 
CEO-chairman role duality structure is prevalent among Belgian family companies. 
Rather, these findings are in accordance with the findings of the Minority Shareholder 
Watchdog Group (2014b) that approximately 78.81% of Malaysian PLCs have 
separated the roles of board chairman and CEO. In addition, the findings are consistent 
with past studies showing that CEO-chairman role duality is uncommon in Malaysian 
companies (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006; Amran and Che-Ahmad 2009; Yatim 2013; 
Goh, Rasli and Khan 2014). This indicates that the MCCG’s recommendation of 
separating the roles of CEO and board chairman has been widely accepted by 
Malaysian listed family companies. It has not been mentioned in any past studies 
whether the two individuals are family-related or not. During the data collection, it is 
noted that the board chairman and CEO in Malaysian listed family companies are 
related to each other, i.e. spouse, siblings, parent and children, relatives. This raises 
doubt whether the board chairman could effectively oversee the CEO, who has family 
relationship with him/her. The family companies might choose to separate the roles 
simply to comply with the MCCG or to legitimise their businesses, rather than to 
improve board governance. The multiple regression model discussed in Chapter Six 
provides insights into the influence of role duality on executive remuneration.  
 
(iv) Remuneration Committee 
The MCCG stipulates that the board should establish remuneration committee, which 
consists exclusively of or a majority of non-executive directors (Securities 
Commission Malaysia 2012). Table 5.17 reveals the number of sample family 
companies that have established remuneration committee from 2010 to 2014. 
Approximately 95.00% of Malaysian listed family companies have established the 
remuneration committee as part of their corporate governance mechanisms. This is in 
accordance with past findings (Yatim 2013; Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 
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2014b). Moreover, this is similar to the UK context that more than 90.00% of 
companies have established the remuneration committee. This indicates that the 
establishment of remuneration committee recommended by the MCCG, which mimics 
the Cadbury Committee Report 1992 and Greenbury Committee Report 1995 from the 
UK, has been widely accepted and adopted by Malaysian listed companies including 
family companies. 
 
Table 5.17: Frequency distribution for the establishment of remuneration 
committee 
Period Yes % No % 
2010 259 92.83 20 7.17 
2011 260 93.19 19 6.81 
2012 262 93.91 17 6.09 
2013 266 95.34 13 4.66 
2014 266 95.34 13 4.66 
 
Table 5.18 shows the composition of remuneration committee.  
 
Table 5.18: Frequency distribution for the composition of remuneration 
committee 
 N % 
Panel A: 100% of  remuneration committee 
are independent non-executive directors 
  
2010 36 13.90 
2011 39 15.00 
2012 40 15.27 
2013 40 15.04 
2014 42 15.79 
   
Panel B: 100% of remuneration committee 
are family directors 
  
2010 1 0.37 
2011 1 0.38 
2012 1 0.38 
2013 1 0.38 
2014 1 0.38 
Note: % is calculated based on the number of sample family companies that have established 
remuneration committee for respective year. 
 
Panel A of Table 5.18 reports that approximately 15.00% of Malaysian listed family 
companies have a fully independent remuneration committee. This shows the 
initiatives of some family companies to comply beyond the basic recommendation of 
the MCCG - the board should establish remuneration committee which consists of a 
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majority of non-executive directors. Based on Panel B of Table 5.18, only one sample 
family company has the remuneration committee composed entirely of family 
directors. 
 
Essentially, the findings indicate despite a majority of the Malaysian listed family 
companies complying with the MCCG to establish remuneration committee, the 
composition of directors varies. 
 
Table 5.19 summarises the descriptive statistics for remuneration committee, where 
Panel A reports the proportion of independent non-executive directors on 
remuneration committee (IDRC) and Panel B reports the proportion of family directors 
on remuneration committee (FDRC). 
 
Table 5.19: Descriptive statistics for remuneration committee 
Period Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistic for IDRC 
2010 63.56 66.67 23.64 0.00 100.00 
2011 64.90 66.67 23.45 0.00 100.00 
2012 65.47 66.67 22.96 0.00 100.00 
2013 66.66 66.67 21.52 0.00 100.00 
2014 67.46 66.67 21.39 0.00 100.00 
2010 – 2014 65.61 66.67 22.66 0.00 100.00 
      
Panel B: Descriptive statistic for FDRC 
2010 22.35 33.33 17.03 0.00 100.00 
2011 22.26 33.33 16.99 0.00 100.00 
2012 22.12 33.33 16.73 0.00 100.00 
2013 22.44 33.33 16.84 0.00 100.00 
2014 22.60 33.33 16.82 0.00 100.00 
2010 – 2014 22.36 33.33 16.89   0.00 100.00 
 
Panel A of Table 5.19 reports that the mean value of IDRC over the five-year period 
is 65.61%, whilst Panel B shows that the mean value of FDRC over the five-year 
period is 22.36%. This is consistent with the findings of Lim and Yen (2011) where 
more than 50.00% of independent non-executive directors sit on the remuneration 
committee. 
 
Despite the prevalence of independent non-executive directors on remuneration 
committee in Malaysian listed family companies, their independence role in governing 
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executive remuneration lacks empirical investigation. There is a genuine concern that 
the independent non-executive directors may find it difficult to confront the family 
directors on remuneration committee. In order to address this literature gap, its 
association with executive remuneration is investigated using the multiple regression 
model in Chapter Six. 
 
5.4 Institutional Ownership 
Table 5.20 presents the descriptive statistic for institutional ownership. Panel A shows 
the domestic institutional shareholdings (DIS) whilst Panel B shows the foreign 
institutional shareholdings (FIS).  
 
Table 5.20: Descriptive statistics for institutional ownership 
Period Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistic for DIS    
2010 11.59 9.59 10.27 0.00 57.33 
2011 11.01 8.65 10.08 0.00 56.84 
2012 10.73 8.32 10.16 0.00 56.97 
2013 10.72 7.85 10.28 0.00 52.09 
2014 10.85 7.62 10.33 0.00 52.41 
2010 – 2014 10.98 8.44 10.23 0.00 57.33 
      
Panel B: Descriptive statistic for FIS    
2010 4.09 0.90 6.86 0.00 39.79 
2011 4.34 0.88 7.27 0.00 39.82 
2012 4.65 1.17 7.51 0.00 40.39 
2013 4.91 1.64 7.28 0.00 41.57 
2014 4.65 1.56 6.87 0.00 37.63 
2010 – 2014 4.53 1.23 7.17 0.00 41.57 
 
The institutional shareholdings in Malaysian listed family companies are relatively 
stable over the five-year period. Over the five-year period, the mean value of DIS is 
10.98%, as shown in Panel A; while the mean value of FIS is 4.53%, as shown in Panel 
B. The DIS ranges from 0.00% to 57.33% whilst the FIS ranges from 0.00% to 41.57. 
The maximum institutional ownership in Malaysian companies reported by Abdul-
Wahab and Abdul-Rahman (2009) is 90.55% with the mean value of 12.65%; the 
maximum foreign institutional ownership reported by Ghazali (2010) is 80.16% with 
the mean value of 23.83%. The findings suggest that Malaysian listed family 
companies have lower levels of institutional ownership, both domestic and foreign. 
Anderson and Reeb (2004) report that the US family companies are associated with 
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significantly fewer institutional investors. A recent US study by Fernando, Schneible, 
and Suh (2014) also note that institutional investors avoid investing in family 
companies. Similarly, Croci, Gonenc, and Ozkan (2012) find out that the 
shareholdings of both domestic and foreign institutional investors are lower in family 
companies compared to non-family companies in the context of Continental Europe. 
Clearly, institutional investors invest less in family companies regardless of developed 
or developing countries.  
 
The relatively low institutional shareholdings in family companies could be interpreted 
in two ways. On the one hand, family shareholders are reluctant to disperse the 
ownership concentration to external institutional investors. The family shareholders 
may be concerned the company’s direction and management would be influenced by 
the institutional investors, which deviate from the interests of the family. On the other 
hand, the institutional investors are aware of the prominent misappropriation and 
expropriation issues in family companies and thus have less interest to invest in family 
companies. Schultz, Tan, and Walsh (2010) argue that foreigners invest less in the 
companies residing in countries with poor outsider protection and have ownership 
structures that are conducive to governance problems. The finding of this study 
suggests that foreign institutional investors are less confident with regard to the 
corporate governance practices in Malaysian listed family companies, which are 
perceived to have poor minority shareholders’ protection and a high possibility of 
wealth expropriation by controlling shareholders. The comparatively low 
shareholdings by institutional investors in Malaysian listed family companies trigger 
the curiosity whether they are effective governing mechanisms that minority 
shareholders can rely on.  
 
5.5 Control Variables 
Table 5.21 summarises the descriptive statistics for the control variables, which 
include family ownership (FO); board size (BS); total assets (TA); firm leverage (LEV); 





Table 5.21: Descriptive statistics for control variables 
Period Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
FO (%)      
2010 46.97 47.05 13.10 20.78 78.93 
2011 47.52 47.10 13.46 20.78 88.72 
2012 47.74 47.41 13.69 20.77 85.46 
2013 47.43 47.37 13.71 20.11 85.46 
2014 47.47 47.37 14.20 20.13 79.14 
2010 – 2014 47.43 47.36 13.64 20.11 88.72 
BS      
2010 7.57 7.00 1.73 4.00 13.00 
2011 7.60 7.00 1.71 4.00 13.00 
2012 7.58 7.00 1.78 4.00 13.00 
2013 7.62 7.00 1.823 4.00 13.00 
2014 7.61 7.00 1.81 4.00 13.00 
2010 – 2014 7.60   7.00 1.77 4.00 13.00 
TA (RM billion)      
2010 1.07 0.29 3.89 0.03 46.99 
2011 1.14 0.32 4.063 0.02 48.91 
2012 1.25 0.35 4.37 0.02 51.87 
2013 1.34 0.38 4.82 0.02 60.61 
2014 1.44 0.41 4.79 0.02 60.16 
2010 – 2014 1.25 0.35 4.41 0.02 60.60 
LEV (%)      
2010 37.46 37.25 17.94 2.15 86.84 
2011 37.78 36.41 19.11 2.13 110.21 
2012 37.90 36.69 20.10 2.08 164.07 
2013 36.95 35.51 20.07 2.48 175.93 
2014 36.81 35.35 20.47 2.78 190.13 
2010 – 2014 37.41 36.24 19.71 2.08 190.13 
ROA(-1) (%)      
2010 6.20 5.15 6.86 (13.75) 34.38 
2011 5.90 5.56 6.41 (18.88) 34.52 
2012 5.39 4.86 6.95 (20.52) 37.67 
2013 5.68 4.89 5.68 (8.18) 31.45 
2014 5.49 5.09 7.49 (26.73) 57.18 
2010 – 2014 5.73 5.09 6.71 (26.73) 57.18 
MV (%)      
2010 98.16 69.00 107.86 18.00 1243.00 
2011 86.95 63.00 88.75 (18.00) 1197.00 
2012 88.10 64.00 88.72 (9.00) 1024.00 
2013 99.84 72.00 94.16 (9.00) 875.00 
2014 104.58 83.00 84.43 (8.00) 671.00 
2010 – 2014 95.52 70.00 93.43 (18.00) 1243.00 
Legend: FO is the family ownership; BS is the board size; TA is the total assets; LEV is the ratio of total 
debts to total assets; ROA(-1) is the lagged ratio of net income to total assets; MV is the ratio of market 




The overall mean value of family ownership (FO) over the five-year period is 47.43%. 
Noticeably, the family ownership is substantially higher than the domestic (DIS) and 
foreign institutional shareholdings (FIS) reported in Table 5.20. The maximum FO is 
88.72% in 2011 while the minimum FO is 20.11% in 2013. The highly concentrated 
family ownership in Malaysian listed family companies is consistent with prior 
literature (Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000; Amran and Che-Ahmad 2010; Azizan 
and Ameer 2012). 
 
The overall mean value of board size (BS) over the five-year period is 7.60. The total 
number of directors on corporate boards among family companies is constant 
throughout the study period with the smallest board consisting of 4.00 directors and 
the maximum number being 13.00 directors. Compared to the average board size of 
10.42 of family companies in Continental Europe (Croci, Gonenc and Ozkan 2012), 
the board size of Malaysian listed family companies are smaller. This finding is 
consistent with previous studies (Yatim, Kent and Clarkson 2006; Lim and Yen 2011).  
 
The firm size measured by total assets (TA) increases gradually over the five-year 
period, from RM1.07 million in 2010 to RM1.44 million in 2014. The overall mean 
value of ta is RM 1.25 million. The variation in ta over the five-year period is huge, 
with the minimum value of RM0.02 million and the maximum value of RM60.60 
million. Prior literature records similar firm size as this study (Yatim, Kent and 
Clarkson 2006; Lim and Yen 2011). 
 
The mean value of firm leverage (LEV) over the five-year period is 37.41%. The mean 
values of LEV recorded in the last two years of the study period, which are 36.95% in 
2013 and 36.81% in 2014, are lower than the overall mean value. The mean value 
recorded in this study is lower than the past studies which report the mean value of 
40.00% or higher (Lim and Yen 2011; Bliss, Gul and Majid 2011; Saad 2010; 
Benjamin, Zain and Wahab 2016). This suggests that Malaysian listed family 
companies do not use huge amounts of debt to finance the business. Despite the 
comparatively lower average LEV, the maximum LEV over the five-year period is up 
to 190.13% recorded in 2014. One the other hand, the minimum LEV for each of the 




The mean value of lagged return on assets (ROA(-1)) over the five-year study period 
is 5.73%. This is higher than the findings reported by previous studies which include 
both family and non-family companies (Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman 2009; Lim 
and Yen 2011). The finding suggests that family companies perform better than the 
overall companies in Malaysia do. This is in accordance with the extant literature in 
developed countries showing that family companies perform better than non-family 
companies do (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Maury 2006; Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan 
2007; Andres 2008). The overall mean (ROA(-1)) over the five-year period is lower 
than the mean value recorded in 2010 and 2011, which are 6.20% and 5.90% 
respectively. The decreasing ROA(-1) over the five-year period from 6.20% in 2010 to 
5.49% in 2014 indicates that the firm performance of family companies has declined. 
 
The mean value of overall market to book value of equity (MV) over the five-year 
period is 95.52%. This is higher than the mean value of 91.00% reported by Lim and 
Yen (2011) who include both family and non-family companies in their sample set. 
This is similar to past studies reporting family companies possess higher market to 
book value of equity ratio than non-family companies (Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan 
2007; Croci, Gonenc and Ozkan 2012). The highest (maximum) MV is 1242% reported 
in 2010. The mean MV of the sample family companies increases steadily since 2011. 
 
5.6 Correlation Analysis - Spearman’s Rank Correlation  
This study conducts Spearman’s rank correlation analysis46 to provide preliminary 
insights into the correlation between two variables without controlling for other factors. 
Spearman’s rank correlation is chosen rather than the Pearson correlation because it is 
not very sensitive to outliers and can be performed even if the variables are not 
normally distributed (Laerd Statistics 2017). Spearman’s rank correlation is performed 
to assess the correlation between executive remuneration and the explanatory variables, 
namely family participation on board, corporate governance mechanisms, institutional 
ownership, as well as the control variables. It is run using 279 sample family 
                                                 
46This study also run Pearson correlation for continuous variables. Appendix 5.2 reports the results of 
the Pearson correlation, which are similar to the Spearman’s rank correlation’s results. 
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companies, without any data transformation and outlier exclusion. Table 5.22 presents 
the Spearman’s rank correlation matrix. 
 
 As shown in Table 5.22, there is a significant negative correlation between the 
independent non-executive directors on board (ID) and executive remuneration 
(EXREM) at 0.01 significance level. This indicates that independent non-executive 
directors play a governing role in restraining executive remuneration in Malaysian 
listed family companies and provides a preliminary support to this study’s hypothesis 
3 (H3).  
 
The average tenure of independent non-executive directors (IDT) is positively 
correlated with EXREM at 0.05 significance level. This positive correlation provides 
preliminary support to hypothesis 4 (H4). Over longer serving period on board, the 
independent non-executive directors develop friendly relationships with the executive 
directors or family directors in family companies. Consequently, their independent 
role in governing the executive remuneration is compromised. The significant positive 
correlation between IDT and the family directors on board (FD) implies that family 
directors tend to retain the existing independent non-executive directors rather than 
appointing new directors. This finding complements Li et al. (2013) that family 
companies tend to keep friendly independent directors and let them to accumulate 
longer tenure. It is questionable whether the long-tenured independent directors in 
family companies are kept for the allegiance to the family or their ability to effectively 
monitor. A friendly board would enable the family directors to consume private 
benefits through executive remuneration. 
 
Moreover, Table 5.22 shows that both domestic (DIS) and foreign institutional 
shareholdings (FIS) are positively correlated with EXREM at 0.01 significance level. 
This is in contradiction to the expectations of hypotheses 7 (H7) and 8 (H8) that they 
would govern and restrain the executive remuneration. A possible interpretation is that 
when there is more investments from institutional investors, the executive directors 
spend more time and efforts dealing with the increasing demands of different 
institutional investors, thus they are remunerated for the extra effort exerted.  
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Table 5.22: Spearman's rank correlation matrix 
 EXREM FD FCEO ID IDT RD IDRC DIS FIS FO BS TA LEV ROA(-1) MV 
EXREM 1               
FD 0.0257 1              
FCEO -0.0345 0.2125*** 1             
ID -0.0824*** -0.2874*** -0.0045 1            
IDT 0.0664** 0.0596** 0.0206 -0.0698** 1           
RD 0.0212 -0.0034 0.1722*** -0.0124 -0.006 1          
IDRC -0.043 0.017 -0.0091 0.2950*** -0.0575** 0.0221 1         
DIS 0.0924*** -0.1202*** -0.0657*** -0.0984*** 0.1325*** -0.0629** -0.1454*** 1        
FIS 0.3271*** -0.1005*** -0.1042*** 0.0363 0.1155*** 0.011 -0.0452* 0.1357*** 1       
FO 0.0982*** 0.2412*** 0.0494* -0.0857*** -0.0325 0.0900*** 0.0641** -0.2747*** -0.1013*** 1      
BS 0.3619*** 0.0268 -0.1227*** -0.3924*** 0.0933*** -0.0990*** -0.0482* 0.0652** 0.1235*** 0.0424 1     
TA 0.5053*** -0.0123 -0.1124*** 0.0067 0.1990*** -0.0718** -0.0759*** 0.2334*** 0.5189*** 0.0668** 0.2428*** 1    
LEV 0.0564** -0.0231 -0.0192 0.0037 -0.0571** -0.1841*** -0.0334 0.0049 -0.1037*** 
-
0.1379*** 
0.0614** 0.2300*** 1   




MV 0.2455*** -0.1154*** 0.0089 -0.0066 0.001 -0.0087 -0.1549*** 0.2044*** 0.2149*** 0.0947*** 0.1472*** 0.1409*** -0.0611** 0.4645*** 1 
Legend: Spearman’s rank correlation matrix shows the correlation coefficients for all the explanatory and control variables and the dependent variable. EXREM is the executive 
remuneration; FD is the proportion of family directors on board; FCEO is a dummy variable with 1= family CEO and 0 = non-family CEO; ID is the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on board; IDT is the average tenure of independent non-executive directors on board; RD is a dummy variable with 1 = same individual holds both CEO 
and board chairman positions and 0 = different individuals hold CEO and board chairman positions; IDRC is the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the 
remuneration committee; DIS is the percentage shareholdings of domestic institutional investors; FIS  is the percentage shareholdings of foreign institutional investors; FO is 
the percentage shareholdings of controlling family; BS is the board size; TA is total assets; LEV is the ratio of total debts to total assets; ROA(-1)  is the lagged ratio of net income 
to total assets; MV is the ratio of market value to book value of equity. ***, ** and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively.
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Further, both domestic (DIS) and foreign (FIS) institutional shareholdings are 
negatively correlated with family directors on board (FD) and family CEO (FCEO) at 
0.01 significance level. This suggests that both domestic and foreign institutional 
investors have less preference investing in companies where the CEO is related to the 
controlling shareholders and there is a higher representation of controlling 
shareholders on the board of directors. Besides, the negative correlation between DIS 
and CEO-chairman role duality (RD) suggests that domestic institutional investors 
have less interest investing in the companies where the positions of CEO and board 
chairman are held by the same individual. In general, the negative correlations with 
FD, FCEO and RD suggest that institutional investors perceive such kind of board 
composition as conducive to poor governance, and their shareholders’ rights are less 
protected as the board may act in the interests of the controlling shareholders.  
 
The independent variables - family directors on board (FD), family CEO (FCEO), 
CEO-chairman role duality (RD), independent non-executive directors on 
remuneration committee (IDRC), which are hypothesised to have an influence on the 
executive remuneration, do not show any significant correlations with executive 
remuneration. These insignificant correlations suggest that controlling shareholders 
and their family do not use their board directorship and managerial power to 
expropriate minority shareholders via executive remuneration. However, family 
ownership (FO) shows a positive correlation with the executive remuneration at 0.01 
significance level; suggesting that controlling family use their concentrated ownership 
instead of the board directorship or managerial power to influence executive 
remuneration. The independent non-executive directors on remuneration committee 
play an insignificant role in the remuneration setting. This raises doubt pertaining to 
the efficacy of remuneration committee. The family companies may just establish the 
remuneration committee in order to fulfil the best practice recommended by the 
MCCG. All of the control variables, family ownership (FO), board size (BS), firm size 
(TA), firm leverage (LEV), lagged firm performance (ROA(-1)), and growth 





In general, the Spearman’s rank correlation provides preliminary insights on the 
correlation between two variables without controlling other factors. The highest 
correlation of 0.5053 is reported between EXREM and TA. None of the variables are 
correlated at 0.8 and above, indicating that there is no multicollinearity problem 
(Gujarati 1995; Hair et al. 1998). Each of the above mentioned possible predictor 
variables are included in the multiple regression analysis in the next chapter. 
 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter discusses the descriptive statistics for all the variables included in this 
study. The statistics are based on 279 sample family companies listed on the Main 
Board of Bursa Malaysia over the five-year period from 2010 to 2014. The executive 
remuneration shows an upward trend over the five-year period. Approximately 90.00% 
of the sample family companies elect their family members to hold the position of 
CEO. The findings show that Malaysian listed family companies elect more 
independent non-executive directors than family directors to sit on corporate boards. 
This may be attributed to the continuous revisions of the MCCG which emphasises the 
board independence. Notwithstanding this, more than 50.00% of the independent non-
executive directors have served in the same capacity for more than nine years. This 
suggests the new corporate governance best practice introduced by the revised MCCG 
2012, which is, the tenure of independent non-executive directors should be capped at 
nine years, has yet to be widely accepted by the family companies. A majority of the 
sample family companies comply with the MCCG to separate the roles of CEO and 
board chairman. Further, more than 90.00% of the sample family companies have 
established remuneration committee, which comprises a majority of independent non-
executive directors. Moreover, the findings reveal that the institutional shareholdings 




CHAPTER SIX: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of multivariate test of hypotheses. The test involves 
the use of multiple regression model with executive remuneration as the dependent 
variable in relation to the explanatory variables. Specifically, the multiple regression 
model investigates the association between executive remuneration and independent 
variables in each of the study periods and over the five-year study period. Control 
variables are also included in the multiple regression model.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 discusses the detection of outlier and 
influential point; section 6.2 assesses the validity of model by testing the underlying 
assumptions of multiple regression model, which include the normality of residuals, 
linearity, homoscedasticity, and multicollinearity; section 6.3 discusses the multiple 
regression results for each of the study periods; section 6.4 discusses the panel 
regression results of five-year data; section 6.5 conducts the sensitivity tests to provide 
a robustness check of panel regression results; section 6.6 presents the endogeneity 
test; and section 6.7 summarises this chapter.  
 
6.1 Detecting Outlier and Influential Point 
Detecting outlier and influential point is one of the most essential statistical diagnostics 
for multiple regression model. Outlier is an observation with a unique combination of 
the characteristics identified as distinctly different from other observations (Hair et al. 
2010). The graph of leverage-versus-residual-squared is used to assess the presence of 
outlier(s). Based on Figure 6.1, there is a few data with high leverage (outliers). 
Subsequently, Cooks’ Distance examination is conducted to examine if those outliers 
are influential47. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) define the influential points as those 
with Cooks’ Distance above 1. The Cooks’ Distance values of the all data in this study 
                                                 
47 An influential point is an outlier that greatly affects the slope of the regression line. The outliers are 
influential only if they have a big effect on the regression model. Sometimes, the outliers may not have 
big effects. For example, when the data set is very large, a single outlier may not have a big effect on 
the regression model. 
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is less than 1, indicating there is no influential point. Hence, all of the 1,395 
observations remain in the sample of this thesis. 
 




6.2 Assessing the Validity of Model 
Before proceeding to the multiple regression analysis, the validity of the model is 
assessed. This is done by testing the underlying assumptions, which include the 
normality of residuals, linearity, homoscedasticity, and multicollinearity.  
 
(i) Normality of Residuals 
Multiple regression model requires the assumption of normally distributed residuals. 
Normality of residuals is checked using Shapiro Wilk test and normal probability plot 
of regression standardised residuals. Table 6.1 shows the result of Shapiro Wilk test 
while Figure 6.2 depicts the normal probability plot. Although the Shapiro Wilk test 
indicates non-normality of residuals (p-value < 0.05), the normality probability plot 
shows that the residuals are fairly normally distributed and they lie on a straight 
diagonal line from the bottom left to the top right. Thus, the assumption of normality 
is deemed met. 
Table 6.1: Shapiro Wilk test result 
























In addition, the multiple regression model requires the residuals to have a straight line 
relationship with the predicted dependent variable scores, which is known as linearity 
(Pallant 2011). The linearity assumption is tested using the scatterplot of standardised 
fitted values against the standardised residuals (Williams, Grajales and Kurkiewicz 
2013). Figure 6.3 observes the linearity of relationship (black line). Hence, the 
assumption of linearity is met. 
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Another underlying assumption to check is the homoscedasticity. This is to ensure that 
the differences between the actual and estimated values of executive remuneration 
(residuals) are normally distributed and the variance of residuals is the same for all 
fitted values of executive remuneration. The scatterplot of standardised fitted value 
against the standardised residuals is used to assess the assumption of homoscedasticity 
(Osborne and Waters 2002; Hayes and Cai 2007). Figure 6.3 shows that the residuals 
roughly form a horizontal line around the 0 point (red line) and the majority of the 
residuals fall between -2 and +2. This indicates that the variance of the residuals is 
fairly constant; hence, the assumption of homoscedasticity is deemed met.  
 
(iv) Multicollinearity 
Another potential statistical problem in the multiple regression model is 
multicollinearity. This concept describes the degree to which an variable’s effect can 
be predicted by the other variable (Hair et al. 1998). Multicollinearity exists when the 
independent variables are highly correlated; this will cause a serious problem in 
multiple regression model as the effect of each explanatory variable becomes difficult 
to identify. The correlation matrix is a tool to get a rough idea of the relationships 
between the independent variables, as provided in Table 5.22 in Chapter Five. Gujarati 
(1995) and Hair et al. (1998) identify the correlation coefficient of 0.8 and above as a 
benchmark score for the multicollinearity. Based on Table 5.22, none of the variables 
has the correlation coefficient exceeding 0.8. Thus, the multicollinearity between the 
independent and control variables is not deemed as an issue in this study. In addition, 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance are computed for each independent 
and control variable to further assess the multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is 
considered a problem if the VIF of a variable is greater than 10.0 and tolerance is lower 
than 0.1 (Pallant 2011). Table 6.2 shows that the VIF of each variable does not exceed 
2.0, while the tolerance is greater than 0.10. The above indications are well within the 
acceptable parameters in controlling the potential multicollinearity problem. Thus, it 
is concluded that multicollinearity does not seem to be an ongoing concern in 





Table 6.2: VIF and tolerance statistics 
Variable VIF Tolerance 
FD 1.31 0.76 
FCEO 1.14 0.87 
ID 1.51 0.66 
IDT 1.09 0.92 
RD 1.09 0.91 
IDRC 1.12 0.89 
DIS 1.30 0.77 
FIS 1.42 0.70 
FO 1.34 0.75 
BS 1.39 0.72 
LNTA 1.78 0.56 
LEV 1.31 0.76 
ROA(-1) 1.38 0.72 
MV 1.31 0.76 
 
Overall, the diagnostic tests exploring the statistical assumptions as illustrated above 
indicate that the multiple regression model is valid and reliable. 
 
6.3 Multiple Regression Results for Each Year 
Multiple regression model is run separately for each of the study periods from 2010 to 
2014 by using 279 sample family companies. This cross-sectional analysis provides a 
better glimpse of the factors influencing executive remuneration, while at the same 
time, examines the efficacy of the corporate governance mechanisms strengthened by 
the revised MCCG 2012.  
 
Table 6.3 shows the ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression results for each 
period. The adjusted R2, a measure of goodness of fit, reports the amount of variance 
of executive remuneration explained by the model. The adjusted R2 ranges from 32.95% 
to 36.44% while the F-statistic value ranges from 10.97 to 12.98 (p-value < 0.01) over 





Table 6.3: OLS multiple regression results for each year  















































































































































































































































      
R2 0.3632 0.4054 0.3964 0.4060 0.4073 
Adjusted R2 0.3295 0.3739 0.3644 0.3745 0.3759 
F-statistic 10.97*** 12.33*** 12.16*** 12.98*** 12.96*** 
Legend: Coefficient is bold. t-statistic is italicised. p-value is in the parenthesis. Associations ***, ** 
and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. One-tailed probabilities are used for 
the tests of the variables since the associated hypotheses are directional. 
 
Table 6.3 shows that the family directors on board (FD) are not statistically associated 
with executive remuneration (LNEXREM) for each of the periods. As such, H1 is not 
supported. The findings are consistent with the insignificant association reported by 
Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri (2003) in the context of United States, but 
contrary to the positive association reported by Barontini and Bozzi (2011) in the 
Italian context. These findings suggest that the controlling family in Malaysian listed 
family companies do not use their board directorship to influence the executive 
remuneration.  
 
The family CEO (FCEO) shows a statistically significant and positive association (p-
value < 0.05, t-statistic = 1.78) with LNEXREM in 2010. This indicates that the family 
CEOs of Malaysian listed family companies are entrenched and able to exert a 
significant control over the setting of executive remuneration in 2010. Except the 
positive association reported in 2010 which is deemed to be sporadic, FCEO is not 
significantly associated with LNEXREM in other study periods. By and large, H2 is not 
supported. 
 
The above findings do not support the notion that family directors and CEOs tend to 
be entrenched and exercise strong influence over the management to pay high level of 
executive remuneration (Basu et al. 2007; Barontini and Bozzi 2011). Apart from the 
little evidence of family entrenchment via board directorship, the insignificant 
influence of FD and FCEO also provide little empirical evidence that family directors 
on board play a governing role in reining in executive remuneration. Combs et al. 
(2010) document that the family directors possess the incentives to invest their energy 
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and time to fully understand the executive activities, and to ensure the remuneration 
packages of executive directors are tied to the long-term interest of the family. The 
findings of this study do not support the argument of Combs et al. (2010) that family 
participation on board provides an effective monitoring source of executive 
remuneration.  
 
Contrary to past studies (Basu et al. 2007; Sapp 2008; Combs et al. 2010; Barontini 
and Bozzi 2011), the findings of this study show that family directors and family CEOs 
of Malaysian listed family companies have neither entrenchment effect nor incentive 
alignment effect via executive remuneration. The board directorships of the controlling 
shareholders and/or their family members do not exacerbate the Type II agency 
conflict.  
 
The independent non-executive directors on board (ID) show an insignificant 
association with the LNEXREM for each of the study periods. Thus, H3 is not supported. 
This is inconsistent with the negative association reported by prior studies (Ghosh 
2006; Abdullah 2006; Lim and Yen 2011; Yatim 2013). This may be attributed to the 
inclusion of non-family companies in their sample sets; hence, the statistical results 
are generalised across the overall companies. The insignificant association reported in 
this study indicates that the ID in Malaysian listed family companies plays an 
indifferent role in governing executive remuneration. This could be due to the fact that 
they owe their positions to the controlling shareholders who elected them to the board. 
They have the tendency to show their appreciation in order to be re-elected and 
continue to collect directors’ fees (Hart 1995; Fahlenbrach 2009). Thus, they are less 
opposed in questioning executive remuneration. The finding suggests that the 
independent non-executive directors are not a good representation of the minority 
shareholders in governing executive remuneration and could not ameliorate the Type 
II agency conflict in Malaysian listed family companies. Further, little empirical 
evidence is found to support the effectiveness of the revised MCCG 2012, which 
emphasises the independence role played by the independent non-executive directors. 
 
The average tenure of the independent non-executive directors (IDT) shows an 
insignificant association with the LNEXREM in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Nonetheless, it 
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is statistically significant and negatively associated with the LNEXREM in 2013 (p-
value < 0.10, t-statistic = -1.34) and 2014 (p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = -1.49). The 
negative association is contrary to the hypothesised positive association. Consequently, 
H4 is not supported. In Chapter Five, Table 5.15 shows that the IDT in 2013 and 2014 
exceed nine years. The negative association reported in 2013 and 2014 implies that 
independent non-executive directors with the IDT exceeding nine years could better 
monitor and restrain the executive remuneration. As such, these findings do not 
support the new corporate governance best practice introduced by the revised MCCG 
2012, which is, the tenure of independent director should not exceed a cumulative term 
of nine years (Securities Commission Malaysia 2012). Rather, this finding supports 
the argument of past literature that independent non-executive directors with a longer 
tenure accumulate greater firm specific knowledge, which enhances their commitment 
and monitoring effectiveness (Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi 2010; Liu and Sun 2010; 
Li et al. 2013; Chan, Liu and Sun 2013). The findings of this study set forth that the 
independent non-executive directors with a longer tenure could play an effective role 
in governing executive remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies and 
mitigate the Type II agency conflict.   
 
The influence of the CEO-chairman role duality (RD) on LNEXREM is different across 
the study periods. It shows an insignificant association in 2010 (p-value > 0.10, t-
statistic = 1.01) and 2012 (p-value > 0.10, t-statistic = 1.12); but a statistically 
significant and positive association in 2011 (p-value < 0.01, t-statistic = 2.22), 2013 
(p-value < 0.05, t-statistic = 1.99), and 2014 (p-value < 0.05, t-statistic = 1.85), H5 is 
supported. The significant positive association in 2011 may be sporadic as the year 
before and after 2011 show an insignificant association. The insignificant association 
is consistent with some of the past findings which document that the role duality does 
not fully capture the CEO power in relation to establishing remuneration (Conyon and 
Peck 1998; Ramaswamy, Veliyath and Gomes 2000; Connelly, Limpaphayon and 
Nagarajan 2012; Theeravanich 2013). Nevertheless, the significant positive 
association reported in 2013 and 2014, which is after the introduction of the revised 
MCCG 2012, implies the ineffectiveness of the revised MCCG 2012 pertaining to 
separating the roles of board chairman and CEO. In Chapter Five, Table 5.13 reports 
that approximately 90% of CEOs of the sample companies are family directors. The 
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positive association indicates that the controlling family uses the structural positions 
of CEO and board chairman to intervene in the remuneration arrangement. The CEO-
chairman role duality structure erodes the board governance on executive 
remuneration and enables the family CEOs to design high level of executive 
remuneration. The positive association is consistent with some of the past studies 
(Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999; Cyert, Kang and Kumar 2002; Ghosh 2006). 
When the CEO is also the board chairman, the board monitoring is compromised 
because the CEO has the power to recruit or dismiss the board directors including 
independent non-executive directors (Crystal 1991). As such, the independent non-
executive directors in Malaysian listed family companies are passive advisors, 
particularly concerning executive remuneration. In this instance, the Type II agency 
conflict becomes severe as it is difficult for the minority shareholders and independent 
non-executive directors to challenge the decisions of CEOs, particularly family CEOs. 
CEO-chairman role duality structure confers power to the CEO to fully control the 
management and the board of directors (Combs et al. 2007; Essen, Oosterhout and 
Carney 2012).  
 
The proportion of independent non-executive directors on remuneration committee 
(IDRC) shows an insignificant association with the LNEXREM for each period. Hence, 
H6 is not supported. This finding is inconsistent with Lim and Yen (2011) reporting a 
negative association between the bonuses paid to executive directors and the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors on remuneration committee. 
Nonetheless, the finding is consistent with some of the past studies in the context of 
developed countries, the United Kingdom and New York (Benito and Conyon 1999; 
Anderson and Bizjak 2003). The insignificant influence of IDRC reported in this study 
implies the ineffectiveness of remuneration committee as a governance mechanism in 
overseeing the remuneration setting in Malaysian listed family companies. The 
findings suggest that, to some extent, the remuneration committees in Malaysian listed 
family companies have been overshadowed by the powerful family CEOs and 
management, rendering them ineffective in structuring the optimal executive 
remuneration. Besides, the involvement of controlling shareholders and their family 
members on remuneration committee may cause the independent non-executive 
directors ineffective. The remuneration committees in Malaysian listed family 
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companies are deemed to be puppet committees with no substance role, and could not 
mitigate the Type II agency conflict via executive remuneration.  
 
Furthermore, both domestic (DIS) and foreign institutional shareholdings (FIS) do not 
have any significant influence on the LNEXREM in Malaysian listed family companies 
for each period. Thus, H7 and H8 are not supported. The insignificant influence of DIS 
and FIS suggest that institutional investors, both domestic and foreign, do not play an 
effective role in monitoring executive remuneration. This may be due to their relatively 
low institutional shareholdings in family companies, making their voice less powerful 
and influential. In addition, low levels of shareholdings discourage the monitoring 
incentive of institutional investors as the costs of monitoring may exceed the benefits. 
Besides, stock market liquidity may encourage them to sell their shares and exit rather 
than intervene in the management. The findings are consistent with prior literature 
documenting various reasons attributing to the ineffectiveness of institutional investors, 
such as potential liquidity costs (McCahery, Sautner and Starks 2016; Coffee 1991; 
Maug 1998), free-rider problem with other investors, conflict of interests and strategy 
misalignment (Ivanova 2017; Pound 1988). Nonetheless, the findings are inconsistent 
with the negative association reported by Hartzell and Starks (2003), Dong and Ozkan 
(2008), and Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman (2009) in the context of the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and Malaysia, respectively. In summary, the institutional 
investors, both domestic and foreign, are not an effective external monitoring 
mechanism that the minority shareholders could rely on to mitigate the family 
opportunism through executive remuneration. They could not ameliorate the typical 
Type II agency problem in Malaysian listed family companies.  
 
With regard to the control variables, family ownership (FO) shows an insignificant 
influence on the LNEXREM for each of the periods. This finding provides little 
empirical evidence on the entrenchment effect of controlling family shareholders via 
executive remuneration. The board size (BS) is positively associated with the 
LNEXREM at 0.01 significance level. This is in accordance with the past findings 
(Kashif and Mustafa 2012; Yatim 2013; Ozkan 2011; Coakley and Iliopoulou 2006; 
Ghosh and Sirmans 2005; Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999). Besides, the firm size 
(LNTA) is positively associated with the LNEXREM at 0.01 significance level, 
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consistent with the past findings (Yatim 2013; Kashif and Mustafa 2012; Lim and Yen 
2011; Ghosh 2006; Tosi et al. 2000; Hassan, Christopher and Evans 2003; Conyon 
1997; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1994). The firm leverage (LEV) is not statistically 
associated with the LNEXREM. This is inconsistent with the past studies documenting 
that the company with a higher debt level is likely to have less free cash flow, hence, 
lower level of remuneration is paid (Jensen 1989; Yoshikawa, Rasheed and Brio 2010; 
Dong and Ozkan 2008). This may be due to the relatively low level of debt used by 
the Malaysian listed family companies to finance the business; thus, the firm leverage 
has insignificant bearing effect on the LNEXREM. The lagged return of assets (ROA(-
1)) is positively associated with LNEXREM at different significance levels across the 
study periods, indicating that executive remuneration is directly linked to the prior year 
firm performance. Further, the LNEXREM is positively associated with the growth 
opportunities (MV). The revised MCCG 2012 emphasises that the remuneration 
packages should be aligned with the business strategy and long-term objectives, and 
reflect the directors’ expertise. The positive association between LNEXREM and MV 
indicates that Malaysian listed family companies remunerate the executive directors 
based on the growth opportunities, which reflect the long-term business objectives. 
 
 6.4 Panel Regression Results 
Panel data analysis is employed to examine the five-year data (2010 to 2014 inclusive). 
Three tests, namely F test, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, and Hausman test 
are conducted to decide the most efficient estimator for this study.  
 
Table 6.4 shows the result of F test. The p-value of 0.00, which is less than 0.05, 
indicates the presence of individual specific effects. 
 
Table 6.4: F test result 




In addition, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, as shown in Table 6.5, also 





Table 6.5: Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test result 




Collectively, the rejection of null hypotheses of F test and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier test indicate the presence of individual specific effects. Hence, pooled OLS 
estimation is not the most efficient estimation for this study as the variance across 
entities is not equal to zero. 
 
In this instance, the next step is to examine whether the individual specific effects are 
correlated with the explanatory variables. Random effect model (REM) should be used 
if there is no correlation, on the other hand, fixed effect model (FEM) should be used 
if the correlation exists (Torres-Reyna 2007b; Wooldridge 2013; Hsiao 2014). 
Hausman specific test is conducted to choose between REM and FEM by testing the 
correlation between the explanatory variables and individual specific effects.  
 
Table 6.6 shows the Hausman specific test result. The p-value of 0.12, which is more 
than 0.05, does not reject the null hypothesis that the individual specific effects are 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Hence, the statistical result indicates that 
REM is more efficient for this study. Besides, the Hausman specific test result suggests 
there is no endogeneity problem – there is no correlation between the explanatory 
variables and individual specific effects or error terms. In essence, REM assumes the 
exogeneity of all explanatory variables with individual specific effects (Mundlak 1978; 
Wooldridge 2013).  
 
Table 6.6: Hausman specific test result 





One of the advantages of REM is that it can estimate coefficient for explanatory 
variables that are constant over time (Dougherty 2016; Hsiao 2014; Torres-Reyna 
2007b; Baltagi 2005). Dougherty (2016) posits that the REM with generalised least 
squares (GLS) estimation is more attractive because the observed characteristics that 
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remain constant for each individual are retained in the regression model; however in 
the FEM estimation, they have to be dropped. Moreover, REM does not lose the degree 
of freedom in which FEM does (Dougherty 2016). Based on the descriptive statistics 
reported in Chapter Five, most of the independent variables in this study are fairly 
constant over the five-year study period, for instance, the proportion of family directors 
on board, the nomination of family CEO, the proportion of independent directors on 
board, domestic institutional shareholdings and foreign institutional shareholdings, to 
name a few. The changes in independent variables over time are trifling. Hence, REM 
is deemed to be the most appropriate and efficient estimator for this study 
 
Another comparative strength of GLS estimation over the OLS estimation is that it 
automatically controls the heteroscedasticity (Schurer 2014). As such, the following 
panel data model is run using REM with GLS estimation: 
 
LNEXREMit = β0 + β1FDit + β2 FCEOit + β3IDit + β4IDTit + β5RDitt + β6IDRCit 
+ β7DISit + β8FISit + β9YEARit + β10FOit + β11BSit + β12LNTAit + 
β13LEVit + β14ROA(-1) it + β15MVit + + εit 
 
To assure that there is no heteroscedasticity, Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test is 
conducted. Table 6.7 shows the result of Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test. The p-
value of 0.35, which is more than 0.05, indicates that the null hypothesis of constant 
variance of individual specific effects is not rejected. In other words, heteroscedasticity 
is not a concern in this study.  
 
Table 6.7: Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test result 




Table 6.8 shows the REM results. The panel regression model of this study explains 
37.20% of the variance in executive remuneration, with a statistically significant wald 





Table 6.8: REM results 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
FD  0.1780 0.81 0.21 
FCEO 0.0768 1.04 0.15 
ID -0.2794 -1.28 0.10* 
IDT -0.0009 -0.18 0.43 
RD 0.0777 1.51 0.07* 
IDRC 0.0244 0.23 0.41 
DIS -0.2939 -1.14 0.12 
FIS -0.2163 -0.55 0.29 
YEAR 0.1180 6.1 0.00*** 
FO 0.4846 2.04 0.02** 
BS 0.0748 5.33 0.00*** 
LNTA 0.4158 13.45 0.00*** 
LEV -0.2117 -1.73 0.04** 
ROA(-1) 0.0031 1.51 0.07* 
MV 0.0655 3.04 0.00*** 
_cons 8.2556 19.55 0.00*** 
    
Overall R2 0.3720   
Wald chi2(15) 413.01***   
No. of companies 279   
No. of observation 1395   
Legend: Associations ***, ** and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. One-
tailed probabilities are used for the tests of the variables since the associated hypotheses are directional.  
 
Consistent with the multiple regression results reported in Table 6.3 for individual 
study period, the FD and FCEO show insignificant associations (p-value > 0.10, t-
statistic = 0.81; p-value > 0.10, t-statistic = 1.04 respectively) with the LNEXREM; 
thus H1 and H2 are not supported. These panel regression results provide little 
empirical evidence that the controlling shareholders and their family members use the 
board directorship or managerial power to influence executive remuneration. The 
findings do not support the argument of past literature that family members on 
corporate boards misappropriate funds through excessive remuneration (Basu et al. 
2007; Barontini and Bozzi 2011). Rather, this study puts forward that controlling 
shareholders and their family members involve in the boards to ensure the ownership 
and control/management are within the family and the managerial decisions are in 
congruence to their interests. The family CEOs and family directors may pursue other 
objectives such as firm survival and non-economic goals. Board directorship does not 
confer power to the family directors to design remuneration packages. Succinctly, little 
empirical evidence is found to attest either the entrenchment effect or interest 
alignment effect of the family shareholders via board directorship. Family directors 
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and family CEOs do not exacerbate the Type II agency conflict via executive 
remuneration. The influence of family directors on board may have been 
counterbalanced by the independent non-executive directors on board (ID) as the mean 
ID is greater than the mean FD (42.46% versus 40.89%, as reported in Table 5.14 and 
Table 5.11 respectively). 
 
The ID is reported to have a negative association with the LNEXREM although the 
statistical significance level is weak (p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = -1.28). Thus, H3 is 
supported. A unit increase in ID leads to 27.94% decrease in executive remuneration. 
This finding is consistent with the past studies (Ghosh 2006; Abdullah 2006; Lim and 
Yen 2011; Yatim 2013) which include non-family companies in their sample sets. 
However, those past studies report a higher t-statistic value at 0.05 significance level, 
while this study reports a t-statistic value of 1.28 at 0.10 significance level. This 
indicates the weak influence of ID on executive remuneration in Malaysian listed 
family companies. The result suggests that the independent non-executive directors in 
Malaysian listed family companies are able to monitor and restrain executive 
remuneration, however, the influence is weak. This may be attributed to the Malaysian 
culture of high power distance (Haniffa and Cooke 2002; The Iclif Leadership and 
Governance Centre 2014). According to The Iclif Leadership and Governance Centre 
(2014), many Asian countries have extraordinarily high levels of power distance; 
Malaysia scores the highest in power distance, with a rating of 100. In general, the 
Malaysians are afraid of taking risk and prefer to keep silent as it is the safer alternative. 
Provided that such culture is deeply instilled in the Malaysians, this study suspects that 
the independent non-executive directors in Malaysian listed family companies may be 
introversive and are timid to question the remuneration of executive directors 
particularly those related to controlling shareholders who are perceived to have a 
higher rank in the company. There is a genuine concern that the independent non-
executive directors are less inclined to govern the executive remuneration intensively 
as displeasing the controlling shareholders and their family members may risk the 
opportunity to be re-elected to the board. Generally, the negative association suggests 
that, to some extent, the independent non-executive directors could restrain the 
executive remuneration and mitigate the Type II agency conflict in Malaysian listed 
family companies. They are potentially one of the corporate governance mechanisms 
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that the minority shareholders could rely on in protecting their interests against family 
opportunism.  
 
The average tenure of independent non-executive directors (IDT) is not statistically 
associated with LNEXREM (p-value > 0.10; t-statistic = -0.18); hence, H4 is not 
supported. The insignificant association suggests that long tenure does not confer 
additional ability to the independent non-executive directors to exert a significant 
influence on the determination of executive remuneration. There is a concern that this 
result may be generalised by the samples with high IDT and low IDT. In order to 
provide more insights, panel regression model is run separately for subsamples: (i) 
IDT is nine years or less, and (ii) IDT is more than nine years. The results are presented 
and discussed in Chapter Seven.  
 
Table 6.8 reveals a positive and statistically significant association (p-value < 0.10, t-
statistic = 1.51) between the LNEXREM and the CEO-chairman role duality (RD). 
Consequently, H5 is supported. This finding is consistent with the past findings in the 
context of the United States (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999; Cyert, Kang and 
Kumar 2002). Since approximately 90% of the sample companies appoint family CEO, 
it is posited that the family CEOs use the combined power of board chairman and CEO 
to influence executive remuneration. The insignificant influence of FCEO but positive 
influence of RD imply that the CEO position alone does not confer power to the 
controlling family to intervene in remuneration arrangement; instead, the controlling 
family uses the collective power of board chairman and CEO to exert a significant 
influence on executive remuneration. The CEO-chairman role duality structure gives 
the controlling family ample opportunity to misappropriate funds through executive 
remuneration as there is no one to oversee the decisions and actions of family CEO. In 
short, CEO-chairman role duality aggravates the Type II agency conflict in Malaysian 
listed family companies via executive remuneration.  
 
Consistent with the multiple regression results reported in Table 6.3 for individual 
study period, the panel regression results show that the independent non-executive 
directors on remuneration committee (IDRC) have an insignificant association (p-
value > 0.10, t-statistic = 0.23) with the LNEXREM. As such, H6 is not supported. This 
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finding is consistent with the past studies documenting that the remuneration 
committees play an ineffective governing role in structuring the remuneration in the 
non-Malaysian context (Benito and Conyon 1999; Anderson and Bizjak 2003). To 
some extent, the remuneration committees in Malaysian listed family companies have 
been captured by the management and play a passive role in designing remuneration 
packages. The remuneration committees in Malaysian listed family companies are 
deemed to be puppet committees established by the controlling family shareholders 
merely to comply with the MCCG’s recommendation rather than performing 
governance role. MCCG is based on the comply-or-explain principle, which allows 
the compliance with the governance practices that best suit the firm features such as 
activity, operation, size and structure; otherwise, the companies must explain the 
reasons for non-compliance. The flexibility of the comply-or-explain principle raises 
doubt pertaining to the motivation of the family companies to comply and establish 
the remuneration committee when they are not mandated to do so. The compliance of 
MCCG may be a way to gain the legitimacy and enhance the firm survival. Berrone et 
al. (2010) relate that the legitimacy-seeking behaviour of family companies is 
susceptible to institutional pressures. Earlier, Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) posit that 
family companies adapt to the external pressures because they are committed to the 
preservation of family endowments such as the continuation of family business. In 
spite of the compliance, the result indicates the ineffectiveness of remuneration 
committee in determining the level of executive remuneration. They could not mitigate 
the Type II agency conflict in Malaysian listed family companies via executive 
remuneration. 
 
Similar to the cross-sectional multiple regression results reported in Table 6.3 for 
individual study period, the panel regression results in Table 6.9 show that institutional 
investors, both domestic (DIS) and foreign (FIS), play an ineffective role in governing 
executive remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies (p-value > 0.10, t-
statistic = -1.14; p-value > 0.10, t-statistic = -0.55 respectively). This is inconsistent 
with the negative association reported by past studies which include non-family 
companies in the sample sets (Hartzell and Starks 2003; Ozkan 2007). Rather, the 
insignificant association is consistent with the findings of Lim and Yen (2011) that 
external block-holder does not have any significant influence on the executive 
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directors’ salary in Malaysian companies. These findings indicate that the institutional 
investors are not a good corporate governance mechanism that the minority 
shareholders could rely on. The ineffectiveness of institutional investors may be due 
to their relatively low shareholdings and voting rights compared to the controlling 
family shareholders in Malaysian listed family companies. The institutional investors 
may simply sell their shares and exit the companies instead of monitoring the 
management because the monitoring cost involved may exceed the benefit of 
monitoring. Besides, they may face several impediments that hinder their ability to 
monitor, such as liquidity concerns, free rider problems, internal conflict of interest, 
and low client demand for engagement and intervention (Ivanova 2017; McCahery, 
Sautner and Starks 2016; CvijanoviĆ, Dasgupta and Zachariadis 2016). Further, they 
may lack knowledge and experience of how to effectively engage with the investee 
companies. The Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors which gives the guidance 
to institutional investors is introduced in 2014; prior to that, the institutional investors 
in Malaysian companies generally do not have any explicit guides. In addition, the 
institutional investors, such as insurance companies or mutual funds, may have 
business ties with the family companies. Voting against the management particularly 
concerning their remuneration packages would affect the existing or potential business 
relationships. To conclude, the institutional investors in Malaysian listed family 
companies do not provide circumspect monitoring on executive remuneration and 
could not mitigate the Type II agency conflict.  
 
The YEAR dummy shows a positive and statistically significant association with the 
LNEXREM (p-value < 0.01, t-statistic = 6.1). This implies that the revised MCCG 2012 
pertinent to restraining executive remuneration. In order words, the revised MCCG 
2012 does not enhance the governance of remuneration policy of Malaysian listed 
family companies. The compliance of MCCG is merely a tick-box practice of family 
companies to fulfil the legislation. 
 
With regard to the control variables, family ownership (FO) is statistically significant 
and positively associated with the LNEXREM (p-value < 0.05, t-statistic = 2.04), 
consistent with past findings (Haid and Yurtoglu 2006; Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong 
2005). The significant influence of family ownership on executive remuneration 
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affirms the Type II agency conflict in Malaysian listed family firms. The insignificant 
influence of FD and FCEO but significant influence of FO implies that board 
directorship and CEO positions do not confer influential power to the controlling 
family to intervene in remuneration arrangement. Instead, the controlling family uses 
the concentrated ownership rights to influence the executive remuneration.  
 
Board size (BS) is statistically significant and positively associated with LNEXREM 
(p-value < 0.01, t-statistic = 5.33). The finding is consistent with the past studies 
(Coakley and Iliopoulou 2006; Kashif and Mustafa 2012; Yatim 2013; Ozkan 2011; 
Ghosh and Sirmans 2005; Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999). Firm size (LNTA) is 
statistically significant and positively associated with the LNEXREM (p-value < 0.01, 
t-statistic = 13.45), attesting that larger firm size is associated with greater complexities, 
therefore the executive directors receive a higher level of remuneration for the efforts 
exerted (Yatim 2013; Kashif and Mustafa 2012; Lim and Yen 2011; Ghosh 2006; Tosi 
et al. 2000; Hassan, Christopher and Evans 2003; Conyon 1997; Tosi and Gomez-
Mejia 1994). Moreover, the statistically significant and negative association between 
firm leverage (LEV) and LNEXREM (p-value < 0.05, t-statistic = -1.73) is consistent 
with the past literature (Jensen 1989; Dong and Ozkan 2008; Yoshikawa, Rasheed and 
Brio 2010). The companies with a higher debt level are likely to have less free cash 
flow, and thus less likely to pay a higher level of remuneration. The statistically 
significant and positive association between ROA(-1) and LNEXREM (p-value < 0.10, 
t-statistic = 1.51) indicates that the executive remuneration is linked to the lagged firm 
performance. Moreover, the statistically significant and positive association (p-value 
< 0.01; t-statistic = 3.04) between MV and LNEXREM supports the past studies that 
the companies with higher growth opportunities reward their executives with a higher 
level of remuneration (Smith and Watts 1992; Conyon, Core and Guay 2011; Croci, 
Gonenc and Ozkan 2012; Fernandes et al. 2013). The positive associations of 
LNEXREM with ROA(-1) and MV indicate that Malaysian listed family firms comply 
with the recommendations of the revised MCCG 2012 to remunerate executive 
directors based on firm performance and growth opportunities, which reflect the long-




6.5 Sensitivity Tests 
Two sensitivity tests are conducted to provide robustness checks for the main panel 
regression results reported in the preceding section, which are cluster-robust standard 
errors estimation and REM estimation for the models with the inclusion of share option 
component in executive remuneration. 
 
Firstly, Wooldridge test is conducted as a diagnostic check for the serial correlation. 
Its result is shown in Table 6.9. The p-value of 0.00, which is less than 0.05, indicates 
the presence of serial correlation in the panel regression model.  
 
Table 6.9: Wooldridge test result 
Null hypothesis: No first-order autocorrelation 
F(1, 278): 14.364 
p-value: 0.00 
 
Despite this, according to Baltagi (2014) and Torres-Reyna (2007b), serial correlation 
is not a major problem in micro panel where N>T. In order to validate and ascertain 
the results of REM estimation, cluster-robust standard errors estimation is performed. 
Cluster-robust standard errors estimation can solve the heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation problems existed in the REM estimation (Baltagi 2005; Torres-Reyna 
2007b; Schmidheiny 2016). Table 6.10 shows the REM results using cluster-robust 
standard errors estimation. The overall R2 of the regression model is 37.20%, which is 
identical to the main REM reported in Table 6.8, whilst the wald chi(2) of the model 
is 272.52 (p-value < 0.01). 
 
The REM results using cluster-robust standard errors estimation are similar to the main 
REM results reported in Table 6.8. The p-value of ID in the main REM is 0.10 (as 
reported in Table 6.8), at the verge of becoming insignificant. The REM using cluster-
robust standard errors estimation shows that it is insignificant (p-value > 0.10). This 
finding affirms the ineffectiveness of independent non-executive directors in 
governing executive remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies. The 
summary of the results of the main REM estimation and cluster-robust standard errors 




Table 6.10: REM results using cluster-robust standard errors estimation 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
FD  0.1780 0.62 0.27 
FCEO 0.0768 0.68 0.25 
ID -0.2794 -0.90 0.18 
IDT -0.0009 -0.18 0.43 
RD 0.0777 1.56 0.06* 
IDRC 0.0244 0.24 0.41 
DIS -0.2939 -1.18 0.12 
FIS -0.2163 -0.62 0.27 
YEAR 0.1180 5.28 0.00*** 
FO 0.4846 1.65 0.05** 
BS 0.0748 4.64 0.00*** 
LNTA 0.4158 11.53 0.00*** 
LEV -0.2117 -1.37 0.09* 
ROA(-1) 0.0031 1.26 0.10* 
MV 0.0655 2.77 0.00*** 
_cons 8.2556 15.57 0.00*** 
    
Overall R2 0.3720   
Wald chi2(15) 272.52***   
No. of companies 279   
No. of observation 1395   
Legend: Associations ***, ** and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. One-
tailed probabilities are used for the tests of the variables since the associated hypotheses are directional.  
 
In addition, pooled OLS and FEM are conducted so as to compare with the REM 
results. The results generated by different regression estimators are summarised in 
Appendix 6.1. All of these models report near similar R2. To sum up, the rejection of 
the null hypotheses of F test and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test indicate the 
presence of individual specific effects; pooled OLS is not the most efficient estimator. 
Subsequently, Hausman specific test is conducted to choose between FEM and REM. 
The null hypothesis of Hausman specific test is not rejected, indicating that REM is 
the most efficient estimator for this study.  
 
Secondly, one of the limitations of this study is the exclusion of share option from the 
measurement of executive remuneration due to the non-disclosure of this information 
in the annual reports of Malaysian listed companies. In order to address this limitation, 
this study conducts sensitivity test by including the share option component in 
executive remuneration. It is assumed that the inclusion of share option will increase 
executive remuneration by 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, or 50%. Table 6.11 shows the REM 
results for this sensitivity test. Panels (a) to (e) show the results of REM model where 
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the executive remuneration (EXREM) is increased by 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% 
respectively. The REM results of all of the panels in Table 6.11 are identical to the 
main REM results reported in Table 6.8, with the overall R2 of 37.20% and 
waldchi2(15) of 413.01 (p-value < 0.01).  
 
Table 6.11: REM results for sensitivity test 
Panel (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
























































































































































































































































      
Overall R2 0.3720 0.3720 0.3720 0.3720 0.3720 
Wald 
chi2(15) 
413.01*** 413.01*** 413.01*** 413.01*** 413.01*** 
No. of 
companies 
279 279 279 279 279 
No. of 
observations 
1395 1395 1395 1395 1395 
Legend: Coefficient is bold. t-statistic is italicised. p-value is in the parenthesis. Associations ***, ** 
and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. One-tailed probabilities are used for 
the tests of the variables since the associated hypotheses are directional. 
 
In a nutshell, the sensitivity tests, which are cluster-robust standard errors estimation, 
and REM estimation for the models with the inclusion of share option component in 
executive remuneration, ascertain the robustness of the main REM results reported in 
Table 6.8. 
 
6.6 Endogeneity Test 
The presence of endogeneity will cause the estimates to be biased. The sources of 
endogeneity include model specification error and simultaneity, which is known as 
reverse causality (Wooldridge 2013). 
 
According to Torres-Reyna (2007a), linktest can assess the model specification.  
 
Table 6.12: linktest result 
Null hypothesis: There is no model specification error 
  _hatsq: 0.04 
p-value: 0.24 
 
Table 6.12 shows the result of linktest. The p-value of 0.24, which is more than 0.05, 
indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected. In other words, the model of this study 




In order to investigate the possibility of simultaneity (reverse causality) between 
executive remuneration and institutional ownership, this study adopts the way of 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) to examine whether lagged executive remuneration would 
predict the subsequent institutional shareholdings – domestic (DIS), foreign (FIS), and 
total (IS). The natural logarithm of lagged executive remuneration (LNEXREM(-1)) is 
used as the independent variable for all of the bivariate regression models. The 
following bivariate regression models are used: 
 
DISit =  β0 + β1LNEXREM(-1)it + εit 
FISit =  β0 + β1LNEXREM(-1)it + εit 
ISit =  β0 + β1LNEXREM(-1)it + εit 
 
Breush-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test and Hausman specific test are conducted to 
determine the most efficient estimator (pooled OLS, FEM or REM) for each bivariate 
regression model stated above. 
 
Table 6.13 shows the results of Breush-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for each model. 
There is the presence of individual specific effects (p-value < 0.05) for each bivariate 
model. 
 
Table 6.13 Breush-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for each bivariate model 
Dependent variable DIS FIS IS 
chi2(1) 1387.73 1424.99 1433.05 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Hausman specific test is conducted to choose between FEM and REM for each model. 
Table 6.14 shows the results of Hausman specific test. REM is chosen for bivariate 
model using DIS as the dependent variable (p-value > 0.05); FEM is chosen for the 
bivariate model using FIS as the dependent variable (p-value < 0.05); FEM is chosen 





Table 6.14: Hausman specific test for each bivariate model 
Dependent variable DIS FIS IS 
chi2(1): 3.82 6.81 10.14 
p-value: 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Efficient estimator REM FEM FEM 
 
Table 6.15 shows the bivariate regression result for each model. There is an 
insignificant association (p-value > 0.10) between the lagged executive remuneration 
and the institutional shareholdings – DIS, FIS and IS. Succinctly, the simultaneity or 
reverse causality between executive remuneration and institutional shareholdings are 
not identified in this study. 
 
Table 6.15: Simultaneity test  






















Legend: Coefficient is bold; t-statistic is italicised; p-value is in the parentheses.    
 
Based on the results of the linktest and simultaneity test, endogeneity problem is not a 
major concern in this study. Listokin (2008) document that FEM can be used as a cure 
to mitigate endogeneity. Appendix 6.1 shows that the regression results and the R2 of 
FEM are similar to the REM reported in section 6.4. In addition, this study uses 
subsample estimates to address the potential endogeneity problem (Listokin 2008). 
The analysis and discussions of subsample estimates are presented in the next chapter.  
 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter presents and discusses the multivariate analysis using multiple regression 
model. Multiple regression model is run separately for each year (from 2010 to 2014) 
and also for the panel data of five years using REM with GLS estimation. Table 6.16 














FD H1 Positive Insignificant Not supported 
FCEO H2 Positive Insignificant Not supported 
ID H3 Negative Negative Supported 
IDT H4 Positive Insignificant Not supported 
RD H5 Positive Positive Supported 
IDRC H6 Negative Insignificant Not supported 
DIS H7 Negative Insignificant Not supported 
FIS H8 Negative Insignificant Not supported 
YEAR H9 Negative Positive Not supported 
FO   Positive  
BS   Positive  
LNTA   Positive  
LEV   Negative  
ROA(-1)   Positive  
MV   Positive  
 
In summary, the family directors and CEOs are not associated with executive 
remuneration, indicating that the family members (of controlling shareholders) on 
board do not exacerbate the Type II agency conflict in Malaysian listed family 
companies. The independent non-executive directors are able to rein in executive 
remuneration; suggesting that they are potentially one of the mechanisms that the 
minority shareholders could rely on to mitigate the Type II agency conflict in 
Malaysian listed family companies. Nonetheless, their influence is weak. The average 
tenure of independent non-executive directors is not associated with executive 
remuneration. The CEO-chairman role duality is positively associated with executive 
remuneration; such structure erodes the board governance and autonomy. The 
remuneration committees of Malaysian listed family companies play a tokenism role 
in setting executive remuneration. Likewise, the institutional investors, both domestic 
and foreign, do not play an effective role in monitoring executive remuneration in 
Malaysian listed family companies. The revised MCCG 2012 could not restrain the 
executive remuneration of family companies. The executive remuneration is positively 
associated with the concentrated family ownership, firm size, board size, lagged firm 
performance, and growth opportunities; and negatively associated with the firm 




Additional analyses which segregate the overall sample into different subsample sets 
(subsample estimates) are conducted to validate the multiple regression results and 
provide a cure for the possible endogeneity problem in this study. The additional 
analyses also provide further insights into the influence of family participation on 
board, corporate governance mechanisms, and institutional ownership on executive 
remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies. Chapter Seven presents and 




CHAPTER SEVEN: ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 
7.0 Introduction  
This chapter undertakes additional analyses to provide a series of robustness checks of 
the results in the preceding chapter and yield more insights into the determinants of 
executive remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies. Besides, the additional 
analyses which entail the subsample estimates may address the potential endogeneity 
problem. Section 7.1 examines the association between executive remuneration and 
explanatory variables for different industry sectors. Section 7.2 provides further 
analysis to test the association between executive remuneration and explanatory 
variables under two conditions: (i) companies with family CEO; and (ii) companies 
with non-family CEO. Section 7.3 involves running the multiple regression model 
specifically for family companies that have institutional ownership, and also combines 
the shareholdings of both domestic and foreign institutional investors to examine the 
collective influence of the total institutional ownership on executive remuneration. 
Section 7.4 analyses the factors influencing executive remuneration at various levels 
of family ownership. Section 7.5 further examines the influence of the tenure of 
independent non-executive directors on executive remuneration. Section 7.6 examines 
the interaction effects between the variables.  
 
7.1 Different Industry Sectors 
The REM is run separately for different industry sectors 48 : properties, industrial 
products, construction, consumer products, trading/services, and plantation sectors. 
These additional analyses provide insights into the influence of family participation on 
board, corporate governance mechanisms, and institutional ownership on the executive 
remuneration across different industry sectors. Table 7.1 shows the REM results for 
each industry sector. The findings highlight that industry heterogeneity has an impact 
on the factors influencing the executive remuneration of Malaysian listed family 
companies.  
 
                                                 
48 REM is not conducted for technology, hotels, and infrastructure project sectors because there are only 
a few sample companies in these sectors. 
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Table 7.1: REM results for each industry sector 
Panel (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 








































































































































































































































































































       
Overall R2 0.4506 0.4286 0.6468 0.3501 0.1476 0.7143 
Wald chi2(15) 82.3*** 150.85*** 72.51*** 131.11*** 32.87*** 70.56*** 





180 475 90 300 235 85 
Legend: Coefficient is bold. t-statistic is italicised. p-value is in the parenthesis. Associations ***, ** and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. One-
tailed probabilities are used for the tests of the variables since the associated hypotheses are directional. 
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Table 7.1 panel (a) reports the REM results for the properties sector with an overall R2 
of 45.06%. The RD is found to have a statistically significant and positive association 
(p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = 1.37) with the LNEXREM. The finding indicates that the 
CEO-chairman role duality structure erodes the board governance and enables the 
CEO to intervene in the determination of executive remuneration. Besides, there is a 
statistically significant and positive association (p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = 1.36) 
between the IDRC and LNEXREM. This finding is contrary to the hypothesised 
negative association of H6. This finding is similar to Sapp (2008) reporting that the 
higher the proportion of independent non-executive directors on remuneration 
committee, the higher the level of CEO remuneration of Canadian public listed 
companies. The independent non-executive directors on remuneration committee may 
have been captured by the management, particularly the controlling shareholders and 
family directors, hence they play an ineffective role in governing remuneration 
arrangement. Instead of governing, the ‘not so independent’ independent non-
executive directors on remuneration committee have the possibility to inflate the 
executive remuneration in order to please the executive directors so that they could be 
re-elected and continue to collect fee. This finding suggests that the definition of 
‘independent’ need to be revisited. The other independent variables, which are FD, 
FCEO, ID, IDT, DIS, and FIS, do not show any statistically significant associations 
with executive remuneration in properties sector. 
 
Table 7.1 panel (b) reports the REM results for the industrial products sector with an 
overall R2 of 42.86%. The FD shows a statistically significant and positive association 
(p-value < 0.01, t-statistic = 2.97) with the LNEXREM. This finding implies that the 
controlling shareholders and their family members use the board directorship or 
managerial power to influence the remuneration arrangement. This indicates the 
evidence of the family entrenchment and Type II agency conflict in the industrial 
products sector. Contrary to the hypothesised negative association of H3, the ID is 
reported to have statistically significant and positive association (p-value < 0.05, t-
statistic = 2.05) with the LNEXREM. This finding is not consistent with the past 
findings of negative association (Ghosh 2006; Abdullah 2006; Lim and Yen 2011; 
Yatim 2013). Essentially, this finding casts doubt pertaining to the independence role 
of independent non-executive directors. The governance role of the independent non-
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executive directors in industrial products sector may have been attenuated by the 
entrenched family directors. The former may find it hard to challenge the latter, 
particularly concerning their remuneration packages. Of importance, the finding 
highlights that the independent non-executive directors in industrial products sector 
are in allegiance to the family directors and exacerbate the Type II agency conflict. 
The other independent variables, which are FCEO, IDT, RD, IDRC, DIS, and FIS, do 
not show any statistically significant associations with executive remuneration in 
industrial products sector. 
 
Table 7.1 panel (c) reports the REM results for the construction sector with an overall 
R2 of 64.68%. There is a statistically significant and negative association (p-value < 
0.10, t-statistic = -1.54) between the IDRC and LNEXREM. Construction sector is the 
only sector that shows the effectiveness of the remuneration committee in governing 
executive remuneration. The other independent variables, namely FD, FCEO, ID, IDT, 
RD, DIS, and FIS, do not show any statistically significant associations with executive 
remuneration in construction sector. 
 
Table 7.1 panel (d) reports the REM results for the consumer products sector with an 
overall R2 of 35.01%. There is a statistically significant and positive association (p-
value <0.01, t-statistic = 2.85) between the FCEO and LNEXREM. This indicates the 
family entrenchment via CEO position in the consumer products sector. The 
entrenched family CEOs exert a significant influence on the remuneration arrangement 
and exacerbate the Type II agency conflict. On the other hand, the ID shows a 
statistically significant and negative association (p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = -1.57) 
with the executive remuneration. This suggests that the ID in consumer products sector 
are able to restrain the remuneration level, however the influence is weak. The 
governing function of the ID may have been counterbalanced by the entrenched family 
CEOs. In contrast to the hypothesised negative association of H8, the FIS is reported 
to have statistically significant and positive association (p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = 
1.56) with the LNEXREM. The possible interpretation is that, when there is more 
investment from foreign institutions, the executive directors put in more time and 
effort to deal with the increasing expectations and demands of different foreign 
institutional investors and thus, they are paid more for the extra effort exerted. The 
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positive influence of the FIS is consistent with the past findings that more 
internationalised companies offer a higher level of remuneration (Croci, Gonenc and 
Ozkan 2012; Fernandes et al. 2013). The other independent variables, which are FD, 
IDT, RD, DIS, and FIS, do not show any statistically significant associations with 
executive remuneration in the construction sector. 
 
Table 7.1 panel (e) reports the REM results for the trading/services sector with an 
overall R2 of 14.76%. Contrary to the hypothesised positive association of H1, the FD 
shows a statistically significant and negative association (p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = -
1.54) with the LNEXREM. The negative association supports the findings of Sapp 
(2008) and Combs et al. (2010) that family directors on board provide a source of 
monitoring on CEO remuneration in the context of Canada and the United States 
respectively. This finding suggests that the FD in trading/services sectors play a 
governing role. Instead of exacerbating, they ameliorate the Type II agency conflict 
via executive remuneration. In addition, the ID is found to exert a significant negative 
influence on the LNEXREM (p-value < 0.05, t-statistic = -1.73), indicating the 
effectiveness of independent non-executive directors in governing executive 
remuneration in trading/services sector. Nonetheless, the IDT shows a statistically 
significant and positive association (p-value < 0.05, t-statistic = 1.88) with the 
LNEXREM. This indicates that the longer the average tenure of independent non-
executive directors, the higher the level of executive remuneration. The long-tenured 
independent non-executive directors may have developed friendly relationships with 
the executive directors, hence their independence role is compromised. Further, the 
DIS is reported to have a negative and statistically significant association (p-value < 
0.05, t-statistics = -2.35) with the LNEXREM. This indicates that the domestic 
institutional investors play an effective disciplinary role in monitoring the 
remuneration arrangement. They are potentially a good representation of the minority 
shareholders in trading/services sector. The negative influence of DIS supports the past 
studies (Hartzell and Starks 2003; Ozkan 2007). The other independent variables, 
which are FCEO, RD, IDRC, and FIS, do not show any statistically significant 
associations with executive remuneration in the trading/services sector. The negative 
influence of DIS but insignificant influence of FIS suggest that the governing role of 
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domestic institutional investors prevail that of foreign counterparts in the 
trading/services sector.  
 
Table 7.1 panel (f) reports the REM results for the plantation sectors with an overall 
R2 of 71.43%. The RD is found to have statistically significant and positive association 
(p-value < 0.05, t-statistic = 2.08) with the LNEXREM. This finding is similar to the 
positive influence of RD on LNEXREM in the properties sector, as reported in panel 
(a). The CEO-chairman role duality compromises the board autonomy in governing 
executive remuneration.  
 
In a nutshell, different independent variables (FD, FCEO, ID, IDT, RD, IDRC, DIS, 
and FIS) exert different influence on the executive remuneration across different 
industry sectors at different significance levels. Of importance, these additional 
analyses point out that the effectiveness of different governance mechanisms vary due 
to the industry heterogeneity.  
 
To reiterate, the controlling shareholders and their family members of the companies 
in the industrial products sector use their board directorship (FD) to intervene in and 
inflate the executive remuneration; nonetheless, the family directors (FD) in the 
trading/services sector play a disciplinary function in curbing executive remuneration. 
Family CEOs (FCEO) is reported to have a significant influence on executive 
remuneration in the consumer products sector only. 
 
The independent non-executive directors (ID) play an effective role in reining in 
executive remuneration in the consumer products and trading/services sectors. 
However, the independent non-executive directors in the industrial products sector 
show a positive and statistically significant association with executive remuneration. 
The average tenure of independent non-executive directors (IDT) is reported to have 
positive association with executive remuneration in the trading/services sector only. 
Further, CEO-chairman role duality (RD) shows a positive and statistically association 
with executive remuneration in the properties and plantation sectors. Except in the 
construction sector, little empirical evidence is found to support the notion that the 
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remuneration committee (IDRC) can be an extension of corporate governance that 
tailors executive remuneration to the benefit of overall shareholders.  
 
In general, the domestic (DIS) and foreign institutional investors (FIS) do not have any 
significant influence on the executive remuneration, except those in the 
trading/services and consumer products sectors.  
 
The revised MCCG 2012 (YEAR) does not enhance the governance of remuneration 
policy and could not rein in executive remuneration of listed family companies in all 
of the industry sectors. 
 
Table 7.2 summarises the REM results for each industry sector. 
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FO  Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Positive Insignificant Insignificant 
BS  Positive Positive Positive Positive Insignificant Insignificant 
LNTA  Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
LEV  Insignificant Negative Positive Negative Insignificant Negative 
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ROA(-1)  Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Positive 
MV  Insignificant Positive Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Positive 
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7.2 Family CEO and Non-Family CEO 
The sample is segregated into two subsample sets: (a) companies with family CEO, 
and (b) companies with non-family CEO. This sheds light on the association between 
different variables and executive remuneration when the management is led by family 
CEO (or non-family CEO). Table 7.3 shows the REM results for the two subsample 
sets with the overall R2 of 36.33% and 54.75% respectively. 
 
Table 7.3: REM results for: (a) companies with family CEO, and (b) companies 
with non-family CEO 
Panel (a) (b) 
 Companies with family 
CEO 































































































   
Overall R2 0.3633 0.5475 







Legend: Coefficient is bold. t-statistic is italicised. p-value is in the parenthesis. Associations ***, ** 
and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. One-tailed probabilities are used for 
the tests of the variables since the associated hypotheses are directional. 
  
Panel (b) of Table 7.3 reports that when the CEOs are non-family directors, the ID 
shows a statistically significant and negative association (p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = 
1.39) with the LNEXREM, but statistically insignificant association (p-value > 0.10, t-
statistic = -0.49) when the CEOs are family directors, as reported in panel (a). The 
findings suggest that the independent non-executive directors are able to effectively 
govern and rein in executive remuneration when the CEOs have no kinship with the 
controlling shareholders. Succinctly, the board independence is compromised when 
the CEO is related to the controlling family shareholders. The independent non-
executive directors play a passive role when the management is led by family CEO. 
 
Moreover, panel (b) reports a statistically significant and positive association (p-value 
< 0.10, t-statistic = 1.6) between the IDT and LNEXREM; the longer the average tenure 
of independent non-executive directors, the higher the executive remuneration. The 
independent non-executive directors may have built friendly relationships with the 
executive directors over a long serving period; thus, their governing role is conceded 




Both panels (a) and (b) report that the RD is positively associated with the LNEXREM 
regardless the CEOs are family directors (p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = 1.53) or non-
family directors (p-value < 0.05, t statistic = 1.62). Essentially, the findings highlight 
that CEO-chairman role duality structure is detrimental to the board autonomy and 
governance. The CEOs would use the highly symbolic position of board chairmen to 
intervene in the remuneration design whether or not they are related to the controlling 
shareholders. When the positions of CEO and board chairman are both held by an 
individual, there is no person with formal autonomy and authority to challenge his/her 
decisions and actions. 
 
The FIS shows a statistically significant and negative influence on the LNEXREM (p-
value 0.10, t-statistic = -1.25) when the CEOs have no family relationships with the 
controlling shareholders, as reported in panel (b). The influence of the controlling 
shareholders on executive remuneration is diluted when the CEOs are not related to 
them; hence, the foreign institutional investors are able to voice on the remuneration 
arrangement and exert a governing function. The significant FIS but insignificant DIS 
suggest that the role of foreign institutional investors prevail that of the domestic 
institutional investors in monitoring executive remuneration. The findings support 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) arguing that in the countries with weak investor protection, the 
main role in improving governance is played by the foreign institutional investors, 
rather than the domestic institutional investors. Of importance, the findings highlight 
the different governing roles of institutional investors due to the nationality 
heterogeneity, in the case of non-family CEOs in Malaysian listed family companies.  
 
Family ownership (FO) shows a positive and statistically significant association (p-
value < 0.01, t-statistic = 2.96) with the LNEXREM when the CEOs are family 
directors, as reported in panel (a); but insignificant association (p-value > 0.10, t-
statistic = -0.27) when the CEOs are non-family directors, as reported in panel (b). 
These findings suggest that the controlling shareholders expropriate minority 
shareholders via executive remuneration only when the CEOs are related to them. The 
control of the controlling shareholders over the remuneration design is diluted when 
the CEOs have no kinship with them. In short, the concentrated ownership alone does 
not empower the family to intervene in executive remuneration. The family has to 
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combine the concentrated ownership and structural position of CEO to influence the 
remuneration arrangement. Of essence, these findings provide theoretical implication 
by asserting that the Type II agency conflict via executive remuneration in family 
companies is ameliorated when the CEOs have no family relationships with the 
controlling shareholders. The interaction effect between family ownership and family 
CEO is further examined and discussed in section 7.6. 
 
Furthermore, panel (a) shows that the executive remuneration is not associated with 
the ROA(-1) (p-value > 0.10, t-statistic = 0.91) when the CEOs are family directors; 
on the other hand, panel (b) shows a positive and statistically signification association 
(p-value < 0.05, t-statistic = 2.11) with the ROA(-1) when the CEOs are non-family 
directors. These findings suggest family opportunism; the entrenched family CEOs 
interfere the remuneration arrangement – executive remuneration is not directly linked 
to the lagged firm performance.  
 
Notwithstanding this, the LNEXREM is associated with the MV at 0.01 significance 
level when CEOs are family directors; on the other hand, at 0.10 significance level 
when CEOs are non-family directors. These findings suggests that family CEOs prefer 
to remunerate the executive directors based on growth opportunities (MV) which 
reflects the long term horizon, rather than short term firm performance (ROA(-1)). In 
contrast, the non-family CEOs prefer to remunerate the executive directors based on 
the short term firm performance because long term objectives may not be their major 
concern.  
 
7.3 Institutional Ownership 
During the data collection, it is noted that some of the Malaysian listed family 
companies do not have institutional ownership. There is a genuine concern that the 
multiple regression results of domestic institutional shareholdings (dis) and foreign 
institutional shareholdings (fis) may be generalised or weakened by those companies 
without institutional ownership. Hence, additional analyses are conducted specifically 
for the sample companies that have institutional ownership. Table 7.4 shows the REM 
results for three subsample sets: (a) observations with dis, (b) observations with fis, 
and (c) observations with both DIS and fis, with the overall R2 of 36.68%, 34.89%, 
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and 34.06% respectively. The models are significant with the wald chi(2) of 411.56 
(p-value < 0.01), 291.84 (p-value < 0.01) and 288.81 (p-value <0.01) respectively. 
 
Table 7.4: REM results for: (a) observations with dis, (b) observations with fis, 
and (c) observations with both DIS and fis 
Panel (a) (b) (c) 
 Observations with 
dis 
Observations with fis Observations 





















































































































































    
Overall R2 0.3679 0.3482 0.3406 
Wald chi2(14) 411.56*** 291.84*** 288.81*** 
No. of 
companies 
270 222 215 
No. of 
observations 
1262 938 874 
Legend: Coefficient is bold. t-statistic is italicised. p-value is in the parenthesis. Associations ***, ** 
and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. One-tailed probabilities are used for 
the tests of the variables since the associated hypotheses are directional. 
  
Table 7.3 reports that the ID is statistically significant and negatively associated with 
the LNEXREM under all of the 3 panels (p-value < 0.01, t-statistic = -2.18 in panel (a); 
p-value < 0.10; t-statistic = -1.58 in panel (b); and p-value <0.05, t-statistic = -1.74 in 
panel (c)). This indicates that the independent non-executive directors play an effective 
role in governing the executive remuneration when there are investments from external 
institutions. Past literature documents that institutional investors prefer to invest in the 
companies with strong and independent boards (Downes, Houminer and Hubbard 
1999; Schnatterly and Johnson 2014). The ineffectiveness of independent non-
executive directors in Malaysian listed family companies may drive away the 
investment preference of institutional investors. Hence, in order to attract and retain 
the institutional investors for additional capital and business expansion, the ID in 
Malaysian listed family companies play an effective governing role. The interaction 
effect between the institutional investors and independent non-executive directors is 
further examined and discussed in section 7.6. 
 
Besides, panel (c) reports a statistically significant and negative association (p-value 
< 0.10, t-statistic = -1.26) between the IDT and LNEXREM when there is the presence 
of both domestic and foreign institutional investors. This finding suggests that the 
independent non-executive directors with a longer tenure play a role in governing 
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executive remuneration when the firm ownership is held by varied investors. Both 
domestic and foreign institutional investors collectively exert pressure on the long-
tenured independent non-executive directors who are expected to have more firm-
specific knowledge to play an active governing role. The insignificance of IDT 
reported in panels (a) and (b) suggests that the shareholdings of domestic institutional 
investors or foreign institutional investors alone do not confer influential power for 
them to pressure the long-tenured independent directors. They have to collaborate and 
exert pressure collectively.  
 
The multiple regression models (both cross-sectional regression model and panel 
regression model) in Chapter Six for all the sample family companies, which include 
the companies with and without institutional ownership, report that the DIS do not 
have any significant bearing effect on the executive remuneration. By specifically 
focusing on the companies with the presence of dis, the additional analyses unveil that 
the DIS exert a negative influence on the LNEXREM at 0.05 significance level, as 
reported in panels (a) and (c). This implies that the domestic institutional investors 
play an effective role in monitoring executive remuneration of investee companies. 
The findings suggest the domestic institutional investors are the potential mechanism 
that the minority shareholders could rely on in mitigating the prevalent Type II agency 
conflict in Malaysian listed family companies.   
 
On the other hand, FIS do not show any significant association with the LNEXREM 
under all of the 3 panels (p-value > 0.10, t-statistic = -0.55 in panel (a); p-value > 0.10, 
t-statistic = -0.87 in panel (b); and p-value > 0.10, t-statistic = 1.13 in panel (c)). The 
findings of significant DIS and insignificant FIS suggest the different governance roles 
played by the institutional investors due to nationality heterogeneity and different 
stakes of shareholdings in the investee companies. The descriptive statistics in Chapter 
Five Table 5.20 reports that the foreign institutional shareholdings of Malaysian listed 
family companies are relatively low. The foreign institutional investors may find the 
costs of monitoring exceed the benefits of monitoring the management; they can opt 
to sell the shares and exit rather than intervene the management. In essence, the 
findings suggest that the monitoring role of domestic institutional investors prevail that 
of foreign institutional investors in Malaysian listed family companies. These findings 
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provide literature and empirical contributions that the governing roles of institutional 
investors in Malaysian listed family companies vary, depending on whether they are 
domestic or foreign. 
 
Notwithstanding the insignificant influence of FIS on LNEXREM, the presence of 
foreign institutional investors impedes the family shareholders from using their 
concentrated ownership rights to interfere the remuneration arrangement. The family 
ownership (FO) is found to have an insignificant influence on the LNEXREM when 
there is the presence of foreign institutional investors, as reported in panels (b) and (c). 
In other words, the presence of foreign institutional investors dilutes the control of the 
family shareholders over executive remuneration in Malaysian listed family 
companies.  
 
Earlier, Black (1992) suggests that the institutions should team up with other 
institutional investors to have more influence on the investee companies. This study 
further investigates the influence of total institutional shareholdings (IS), which 
include both domestic and foreign. Table 7.5 reports the REM results using total 
institutional shareholdings with an overall R2 of 37.23%. 
 
Based on Table 7.5, the total institutional shareholdings (IS) do not have any 
significant influence (p-value > 0.10, t-statistic = -1.17) on executive remuneration. 
This finding attests the governance ineffectiveness of the institutional investors in 
Malaysian listed family companies. This could be attributed to the conflict of interests 
arose during the collaborative engagement between the institutional investors. The 
diverging interests of the institutional investors and their differences in time horizons 





                                                 
49 Transient institutional investors have short investment horizons and high portfolio turnover, and they 
actively trade the stock (Zheng 2010; Bushee 1998, 2001). 
50 Dedicated institutional investors have longer investment horizons, concentrated holdings and low 
portfolio turnover (Zheng 2010; Bushee 1998, 2001). 
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Table 7.5: REM results using total institutional shareholdings 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
FD  0.1790 0.82 0.21 
FCEO 0.0768 1.04 0.15 
ID -0.2792 -1.28 0.10* 
IDT -0.0009 -0.18 0.43 
RD 0.0779 1.52 0.06* 
IDRC 0.0252 0.24 0.40 
IS -0.2749 -1.17 0.12 
YEAR 0.1182 6.12 0.00*** 
FO 0.4841 2.04 0.02** 
BS 0.0749 5.34 0.00*** 
LNTA 0.4166 13.63 0.00*** 
LEV -0.2130 -1.74 0.04** 
ROA(-1) 0.0031 1.51 0.07* 
MV 0.0656 3.04 0.00*** 
_cons 8.2449 19.74 0.00*** 
    
Overall R2 0.3723   
Wald chi2(14) 413.43***   
No. of companies 279   
No. of observation 1395   
Legend: Associations ***, ** and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. One-
tailed probabilities are used for the tests of the variables since the associated hypotheses are directional. 
 
7.4 Different Levels of Family Ownership 
Lim and Yen (2011) note that for the executive ownership level of less than 23%, a 
unit increase in ownership will lead to approximately 1.1% decrease in salary; for the 
ownership levels between 23% and 76%, a unit increase in ownership will bring 
approximately 0.8% increase in salary. In light of their study, this study suspects that 
the influence of family participation on board, corporate governance mechanisms, and 
institutional ownership on executive remuneration may vary at different levels of 
family ownership. Thus, the additional analyses are conducted for the subsample 
companies according to the levels of family ownership: 20% to 29%, 30% to 39%, 40% 
to 49%, 50% to 59%, 60% to 69%, 70% to 79%, and 80% and above. Table 7.5 shows 
the panel regression results using REM for different levels of family ownership.  
 
Based on Table 7.6, the controlling shareholders of Malaysian listed family companies 
use the structural position of CEO (FCEO) and/or the concentrated ownership (FO) to 
intervene in the executive remuneration at different levels of family ownership levels. 
226 
 
Table 7.6: REM results for different levels of family ownership 
Panel (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 




































































































































































































































































































        
Overall R2 0.2972 0.3596 0.3542 0.5193 0.1536 0.6237  
Wald chi2(15) 67.95*** 90.95*** 109.59*** 179.45*** 90.56*** 66.00***  
No. of 
companies 





128 321 339 337 182 85  
Legend: Coefficient is bold. t-statistic is italicised. p-value is in the parenthesis. Associations ***, ** and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. One-
tailed probabilities are used for the tests of the variables since the associated hypotheses are directional. 
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Despite the weak influence of family ownership (FO) on executive remuneration at 20% 
to 29% ownership level (p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = 1.55), the family CEO (FCEO) exerts 
a significant influence (p-value < 0.01, t-statistic = 3.05). At the family ownership level 
of between 30% and 39%, the FO shows an insignificant association (p-value > 0.10, t-
statistic = 0.04), but the FCEO shows a significant association (p-value  < 0.10, t-statistic 
= 1.55). Both FCEO and FO show a positive and statistically significant influence (p-
value < 0.10, t-statistic = 1.41; and p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = 1.31 respectively) on the 
executive remuneration at the family ownership level of between 40% and 49%. Even 
though the FCEO does not have a significant influence on the LNEXREM at the ownership 
levels of 50% to 59% and 60% to 69% (p-value > 0.10, t-statistic = 0.28; and p-value > 
0.10, t-statistic = 0.09 respectively), the family shareholders use their concentrated 
ownership (FO) to influence the executive remuneration (p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = 1.26; 
and p-value < 0.05, t-statistic = 1.98 respectively). At the ownership level of 70% to 79%, 
instead of using the concentrated ownership, family shareholders use the position of CEO 
(FCEO) (p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = 1.29) and CEO-chairman role duality structure (RD) 
(p-value < 0.01, t-statistic = 2.2) to intervene in the executive remuneration. In essence, 
these findings shows that at different levels of family ownership, the controlling 
shareholders of Malaysian listed family companies use either the structural position of 
CEO or concentrated ownership, or both, to influence the executive remuneration. Thus, 
the Type II agency conflict is evident via the significant influence of the controlling 
shareholders on executive remuneration through the ownership or/and management 
particularly, CEO position. 
 
Panel (c) reports that at the family ownership of 40% to 49%, the independent non-
executive directors (ID) is positively associated with the LNEXREM (p-value < 0.10, t-
statistic = 1.41).  Besides, the RD is also found to have a significant positive influence on 
the LNEXREM (p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = 1.44). The findings suggest that CEO-
chairman role duality structure erodes the board autonomy. In this instance, the ID has the 
tendency to show allegiance by inflating the executive remuneration. Displeasing the CEO 
cum chairman would risks the opportunities to be re-elected to the boards. The ID does 
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not have significant influence on the executive remuneration at other levels of family 
ownership.   
 
The family directors on board (FD) do not show any significant association with the 
LNEXREM at any levels of family ownership. The insignificant influence of the FD but 
significant influence of the FCEO indicate that family shareholders are prone to use the 
CEO position to exert an influence on remuneration arrangements. In general, the 
independent non-executive directors (ID) play a passive role in governing the executive 
remuneration. The average tenure of independent non-executive directors (IDT) is not 
associated with the LNEXREM at any levels of family ownership. In addition, the 
remuneration committees do not play a significant governing role at any levels of family 
ownership, attesting their formation is merely a puppet committee. Likewise, the 
institutional investors, both domestic (DIS) and foreign (FIS), also play an insignificant 
role in monitoring executive remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies. In a 
nutshell, at different levels of family ownership, the controlling family shareholders use 
either their concentrated ownership rights or CEO positions, or both to interfere the 
remuneration arrangement.  
 
7.5 Tenure of Independent Non-Executive Directors 
The revised MCCG 2012 introduces a new best practice, which is, the tenure of an 
independent director should not exceed a cumulative term of nine years. The mean value 
of the average tenure of independent non-executive directors (IDT) over the five-year 
study period in Malaysian listed family companies is 8.87 years, as reported by Table 5.15. 
During the data collection, it is observed that many Malaysian listed family companies 
retain independent non-executive directors whose tenure has exceeded nine-year tenure. 
In order to provide more insights, the sample companies are segregated into two 
subsamples: (a) companies with IDT less than or equals to nine years, and (b) IDT exceeds 
nine years. Table 7.7 shows the REM panel regression results for the two subsample sets 
with the R2 of 36.77% and 38.50% respectively. 
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Table 7.7 shows that the IDT has no significant influence on the LNEXREM regardless it 
is less than or more than nine years. The DIS and FIS show a statistically significant and 
negative association (p-value < 0.01, t-statistic = -2.2; and p-value < 0.05, t-statistic = -
1.67 respectively) with the LNEXREM when the IDT is more than nine years, as reported 
in panel (b). The findings indicate that the institutional investors, both domestic and 
foreign, monitor the executive remuneration circumspectly when the average tenure of 
independent non-executive directors exceeds nine years. They are probably concerned 
about the independence function of the long-tenured independent non-executive directors.  
 
Table 7.7: REM results for: (a) companies with IDT ≦ nine years, and (b) 
companies with IDT > nine years 
Panel (a) (b) 
 Companies with IDT ≦ 
nine years 




































































































   
Overall R2 0.3677 0.3850 
Wald chi2(14) 210.08*** 227.75*** 
No. of companies 220 174 
No. of observations 801 594 
Legend: Coefficient is bold. t-statistic is italicised. p-value is in the parenthesis. Associations ***, ** and * 
denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. One-tailed probabilities are used for the tests of 
the variables since the associated hypotheses are directional. 
 
In this instance, instead of relying on the independent non-executive directors who 
deemed to lose independence function over a long serving period, the institutional 
investors become increasingly willing to use their ownership rights to intervene in the 
remuneration arrangement. In such disciplinary circumstance, the influence of family 
shareholders on the executive remuneration is diluted, as reported by the insignificant 
association between the FO and LNEXREM in panel (b). In addition, the intervention of 
domestic and foreign institutional investors makes the executive remuneration links to the 
lagged firm performance (ROA(-1)), as reported in panel (b).  
 
In short, when the average tenure of the independent non-executive directors exceeds the 
nine-year cap stipulated by the revised MCCG 2012, the institutional investors are likely 
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to be concerned about the effectiveness of the board in governing the executive 
remuneration. Both domestic and foreign institutional investors play an active monitoring 
role, which subsequently dilute the control of family shareholders on the determination of 
executive remuneration.  
 
In addition, this study uses an alternative measurement to measure the tenure of 
independent non-executive directors and re-run the panel regression model. The 
measurement of the average tenure of the independent non-executive directors may fail to 
reflect the board dynamics. The alternative measurement is proxied by the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors whose tenure exceed nine years over the total number 
of independent non-executive directors on board, IDT# (Liu and Sun 2010). Table 7.8 
shows the REM results using IDT# with the overall R2 of 37.17%. 
 
Table 7.8: REM results using IDT# 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
FD  0.1483 0.68 0.25 
FCEO 0.0757 1.03 0.15 
ID -0.2673 -1.23 0.11 
IDT# 0.0506 1.16 0.12 
RD 0.0762 1.48 0.07* 
IDRC 0.0268 0.26 0.40 
DIS -0.2890 -1.12 0.13 
FIS -0.2044 -0.52 0.30 
YEAR 0.1139 5.92 0.00*** 
FO 0.4889 2.05 0.02** 
BS 0.0750 5.36 0.00*** 
LNTA 0.4133 13.44 0.00*** 
LEV -0.2009 -1.65 0 .05** 
ROA(-1) 0.0030 1.45 0.07* 
MV 0.0660 3.06 0.00*** 
_cons 8.2573 19.54 0.00*** 
    
Overall R2 0.3717   
Wald chi2(15) 413.96***   
No. of companies 279   
No. of observation 1395   
Legend: Associations ***, ** and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. One-tailed 
probabilities are used for the tests of the variables since the associated hypotheses are directional. 
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Table 7.8 reports that the IDT# has no significant association (p-value > 0.10, t-statistic = 
1.16) with the executive remuneration. This finding further validates that the tenure of the 
independent non-executive directors does not have any influence on the executive 
remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies. The Malaysian listed family 
companies may retain the independent non-executive directors and allow them to 
accumulate tenure due to their knowledge and expertise in other areas, but not in 
governing executive remuneration.  
 
7.6 Interaction Effects between the Variables 
Schnatterly and Johnson (2014) and Miletkov, Poulsen, and Babajide Wintoki (2014) note 
that the institutional investors prefer to invest in the companies with a greater board 
independence. On this premise, it is expected that the institutional investors would interact 
with the independent non-executive directors on board to enhance the governance of 
executive remuneration. Hence, the interaction effects between the independent non-
executive directors and institutional investors – domestic and foreign are examined. 
Besides, the interaction effects between the family shareholders and family directors and 
family CEOs are also evaluated. Essentially, the panel regression model involving the 
interaction effects between the variables intends to shed light whether the institutional 
investors (domestic or foreign) interact with the independent non-executive directors to 
protect the interests of minority shareholders (mitigate the Type II agency problem); or on 
the other hand, the family shareholders interact with the family CEOs or directors on board 
to extract excessive remuneration (exacerbate the Type II agency problem). Table 7.9 
shows the REM results involving the interaction effects between the variables. The overall 
R2 is 37.50%. 
 
Based on Table 7.9, the interaction effects between the independent non-executive 
directors on board and institutional shareholdings, both domestic (ID*DIS) and foreign 
(ID*FIS), do not have any significant influence (p-value > 0.10, t-statistic = 1.19; and p-
value > 0.10, t-statistic = -0.34 respectively) on the executive remuneration. The findings 
corroborate the main findings in section 6.4, and attest the ineffectiveness of the 
independent non-executive directors and institutional investors as the corporate 
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governance mechanisms in Malaysian listed family companies. Succinctly, the 
independent non-executive directors on board and institutional investors, both domestic 
and foreign, could not well represent the interests of the minority shareholders and 
mitigate the Type II agency conflict in Malaysian listed family companies via executive 
remuneration. 
 
Table 7.9: REM results with the interaction effects between variables 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
IDT -0.0009 -0.18 0.43 
RD 0.0819 1.59 0.07 
IDRC 0.0187 0.18 0.43 
ID*DIS 1.9659 1.19 0.12 
ID*FIS -0.9240 -0.34 0.37 
FD*FO 0.3001 0.23 0.41 
FCEO*FO 0.7583 1.56 0.06* 
YEAR 0.1191 6.12 0.00*** 
BS 0.0729 5.16 0.00*** 
LNTA 0.4133 13.35 0.00*** 
LEV -0.2045 -1.67 0.05** 
ROA(-1) 0.0029 1.42 0.08* 
MV 0.0648 3.0 0.00*** 
_cons 8.7327 16.99 0.00*** 
    
    
Overall R2 0.3750   
Wald chi2(15) 417.87***   
No. of companies 279   
No. of observation 1395   
Legend: Associations ***, ** and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. One-tailed 
probabilities are used for the tests of the variables since the associated hypotheses are directional. ID*DIS 
is the interaction effect between the independent non-executive directors and domestic institutional 
shareholdings; ID*FIS is the interaction effect between the independent non-executive directors and foreign 
institutional shareholdings; FD*FO is the interaction effect between the family directors and family 
ownership; FCEO*FO is the interaction effect between the family CEO and family ownership. 
 
The interaction effect between the family CEOs and family ownership (FCEO*FO) shows 
a positive and statistically significant association (p-value < 0.10, t-statistic = 1.56) with 
the executive remuneration. This finding supports the findings in section 7.2, where the 
family ownership has a significant influence on the executive remuneration only when the 
CEOs are family directors. These findings suggest that the controlling family shareholders 
in Malaysian listed family companies combine their concentrated ownership and 
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managerial power of CEOs to intervene in executive remuneration. Thus, Type II agency 
conflict is evident in Malaysian listed family companies.  
 
7.7 Summary  
The additional analyses conducted in this chapter provide a deeper insight into the 
influence of family participation on board, corporate governance mechanisms, and 
institutional ownership on the executive remuneration in Malaysian listed family 
companies. The first additional analysis shows that different independent variables have 
different influence on the executive remuneration across different industry sectors. The 
factors influencing executive remuneration vary due to the industry heterogeneity.  
 
The second additional analysis reveals that family shareholders exert a significant 
influence on the executive remuneration only when the CEOs are their family members. 
The influence of family ownership on executive remuneration is insignificant when the 
CEOs are non-family directors. These findings provide a theoretical implication by 
asserting that the Type II agency conflict via executive remuneration in family companies 
is ameliorated when the CEOs have no kinship with the controlling shareholders. 
 
The third additional analysis unveils the different governance roles played by the domestic 
and foreign institutional investors in Malaysian listed family companies. Specifically, the 
role of the former in governing executive remuneration prevails the latter. 
Notwithstanding the insignificant influence of foreign institutional investors on executive 
remuneration, their presence reduces the tendency of family shareholders to use their 
concentrated ownership to intervene in executive remuneration. In other words, the 
foreign institutional investors dilute the control of family shareholders on remuneration 
arrangements. 
 
The forth additional analysis shows that at different levels of family ownership, the 
controlling family uses either the concentrated ownership or CEO position, or both, to 
influence the remuneration arrangement. Succinctly, the Type II agency conflict is evident 
in Malaysian listed family companies; family shareholders exert a significant influence on 
  237 
executive remuneration via managerial entrenchment (through CEO position) and/or 
concentrated ownership. 
 
The fifth additional analysis reports that the average tenure of independent non-executive 
directors has an insignificant influence on executive remuneration, regardless it is less 
than or more than the nine-year cap stipulated by the revised MCCG 2012. 
Notwithstanding this, when it is more than nine years, both domestic and foreign 
institutional investors become circumspect and play an active role in monitoring executive 
remuneration. Instead of relying on the independent non-executive directors who deem to 
lose independence over a long tenure, institutional investors use their ownership rights to 
voice out and intervene in the remuneration arrangements. 
 
The last additional analysis, which involves the interaction effects between the variables, 
attests the ineffectiveness of the independent non-executive directors and institutional 
investors in governing executive remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies. In 
addition, the findings provide an empirical evidence that the controlling shareholders 
combine their concentrated ownership and managerial power of CEOs to influence the 
executive remuneration.  
 
In general, the control variables, which are the family ownership (FO), board size (BS), 
firm size (LNTA), lagged firm performance (ROA(-1)), and growth opportunities (MV) are 
statistically significant and positively associated with executive remuneration; while firm 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the study and provides concluding insights into the executive 
remuneration of listed family companies in Malaysia from 2011 to 2014; it encompasses 
a five-year period spanning a phase of enhanced corporate governance landscape. Section 
8.1 recaps the objectives and research questions of this thesis; section 8.2 recapitulates the 
significant findings of the study; section 8.3 discusses the implications drawn from the 
findings; section 8.4 outlines the assumptions, identifies the limitations of this study and 
presents future research ideas; section 8.5 discusses the contributions of this thesis; and, 
section 8.6 provides the concluding remarks of the study. 
 
8.1 Objectives and Research Questions 
The increasing level of executive remuneration over time has captured the public attention 
and germinated voluminous empirical studies. The agency theory and past literature 
suggest that the board of directors and institutional investors are corporate governance 
mechanisms that could rein in executive remuneration and mitigate the Type I agency 
conflict between the shareholders and management in widely held companies. This thesis 
investigates whether these mechanisms could govern the executive remuneration and 
ameliorate the Type II agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders in the companies with concentrated ownership structure, specifically family 
companies.  
 
Accordingly, the main objectives of this thesis are as follows: (i) to evaluate the extent of 
executive remuneration of listed family companies in Malaysia from 2010 to 2014; (ii) to 
examine the factors influencing the executive remuneration of listed family companies in 
Malaysia; and (iii) to investigate the impact of the revised Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance 2012 on executive remuneration of listed family companies in Malaysia.  This 
longitudinal time period is marked by the second revision to Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance in 2012, which takes into account the changing market dynamics, 
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international developments, and the need to continuously recalibrate and enhance the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance framework. 
 
The study identifies several factors that are associated with the executive remuneration 
over the five-year period, which is considered representative of the enhanced corporate 
governance and accountability. Specifically, this study addresses the following three 
research questions: 
 
1. What is the extent of executive remuneration of listed family companies in Malaysia 
from 2010 to 2014? 
2. What are the factors influencing the executive remuneration of listed family 
companies in Malaysia? 
3. What is the impact of the revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012 
on executive remuneration of listed family companies in Malaysia? 
 
The analysis is considered important as it deepens the understanding of the extent of 
executive remuneration and its determinants in Malaysian listed family companies during 
the period of enhanced corporate governance framework. 
 
8.2 Research Findings 
This section summarises the research findings that answer the research questions of this 
study. Sections 8.2.1 addresses research question 1; whilst section 8.2.2 addresses research 
questions 2 and 3. 
 
8.2.1 Extent of Executive Remuneration of Listed Family Companies in Malaysia  
The findings of this study show that the Malaysian listed family companies pay higher 
remuneration to executive directors, which is, on average, higher than the figures reported 
by other studies in the Malaysian context. This study finds out that the mean value of 
executive remuneration over the five-year period is RM3.41 million. The positions of 
executive directors and CEOs in Malaysian listed family companies are dominated by the 
controlling shareholders and their family members. In some companies, all of the 
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executive directors are family directors. Accordingly, the executive remuneration is 
largely accounted for the family executive directors and CEOs. 
 
The executive remuneration of Malaysian listed family companies shows an increasing 
trend over the five-year period from RM2.63 million in 2010 to RM4.20 million in 2014, 
an increase of 59.70%. The one-way repeated measures ANOVA report that the increase 
over the five-year period is statistically significant. The paired t-tests are performed to test 
the differences between the means of executive remuneration for consecutive years over 
the study period. The increase in mean executive remuneration during the periods of 2010-
2011 and 2011-2012 are statistically significant at 0.01 level with the largest change of 
15.17% occurring between 2010 and 2011. The increase in mean executive remuneration 
from 2012 to 2013 is not statistically significant. This could be attributed to the 
introduction of the revised MCCG 2012, which appears to provide an enhanced 
governance of directors’ remuneration in the first year of its implementation. Nonetheless, 
the increase in mean executive remuneration between 2013 and 2014 is statistically 
significant at 0.10 level, implying that the revised MCCG 2012 is effective in restraining 
executive remuneration in the first year of implementation only. Notwithstanding this, the 
0.10 significance level at the 2013-2014 period is weaker than the 0.01 significance level 
shown in the preceding periods, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. The increasing trend of 
executive remuneration over the study period is contrary to the research proposition of 
this thesis.   
 
Under Malaysian legislations, except for the fees, directors’ remuneration does not require 
the shareholders’ approval even though the amounts involved may be substantial (KPMG 
Malaysia 2012; Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 2015). This study finds out that 
the increase in bonuses is higher than the increase in fees or salaries over the five-year 
period (51.53% versus 34.34%). There is a genuine concern that other components of 
executive remuneration such as bonuses, allowances, and other benefits are designed by 
and for the controlling family shareholders and directors without the approval of other 
shareholders. To an extent, the significant increase of executive remuneration over the 
years may be a sign of expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling family 
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shareholders in Malaysian listed family companies. Alternatively, the increasing 
executive remuneration could be interpreted as a motivating source for the executive 
directors to improve their performance. 
 
8.2.2 Explanatory Variables and Their Associations with Executive Remuneration 
It is hypothesised that family participation on board, corporate governance mechanisms, 
and institutional ownership exert influences on the executive remuneration of listed family 
companies in Malaysia. The main analyses in Chapter Six show that family participation 
on board, which is proxied by family directors and family CEOs, does not have 
statistically significant influence on the executive remuneration. With regard to the 
corporate governance mechanisms, the CEO-chairman role duality is statistically 
significant and positively associated with executive remuneration; the independent non-
executive directors has marginal effect in restraining executive remuneration; the tenure 
of independent non-executive directors and the remuneration committee have no 
significant bearing on executive remuneration. The institutional investors, both domestic 
and foreign, do not play an effective governance role in monitoring executive 
remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies. 
 
8.2.2.1 Family Participation on Board  
Different from the past literature documenting that controlling shareholders generally 
reserve board directorship for their family members (Barnett 1960; Moores and Craig 
2008; Husnin, Nawawi and Salin 2016), this study finds out that Malaysian listed family 
companies recruit more independent non-executive directors than electing the family 
directors to the corporate boards (42.46% versus 40.89%). This may be attributed to the 
introduction and continuous revision of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
which emphasises the board independence.  
 
Thus far, there are limited studies examining the association between family participation 
on board and executive remuneration. Of the few studies, Sapp (2008) reports that the 
proportion of family directors is negatively associated with CEO remuneration in 
Canadian listed companies, suggesting that the family representation of controlling 
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shareholders on corporate board provides a source of monitoring. On the other hand, 
Barontini and Bozzi (2011) reveal that higher board remuneration is associated with a 
higher proportion of family directors on board in Italian listed companies, implying rent 
extraction by family directors at the expense of minority shareholders. The former 
examines the CEO remuneration, instead of all the executive directors; the latter includes 
the remuneration of both executive and non-executive directors in the measurement of 
board remuneration. These past studies are conducted in the context of western developed 
countries.  
 
Different from past studies, this study examines the association between family 
participation on board and executive remuneration (all of the executive directors) in the 
context of a developing country, Malaysia. According to PWC (2016c), executive 
remuneration is one of the key issues the investors are concerned with nowadays. This 
study urges for more empirical studies on the remuneration of all the executive directors, 
instead of just focusing on one of the executive directors – the CEO.  
 
The multiple regression results for each-year observations and the panel regression results 
show that there is no statistically significant association between the family participation 
on board (measured by the proportion of family directors and the presence of family CEO) 
and executive remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies. Hence, H1 and H2 are 
not supported. These findings do not support past studies (Sapp 2008; Barontini and Bozzi 
2011). Essentially, the findings in the context of western developed countries are not 
applicable in Malaysian listed family companies. The findings of this study suggest that 
the family directors and CEOs in Malaysian listed family companies do not use their board 
directorship or managerial positions to influence the executive remuneration.  
 
8.2.2.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
This study examines the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the executive 
remuneration of listed family companies in Malaysia, which include (i) board 
independence; (ii) tenure of independent non-executive directors; (iii) CEO-chairman role 
duality; and (iv) remuneration committee.  
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(i) Board Independence 
The proportion of independent non-executive directors on board of Malaysian listed 
family companies over the five-year period is 42.46%, which is higher than the proportion 
of family directors on board – 40.89%. This composition enables the independent non-
executive directors to counterbalance the control of family directors over the executive 
remuneration – the family directors do not have any statistically significant influence on 
the executive remuneration, as mentioned in the preceding section.  
 
The panel regression results show that the independent non-executive directors are 
negatively associated with the executive remuneration, suggesting they play an effective 
monitoring role. Thus, H3 is supported. This finding is consistent with the past studies 
(Ghosh 2006; Lim and Yen 2011). The p-value of board independence reported in this 
study is 0.10, which is higher than the p-value reported by those past studies. This 
indicates that the independent non-executive directors in Malaysian listed family 
companies are able to govern the executive remuneration, however, the influence is 
relatively weak. This may be due to several reasons. Firstly, Malaysians are characterised 
as high power distance (The Iclif Leadership and Governance Centre 2014). The 
independent non-executive directors may be averse to challenging the remuneration 
packages of executive directors because most of them are family members of the 
controlling shareholders. Secondly, the non-alignment with the controlling shareholders 
and their families may risk the opportunities to be re-elected to the board. Thirdly, the 
independent non-executive directors may have the tendency to show their appreciation 
and loyalty to the controlling shareholders who elect them to the board. 
 
In summary, the negative association reported by panel regression model suggests that, to 
some extent, the independent non-executive directors could restrain the executive 
remuneration. They are potentially one of the governance mechanisms that the minority 
shareholders could rely on to protect their interests against family opportunism and lessen 
the expropriation issue in Malaysian listed family companies. 
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(ii) Tenure of Independent Non-Executive Directors 
The average tenure of independent non-executive directors in the Malaysian listed family 
companies is 8.86 years over the five-year period. The average tenure increases from 8.02 
years in 2010 to 9.53 years in 2014. Besides, 43.51% of the independent non-executive 
directors in the sample companies serve more than nine years in the same capacity. This 
implies the non-compliance with the new governance practice introduced by the revised 
MCCG 2012, which is, the cumulative tenure of the independent non-executive director 
should be capped at nine years. Vafeas (2003) maintains that the length of independent 
directors’ tenure is an observable proxy for what is truly at issue but remains unobserved. 
 
The panel regression results show that there is no statistically significant association 
between the average tenure of independent non-executive directors and executive 
remuneration. Hence, H4 is not supported. Notwithstanding this, the cross-sectional 
multiple regression results report a statistically significant and negative association in 
2013 and 2014. The average tenure of independent non-executive directors is 9.13 years 
and 9.53 years in 2013 and 2014 respectively. The findings indicate that the independent 
non-executive directors play an effective governing role in restraining executive 
remuneration when their tenure exceeds nine years. This may be attributed to the 
acquisition of better firm-specific knowledge and experience over a longer tenure, hence, 
contributing to an enhanced governance. The findings do not support the management 
friendliness hypothesis proposed by Vafeas (2003) that independent non-executive 
directors would develop friendly relationships with the management over a long tenure 
and less likely to monitor them. Further, the findings do not support the new best practice 
introduced by the revised MCCG 2012 that the tenure of the independent non-executive 
director should be capped at nine years. Accordingly, this study sets forth the notion that 
long-tenured independent non-executive directors could effectively govern the executive 
remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies.  
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(iii) CEO-Chairman Role Duality 
This study finds out that more than 75.00% of Malaysian listed family companies comply 
with the recommendation of the MCCG to separate the roles of board chairman and CEO.  
 
The multiple regression results in 2013 and 2014 and the panel regression results report 
that the CEO-chairman role duality is positively associated with executive remuneration. 
Consequently, H5 is supported. These findings are in accordance with the past studies in 
the US context (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999; Cyert, Kang and Kumar 2002; 
Grinstein and Hribar 2004). The statistically significant and positive association is 
reported in 2013 and 2014 even after the implementation of the revised MCCG 2012.  
 
In Chapter Five, section 5.2 reports that approximately 90.00% of the CEOs in the 
Malaysian listed family companies are family directors. The positive association indicates 
that the controlling family uses the high structural power and symbolic positions of board 
chairman cum CEO to intervene in the executive remuneration. The CEO-chairman role 
duality structure erodes the board governance and empowers the CEOs, particularly 
family CEOs, to inflate the executive remuneration as there is no one on the board with 
formal authority to oversee his or her decisions and actions.  
 
(iv) Remuneration Committee 
This study reveals that approximately 95.00% of Malaysian listed family companies have 
established the remuneration committee as recommended by the MCCG. On average, the 
remuneration committee comprises 65.61% independent non-executive directors and 
22.36% family directors over the five-year period.  
 
The multiple regression results for each period and panel regression results report that 
there is no statistically significant association between the remuneration committee 
(measured by the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the remuneration 
committee) and executive remuneration. Thus, H6 is not supported. These findings concur 
with the past studies in the developed countries, particularly the UK and the US (Benito 
and Conyon 1999; Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Gregory-Smith 2012). Nonetheless, the 
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findings are inconsistent with the negative association reported by Lim and Yen (2011) in 
the Malaysian context. 
 
The insignificant association suggests that the remuneration committee is merely a puppet 
committee established by Malaysian listed family companies to comply with the MCCG 
and gain legitimacy. Independent non-executive directors on remuneration committee 
may have been roped in by the management, particularly family directors. Besides, the 
presence of family directors on remuneration committee may be a culprit for the failure 
of remuneration committee to govern the executive remuneration effectively. There is a 
genuine concern that the family directors on remuneration committee counterbalance the 
function of independent non-executive directors on remuneration committee in setting the 
remuneration packages.  
 
8.2.2.3 Institutional Ownership  
The average domestic and foreign institutional shareholdings in the Malaysian listed 
family companies over the five-year period are 10.98% and 4.53% respectively. The 
foreign institutional shareholdings are less than half of the domestic institutional 
shareholdings. Both institutional shareholdings in listed family companies are 
comparatively lower than the findings of other studies in the Malaysian context (Abdul-
Wahab and Abdul-Rahman 2009; Ghazali 2010). These findings suggest that institutional 
investors, particularly the foreign, have less investment preference in Malaysian listed 
family companies. 
 
The cross-sectional and panel regression results show that both domestic and foreign 
institutional shareholdings do not have any significant influence on the executive 
remuneration. As such, H7 and H8 are not supported. These findings do not support the 
past studies (Hartzell and Starks 2003; Ozkan 2007; Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman 
2009). The insignificant influence may be due to several reasons. Firstly, the 
shareholdings of domestic and foreign institutional investors are relatively low in 
Malaysian listed family companies, hence making their voice less powerful. Secondly, 
they are less inclined to intervene in the management because the costs of monitoring may 
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exceed the benefits. Thirdly, the institutional investors may lack knowledge and 
experience on how to effectively engage with the investee companies. The Malaysian 
Code for Institutional Investors which gives guidance to institutional investors is 
introduced in 2014; prior to that, the institutional investors in Malaysian companies 
generally did not have any explicit guides. Fourth, they may encounter conflict of interests 
with other institutions, which impede the effective engagement with the investee 
companies.  
 
During the data collection, it is noted that some Malaysian listed family companies do not 
have the investment from institutional investors at all. Hence, additional analyses are 
conducted specifically for the sample companies that have institutional ownership. 
 
The additional analyses (section 7.3 in Chapter Seven) specifically focus on the companies 
with domestic institutional investors and foreign institutional investors; the findings 
unveil that the former exerts a significant negative influence on executive remuneration, 
while the latter does not have any significant influence. These findings suggest that the 
role of domestic institutional investors prevails that of foreign institutional investors in 
governing the executive remuneration. This may be due to the higher shareholdings of 
domestic institutional investors than their foreign counterparts (10.98% versus 4.53%), 
thus making their voice more powerful than the foreign institutional investors. Despite the 
insignificant association between foreign institutional shareholdings and executive 
remuneration, the additional analyses show that the presence of foreign institutional 
investors reduces the tendency of family shareholders to use their concentrated ownership 
rights to intervene in the executive remuneration. These findings indicate the different 
governance role played by institutional investors due to nationality heterogeneity. 
 
In a nutshell, the main analysis in Chapter Six reports that the domestic and foreign 
institutional shareholdings do not have any significant influence on the executive 
remuneration among the overall Malaysian listed family companies. The additional 
analyses in Chapter Seven, which specifically focus on the companies with institutional 
ownership, show that the domestic institutional investors directly exert a negative 
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influence on the executive remuneration, while the foreign institutional investors dilutes 
the control of family shareholders over the executive remuneration.   
 
8.2.2.4 Revised MCCG 2012 
Panel regression analysis and the majority of the additional analyses report that the 
executive remuneration is positively associated with YEAR, which is the proxy for revised 
MCCG 2012. The findings indicate the revised MCCG 2012 does not enhance the 
governance of remuneration policy and could not restrain the remuneration level of listed 
family companies in Malaysia.  
 
8.2.2.5 Control Variables 
The control variables included in this thesis are family ownership, board size, firm size, 
firm leverage, lagged firm performance and growth opportunities. 
 
The panel regression results report that family ownership is statistically significant and 
positively associated with executive remuneration. This is consistent with the past studies 
(Haid and Yurtoglu 2006; Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong 2005). The finding indicates that 
the controlling family uses the concentrated ownership rights to influence the executive 
remuneration. Type II agency conflict is evident in Malaysian listed family companies. 
The additional analysis unveils that when the CEOs are not related to the controlling 
family shareholders, family ownership is not associated with executive remuneration; 
when the CEOs have family relationships with the controlling shareholders, family 
ownership is positively associated with executive remuneration. These findings imply that 
the influence of family shareholders on executive remuneration via concentrated 
ownership is diluted when the CEOs have no kinship with them. In addition, the executive 
remuneration is statistically significant and positively associated with the board size, firm 
size, lagged firm performance, growth opportunities; and negatively associated with firm 
leverage.  
 
Table 8.1 summarises the panel regression results using REM over the five-year period. 
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FD H1 Positive Insignificant Not Supported 
FCEO H2 Positive Insignificant Not Supported 
ID H3 Negative Negative Supported 
IDT H4 Positive Insignificant Not Supported 
RD H5 Positive Positive Supported 
IDRC H6 Negative Insignificant Not Supported 
DIS H7 Negative Insignificant Not Supported 
FIS H8 Negative Insignificant Not Supported 
YEAR H9 Negative Positive Not Supported 
FO   Positive  
BS   Positive  
LNTA   Positive  
LEV   Negative  
ROA(-1)   Positive  
MV   Positive  
 
Table 8.2 summarises the multiple regression results for each year.  
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FO   Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
BS   Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
LNTA   Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
LEV   Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
ROA(-1)   Insignificant Positive Positive Positive Positive 
MV   Positive Insignificant Positive Positive Positive 
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8.3 Implications 
The findings of this study have several theoretical and practical implications. This study 
employs the agency theory as the theoretical framework. The majority of remuneration 
studies premise on the Type I agency conflict between shareholders and management in 
widely held companies (Hartzell and Starks 2003; Ozkan 2007; Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-
Rahman 2009; Yatim 2013); a limited number of remuneration studies base on the Type 
II agency conflict between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders 
(Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri 2003). As such, a theoretical gap arises on 
whether the corporate governance mechanisms recommended to govern executive 
remuneration and mitigate Type I agency conflict in widely held companies could 
effectively rein in the executive remuneration and ameliorate Type II agency conflict in 
companies with concentrated ownership, particularly family companies. This study fills 
the theoretical gap by premising on Type II agency conflict to examine the executive 
remuneration of Malaysian listed family companies.   
 
By integrating the family business and corporate governance literature, this study makes 
a theoretical implication that the Type II agency conflict is ameliorated when the CEOs 
have no kinship with the controlling shareholders. This is evident in the additional analysis 
(section 7.2) in Chapter Seven. The family ownership exerts a significant positive 
influence on the executive remuneration when the CEOs are family directors; and 
insignificant influence when the CEOs are non-family directors. Of significance, this 
study is the first to document that the control of controlling family shareholders over 
executive remuneration is diluted when the CEOs have no family relationships with them. 
This study extends the agency theory, that is, family CEO exacerbates the Type II agency 
conflict while non-family CEO mitigates it. 
 
The main analyses in Chapter Six report that the family directors, family CEOs, 
remuneration committee and the tenure of independent non-executive directors do not 
have any significant influence on the executive remuneration. While the CEO-chairman 
role duality structure aggravates the Type II agency conflict via executive remuneration, 
the independent non-executive directors could marginally restrain the executive 
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remuneration in Malaysian family listed companies. The institutional investors, both 
domestic and foreign, do not have any significant influence on the executive remuneration. 
These findings indicate that the corporate governance mechanisms suggested by the 
agency theory advocators to mitigate the Type I agency conflict between shareholders and 
management in widely held companies could not effectively alleviate the Type II agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in Malaysian listed 
family companies. The institutional setting as well as the unique characteristics of 
Malaysian listed family companies may allow the controlling family shareholders to 
extract benefits via executive remuneration at the expense of minority shareholders. Of 
essence, this research updates the extant literature as well as provides a better 
understanding of the agency relationships and agency problems between the controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders in the owner-manager led family companies. 
 
Practically, the findings of this thesis have several implications for the individual family 
companies, policy makers, regulators, and investors. The findings shed light on the 
corporate governance issues in Malaysian listed family companies. In general, the 
monitoring function of the independent non-executive directors in Malaysian listed family 
companies is weak. Miletkov, Poulsen, and Babajide Wintoki (2014) document that 
foreign investors prefer to invest in the companies with strong board independence, 
especially in the countries with a lower level of investor protection. At the firm level, 
access to foreign capital is valuable for individual family companies that intend to expand 
the business. Individual family companies in Malaysia could at least partially mitigate the 
concern of foreign investors about the lack of external legal protection of shareholder 
rights and deliver a signal not to engage in minority shareholder expropriation by 
increasing the independence degree of the board of directors and remuneration committee, 
thereby attracting external capital from foreign investors. The involvement of the 
controlling shareholders and their family members in the remuneration committee would 
raise the concern of foreign investors that the former design own remuneration packages 
with one hand and approves with another hand. The firm-level choice to better corporate 
governance is pivotal to attract the foreign investors. At the country level, the Securities 
Commission Malaysia and Malaysia Institute of Corporate Governance should 
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recommend ways to improve the independence and governance role of independent non-
executive directors especially in family companies in order to strengthen the investor 
confidence. 
 
Furthermore, this study documents that despite the positions of CEO and chairman are 
held by different individuals in some family companies, they are related to each other, e.g. 
spouse, siblings, relatives, parent, and children. This raises the concern whether the board 
chairman, who is related to CEO, could effectively monitor and oversee the decisions and 
actions of the CEO due to kinship and altruism. Instead of recommending that the 
positions of board chairman and CEO to be held by different individuals, the Securities 
Commission Malaysia could recommend that they should not have the tie of kinship in 
order to strengthen the board autonomy.  
 
This study reports that a majority of family companies disclose the aggregate 
remuneration of all the executive directors. Besides, there are only a few of the family 
companies that disclose the share option scheme. The Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements should encourage the public listed companies to disclose the remuneration 
details of each director, including the share option scheme in order to enhance the 
corporate transparency and accountability.  
 
Moreover, in view of the ineffectiveness of independent non-executive directors and 
institutional investors in governing the executive remuneration and the significant positive 
influence of the family ownership on the executive remuneration, the Minority 
Shareholder Watchdog Group should regularly target and monitor the family companies 
in order to protect minority shareholders’ rights. During the companies’ annual meetings, 
they should question aggressively the remuneration process and arrangement in order to 
alleviate the potential of fund misappropriation by controlling family shareholders.  
 
Besides, the findings of this study would be of interest to the general and institutional 
investors to evaluate the investor protection in Malaysian listed family companies. 
Furthermore, the governing ineffectiveness of both domestic and foreign institutional 
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investors reported by this study may signal that they lack experience and knowledge of 
how to effectively govern the investee companies. The Securities Committees Malaysia 
and Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group could organise conferences or provide a 
platform for institutional investors to gain and exchange the fundamental knowledge of 
how to effectively engage with investee companies and enhance the firm-level corporate 
governance. 
 
8.4 Assumptions, Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies 
This thesis makes several assumptions and identifies some limitations of this study. 
Section 8.4.1 discusses the assumptions while section 8.4.2 discusses the limitations and 
makes some suggestions for future studies.   
 
8.4.1 Assumptions 
This thesis makes four major assumptions. First, the sample family companies chosen by 
this study is assumed to largely represent all of the listed family companies in Malaysia. 
One of the sample selection criteria is that the family must hold at least 20.00% of a firm’s 
equity directly or indirectly. This is adopted from the past studies in the context of 
Malaysia (Liew, Alfan and Devi 2014; Azizan and Ameer 2012; Amran and Che-Ahmad 
2009) and other countries (Faccio and Lang 2002; Barontini and Bozzi 2011) that use 
20.00% of equity as the cut-off poin t to define a family company. Besides, the 20.00% 
equity threshold is used by the Credit Suisse, a global leading financial institution, to 
establish the CS Global Family 900 Universe database (Credit Suisse 2015). Hence, 20.00% 
of the firm’s equity is assumed to be sufficient to ensure the conclusive influence of a 
family over the business. Some of the listed family companies are excluded from the 
sample due to unavailability of annual reports and certain information of variables.  
 
Second, the thesis uses a matched sample technique over the five-year period from 2010 
to 2014. The same family companies in each period allow the assessment of the changes 
in executive remuneration, family participation on board, corporate governance 
mechanisms and institutional ownership pre- and post- the revision made on the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance in 2012. These study periods are assumed to be 
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appropriate to examine whether the changes of those firm-specific factors significantly 
influence the executive remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies, particularly 
in an enhanced corporate governance landscape.  
 
Third, this thesis utilises the annual reports of individual sample companies published in 
the Bursa Malaysia stock exchange to obtain the information of dependent variable – 
executive remuneration; independent variables – family participation on board, corporate 
governance mechanisms and institutional ownership; and control variables – family 
ownership and board size. DataStream database is used to obtain the financial data of 
control variables such as total assets, return on assets, firm leverage, and market value to 
book value of equity. The annual report is utilised as it is regarded as the main source of 
information which investors and stakeholders use to assess the company’s standing, 
performance, transparency and accountability (Bursa Malaysia, Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants and Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants 2016). Besides, 
DataStream is a powerful and reliable financial time series database introduced by 
Thomsen Reuters. 
 
Fourth, the measurement of executive remuneration is based on the information available 
in the annual reports. In this study, the executive remuneration comprises fees or salaries, 
bonuses, allowances, and other benefits. The measurement is assumed to capture the 
aggregate remuneration received by the executive directors, which the companies want to 
disclose to the external parties.  
 
8.4.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies 
Several limitations are identified in this thesis. First, the main limitation of this study is 
the exclusion of share option from the measurement of executive remuneration. This is 
due to the data unavailability; Malaysian public listed companies are not mandated by the 
Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements to disclose the share options granted to directors. 
This study has conducted sensitivity test by increasing the executive remuneration, 
assuming the inclusion of share options will increase the executive remuneration by 10%, 
20%, 30%, 40%, or 50%. The results of sensitivity test are identical to the main results, 
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affirming that the exclusion of share option from the measurement will not severely affect 
the regression results. 
  
Second, the disclosure of aggregate remuneration instead of individual remuneration in 
the annual reports limits a more refined measurement of executive remuneration.  
 
Third, this study focuses on Malaysian listed family companies over the five-year period 
from 2010 to 2014; the results potentially do not apply to other forms of organisation in 
other legal frameworks and economic environments, and may not be generalisable to other 
periods. Future studies could examine and compare the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms on executive remuneration between family and non-family companies. 
 
Fourth, the measurement of institutional investors disregards the types of institutions, for 
instance, mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds. The objectives and 
monitoring role of different institutional investors may be different. Future studies could 
segregate the institutional investors according to their nature and type and examine 
whether these different types of institutions have different influence on the executive 
remuneration. Besides, Aggarwal et al. (2011) note that in the countries with weak 
shareholder protection, foreign institutional investors from the countries with stronger 
shareholder protection play a prevailing role in enhancing the corporate governance. 
Future studies could further segregate the foreign institutional investors into institutions: 
(i) from the countries with strong shareholder protection, and (ii) from the countries with 
weak shareholder protection.  
 
Fifth, the empirical model does not include all conceivable variables. For instance, the 
composition of remuneration committee in Malaysian listed family companies comprises 
the independent non-executive directors and family directors. This study only examines 
the association between the independent non-executive directors on remuneration 
committee and executive remuneration as to investigate the governance role of the 
independent non-executive directors on remuneration committee. The insignificant 
influence of independent non-executive directors on remuneration committee may be due 
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to the involvement of family directors, which counterbalance their independent function. 
Future studies could examine the characteristics of remuneration committee in family 
companies to understand what factors causing an effective or ineffective remuneration 
committee, such as the proportion of family directors, the involvement of family CEO, 
and the involvement of family chairman.  
 
Sixth, in Malaysia, the spheres of politics and races are inextricably intertwined (Carney 
and Child 2013). However, this study does not include the political tie variable due to the 
unavailability of such information disclosed in annual reports and the difficulty in 
identifying politically-connected companies. Future studies could consider to include the 
political tie as a factor in examining executive remuneration in the Malaysian context.  
 
8.5 Contributions of Thesis 
Notwithstanding the limitations, the contributions of this thesis are manifold. First, the 
main contribution of this study is providing longitudinal evidence by using five-year panel 
data from 2010 to 2014. The majority of related studies use a single-year to examine the 
executive remuneration (Yatim 2013; Abdullah 2006).  
 
Second, different from other remuneration studies that based on the previous version of 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance – 2002 and 2007 versions (Yatim 2013; 
Abdullah 2006; Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman 2009), this study premises on its 
revised version in 2012, which enables the examination of the influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the executive remuneration in an enhanced corporate 
governance regime. 
 
Third, this study contributes to the institutional ownership literature by segregating its 
measurement into domestic and foreign. The additional analyses in Chapter Seven report 
that the governance role of domestic and foreign institutional investors on executive 
remuneration differs. Precisely, domestic institutional investors exert a significant 
negative influence on the executive remuneration; indicating their effective governance 
role. On the other hand, foreign institutional shareholdings do not have any statistically 
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significant influence on the executive remuneration. Notwithstanding the insignificant 
association, the presence of foreign institutional investors dilutes the control of family 
shareholders over the remuneration arrangement – the statistically significant and positive 
association between family ownership and executive remuneration becomes statistically 
insignificant when there is the equity participation of foreign institutional investors. 
Essentially, this study reveals the different governance roles played by domestic and 
foreign institutional investors. Hence, this study calls for future studies to segregate the 
measurement of institutional ownership into domestic and foreign in order to yield more 
insight into how they differ in governing the investee companies.  
 
Fourth, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first empirical study that 
examines the joint influence of different corporate governance mechanisms - board of 
directors and ownership structure, on the executive remuneration in Malaysian listed 
family companies. The majority of the remuneration studies typically assume that the 
corporate governance mechanisms operate independently (Conyon and Peck 1998; Dong 
and Ozkan 2008; Croci, Gonenc and Ozkan 2012; Yatim 2013). Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) suggest that the focus on a single corporate governance mechanism does not detect 
the interdependence of different mechanisms. This thesis finds a broader linkage of 
various governance mechanisms and their joint influence on the executive remuneration. 
For instance, the additional analyses in Chapter Seven report that when the average tenure 
of independent non-executive directors exceeds the nine years recommended by the 
revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012, both domestic and foreign 
institutional investors become circumspect and monitor the executive remuneration. 
These findings indicate that the institutional investors doubt the governance function of 
the long-tenured independent non-executive directors; hence, they prefer to intervene in 
and monitor the investee companies themselves. 
 
Fifth, through the analysis of listed family companies, this study provides empirical 
evidence on the influence of family participation on board, corporate governance 
mechanisms, and institutional ownership on the executive remuneration with respect to a 
market that, at the same time, is highly representative of East Asian companies’ 
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characteristic of concentrated family ownership and significantly different from the 
markets of the United States and the United Kingdom. 
 
8.6 Concluding Remarks 
The longitudinal examination of executive remuneration has enhanced the understanding 
and knowledge of the Malaysian listed family companies’ executive remuneration patterns. 
The findings show that the executive remuneration of Malaysian listed family companies 
increases significantly over the five-year period from 2010 to 2014. The revision of 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance in 2012 does not seem to be able to moderate 
the executive remuneration payout. The corporate governance mechanisms such as the 
remuneration committee and institutional investors are not effective monitors in executive 
remuneration. The significant positive influence of family ownership on the executive 
remuneration may signal the expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling 
family shareholders. Type II agency conflict is evident in listed family companies in 
Malaysia. 
 
Despite the limitations, this study contributes to the remuneration debate by providing 
empirical evidence to the Malaysian policy makers and regulators on the explanatory 
factors of executive remuneration in Malaysian listed family companies. It also depicts 
the need for continued research for enhancing the insights into executive remuneration of 
Malaysian listed family companies and other jurisdictions in Asian context.  
 
From the global financial crisis to rampant corporate scandals involving the top executives 
and management, the importance of transparency and accountability in a corporate 
governance framework can be clearly highlighted. There is a relevant quote by Robert Ian 
Tricker, the father of corporate governance regarded by Sir Adrian Cadbury who is the 
author of the UK Corporate Governance Code: 
 
‘If management is about running the business, 
governance is about seeing that it is run properly.’ 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1.1 Percentages of listed family companies of each Western European 
country  
 














Source: Faccio and Lang (2002), based on 20% equity as the cut-off point 
  
Appendix 1.2 Percentages of listed family companies of each East Asian country  
 
Country % of listed family companies 
in 1996 
% of listed family companies 
in 2008 
Indonesia 71.5% 50.0% 
Malaysia 67.2% 44.7% 
Hong Kong 66.7% 55.1% 
Thailand 61.6% 33.3% 
Singapore 55.4% 51.9% 
Korea 48.4% 35.8% 
Taiwan 48.2% 4.7% 
Philippines 44.6% 76.5% 
Japan 9.7% 6.0% 
Source: Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Carney and Child (2013), based on 
20% equity as the cut-off point 
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Appendix 2.1: Four Founding Organisations of Minority Shareholder Watchdog 
Group 
1. National Equity Corporation – PNB  (Permodalan Nasional Berhad) 
The PNB is established on 17 March 1978 as one of the instruments of the New Economic 
Policy to help rectify the economic imbalance in the Malaysian society. It has emerged as 
the country's premier investment institution, with a diversified portfolio of interests that 
include unit trusts, institutional property trusts, property management and asset 
management. Its investment products include the Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN), 
Amanah Saham Malaysia (ASM), Amanah Saham Gemilang (ASG), Amanah Saham 
Bumiputra (ASB), Amanah Saham Didik (ASD), and Amanah Saham 1Malaysia. PNB 
acts as the catalyst to the development and growth of the domestic unit trust and fund 
management industry. PNB maintains its position as the industry leader with units in 
circulation of its unit trust products (ASNB & AMB) amounted to more than 155 billion 
units, representing a market share of about 42% in 2012 (Permodalan Nasional Berhad 
2012). While managing total funds of more than RM255 billion, the PNB has invested in 
more than 200 companies in Malaysia involved in various key economic sectors. In order 
to protect the investment of unit holders, the PNB continuously monitors the investee 
companies via in depth analysis and proactive engagement with the management and 
board of directors of these investee companies (Permodalan Nasional Berhad 2016). 
 
2. Social Security Organisation – SOCSO (Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial) 
The SOCSO is established in 1971 under the Human Resources Ministry to ensure and 
guarantee the timely and adequate provision of benefits in a socially just manner, and to 
promote occupational health and safety. In 2014, the SOCSO’s investment fund amounted 
to RM22.537 billion, an incremental of RM1.471 billion (or 6.98%) from RM21.066 
billion in 2013. In order to monitor the investees companies, the SOCSO attends the 
Annual General Meeting and Extra Ordinary Meetings of the investees companies and 
exercises its voting rights accordingly. SOCSO frequently participates in the seminars and 
workshops organised by the MSWG to gather information and exchange ideas. Besides, 
the SOCSO also actively cooperates with other minority shareholders to safeguard the 
common interests (Social Security Organisation 2014). 
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3. Armed Forces Fund Board – LTAT (Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera) 
The LTAT is established in August 1972 by an Act of Parliament. LTAT has two main 
objectives. The first is to provide retirement and other benefits to members of the other 
ranks in the Armed Forces (compulsory contributors) and to enable officers and mobilised 
members of the volunteer forces in the service to participate in a savings scheme. The 
second main objective is to promote socio-economic development and to provide welfare 
and other benefits for the retiring and retired personnel of the Armed Forces of Malaysia. 
As at 31 December 2014, LTAT’s total investments amounted to RM8.3 billion, 7.8% 
increased from RM7.7 billion in the previous year, while the investment in shares listed 
on Bursa Malaysia via its eight external portfolio managers stood at RM182.0 million 
(Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera 2014). 
 
4. Pilgrimage Board – LTH (Lembaga Tabung Haji) 
The Pilgrims Fund Corporation is established in November 1962 and commenced 
operation on September 30, 1963. The corporation later merged with Penang-based 
Pilgrimage Affairs Management Office in 1969 resulting in the formation of the 
Pilgrimage Management and Fund Board. The objectives of this entity are (i) to enable 
Muslims to save gradually to support their expenditure during pilgrimage and for other 
beneficial purposes; (ii) to enable Muslims to have active and effective participation in 
investment activities permissible in Islam through their savings; and (iii) to protect, 
safeguard interests and ensure the welfare of pilgrims during pilgrimage by providing 
various facilities and services. The name Pilgrimage Management and Fund Board has 
been changed to Pilgrimage Board effective from August 28, 1997. The role of LTH is to 
make investments in companies to provide contributors with returns on their investments. 
LTH invests in diversified portfolios that include industrial, services, plantation, and 
property investments. LTH employs subsidiaries to handle its portfolios, including TH 
Plantations Berhad, TH Properties Sdn Bhd, TH Technologies Sdn Bhd, TH Travel and 
Services Sdn Bhd, and TH Global Services Sdn Bhd. 
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Appendix 4.1: Profile of Directors 
Source: 2010 annual report of OKA Corporation Bhd 
 
Appendix 4.2: List of Substantial Shareholders 
Source: 2010 annual report of OKA Corporation Bhd 
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Appendix 4.3: Directors’ Remuneration, Statement on Corporate Governance 
 
Source: 2010 annual report of PJ Development Holdings Berhad 
 
Appendix 4.4: Domestic Institutional Ownership 
 
 
Legend: The domestic institutional investors and their respective shareholdings are highlighted in yellow. 
Source: 2010 annual report of Notion Vtec Berhad 
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Appendix 4.5: Foreign Institutional Ownership 
 
 
Legend: The foreign institutional investors and their respective shareholdings are highlighted in purple. 
Source: 2010 annual report of PJ Development Holdings Berhad 
 
Appendix 5.1: Huynh-Feldt (H-F), Greenhouse-Geisser (G-G), and Box’s 
conservative 
 
Legend: Results generated from STATA software. The p-value of year is 0.00 under H-F, G-G and Box 
tests. This validates the result of one-way repeated measures ANOVA that the increase of executive 
remuneration over the five-year period is statistically significant.  
                                                                              
                Residual     1104
                    year        4    22.28   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
                                                                              
                  Source       df      F    Regular    H-F      G-G      Box
                                                         Prob > F             
                                          Box's conservative epsilon =  0.2500
                                          Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon =  0.4086
                                          Huynh-Feldt epsilon        =  0.4107
Repeated variable: year
     Lowest b.s.e. variable:  code
                     Levels:  277       (276 df)
Between-subjects error term:  code
                   Total    3.2766e+16  1384  2.3675e+13   
                                                                              
                Residual    3.7547e+15  1104  3.4010e+12   
                          
                    year    3.0310e+14     4  7.5775e+13      22.28     0.0000
                    code    2.8709e+16   276  1.0402e+14      30.58     0.0000
                          
                   Model    2.9012e+16   280  1.0361e+14      30.47     0.0000
                                                                              
                  Source    Partial SS    df       MS           F     Prob > F
                           Root MSE      = 1.8e+06     Adj R-squared =  0.8563
                           Number of obs =    1385     R-squared     =  0.8854
. anova exrem code year, repeated (year)
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Appendix 5.2: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
EXREM FD ID IDAT IDRC DIS FIS FO BS TA LEV ROA(-1) MV 
EXREM 1 
            
FD 0.0913*** 1 
           
ID -0.0787*** -0.3374*** 1 
          
IDT 0.0415 0.0294 -0.049* 1 
         
IDRC -0.1175*** -0.0268 0.2448*** -0.1029*** 1 
        
DIS 0.1192*** -0.1409*** -0.0634** 0.1313*** -0.1148*** 1 
       
FIS 0.1714*** -0.0945*** 0.0216 0.0629** -0.0118 0.0051 1 
      
FO 0.0433 0.2299*** -0.0719*** -0.0239 0.0115 -0.3035*** -0.1514*** 1 
     
BS 0.2642*** 0.0405 -0.3846*** 0.0901*** -0.0626** 0.0401 0.1214*** 0.0412 1 
    
TA 0.6961*** 0.0856*** -0.0645** 0.1096*** -0.2183*** 0.0962*** 0.2438*** 0.0613** 0.3086*** 1 
   
LEV 0.1308*** -0.0327 -0.0057 -0.0705*** -0.0404 -0.018 -0.0959*** -0.1386*** 0.0573** 0.1592*** 1 
  
ROA(-1) 0.0935*** 0.0117 -0.0439 0.0097 -0.0457* 0.0498** 0.1071*** 0.1361*** 0.1024*** 0.0042 -0.2521*** 1 
 
MV 0.2332*** -0.0703* -0.0241 0.0305 -0.0457* 0.1358*** 0.1322*** 0.0571** 0.1255*** 0.1161*** -0.0164 0.4296*** 1 
Legend: Pearson correlation matrix shows the correlation coefficients for all the continuous explanatory and control variables and the dependent variable. ***, ** 
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Appendix 6.1: Summary of different estimators 
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chi2(15) = 21.65, p-value: 0.1173 
 
Legend: Coefficient is bold. t- statistic is italicised. p-value is in the parenthesis. Associations ***, ** and 
* denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. One-tailed probabilities are used for the tests 
of the variables since the associated hypotheses are directional. 
 
 
 
